# Neg

## Links

### AI

#### **The AI industry is fueling neocolonialism, especially targeting the Global South**

Hao 22 (Karen Hao, senior AI editor at MIT Technology Review, covering the field’s cutting-edge research and its impacts on society, April 19th 2022, “Artificial intelligence is creating a new colonial world order” Mit technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/19/1049592/artificial-intelligence-colonialism/>) – Cayden Mayer

The AI industry does not seek to capture land as the conquistadors of the Caribbean and Latin America did, but the same desire for profit drives it to expand its reach. The more users a company can acquire for its products, the more subjects it can have for its algorithms, and the more resources—data—it can harvest from their activities, their movements, and even their bodies. Neither does the industry still exploit labor through mass-scale slavery, which necessitated the propagation of racist beliefs that dehumanized entire populations. But it has developed new ways of exploiting cheap and precarious labor, often in the Global South, shaped by implicit ideas that such populations don’t need—or are less deserving of—livable wages and economic stability. MIT Technology Review's new AI Colonialism series digs into these and other parallels between AI development and the colonial past by examining communities that have been profoundly changed by the technology. In part one, we head to South Africa, where AI surveillance tools, built on the extraction of people’s behaviors and faces, are re-entrenching racial hierarchies and fueling a digital apartheid. In part two, we head to Venezuela, where AI data-labeling firms found cheap and desperate workers amid a devastating economic crisis, creating a new model of labor exploitation. The series also looks at ways to move away from these dynamics. In part three, we visit ride-hailing drivers in Indonesia who, by building power through community, are learning to resist algorithmic control and fragmentation. In part four, we end in Aotearoa, the Māori name for New Zealand, where an Indigenous couple are wresting back control of their community’s data to revitalize its language. Together, the stories reveal how AI is impoverishing the communities and countries that don’t have a say in its development—the same communities and countries already impoverished by former colonial empires. They also suggest how AI could be so much more—a way for the historically dispossessed to reassert their culture, their voice, and their right to determine their own future.

#### The 1AC’s shift towards artificial intelligence is a tool of military domination that fuels an endless cycle of warfare

**Shaw ’17** (Ian G.R. Shaw, Associate Professor of Global Security Challenges at the School of Politics and International Studies, previous Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences of the University of Glasgow; 9/31/17, “Robot Wars: US Empire and geopolitics in the robotic age”, Sage Journals, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617713157> DOA 6/24/22)//nm

The robotic revolution Robots have disrupted the social and economic spaces of human coexistence for decades. In 1961, General Motors installed the first industrial robotic arm – Unimate – on its assembly lines in New Jersey. Since then, robots have migrated from factories to the social spaces of everyday life. According to one report, there are over 8.4 million robots globally, with a market value in excess of $15 billion (Kadtke and Wells, 2014: 43). And with the exponential leaps in microprocessing power predicted by Moore’s Law, we now stand on the verge of a ‘Cambrian’ explosion of robotic life on planet earth. This has big consequences for the spaces of security and violence. On the ground, in the air, and underwater, military robots are eroding the human monopoly on violence. ‘Today, the world is approaching a robotics revolution in military affairs that may be on par with the introduction of gun-powder, levée en masse, and the advent of nuclear weapons’ (Sukman, 2015: 44). The coming decades will see US soldiers augmented, replaced, and wounded by artificial warriors, which ‘has the potential to change our basic core concepts of defense strategy’ (Work and Brimley, 2014: 6). Yet the robotic revolution must be placed within a longer trajectory of capital-intensive warfare (see Edgerton, 1991). This liberal form of violence aims to use technological superiority to ‘solve’ the problem of ‘uncivilized’ states and actors (Mabee, 2016). Accordingly, the US military continues to project peace through capital, security through technics. In 2014, the USA accounted for just over half of global arms sales in a $70 billion annual industry (Theohary, 2015). Still, robots are disrupting the architectures of capital-intensive warfare. The future-oriented 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age sheds light on the US military’s production of robotic geopolitical futures. Co-authored by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work, it insists that ‘U.S. defense leaders should begin to prepare … for war in the Robotic Age’ (Work and Brimley, 2014: 5). A similar report by the Pentagon-funded National Defense University explores how evolutions in synthetic life, robotics, and artificial intelligence will transform US dominance (Kadtke and Wells, 2014). At the outset of the invasion of Iraq, the US military had zero ground robots. By the end of 2008, there were 12,000, including iRobot’s PackBot, which was integral to counter–improvised explosive device (IED) missions. Aerial robots continue to disrupt the spaces, subjects, and geopolitics of US conflict (Shaw, 2016). Indeed, what Kate Kindervater (2016) calls ‘lethal surveillance’ has transformed US geopolitics. The Pentagon now stocks a fleet of well over 12,000 aerial drones (US Department of Defense, 2013). Controversially, medium-altitude Predator and Reaper drones have been deployed outside of ‘hot’ battlefields in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (Shaw and Akhter, 2012). And on a smaller scale, the US Army is researching how to equip its soldiers with tiny pocket-sized drones for ‘over the hill’ surveillance, which could revolutionize infantry tactics. Within the USA, Predators and Reapers are routinely flown by US Customs and Border Patrol along the Mexico and Canadian borderlands. And back on the ground, $55 million has been spent on transferring 1000 military ground robots to police forces across 43 US states (Center for the Study of the Drone, 2016). On 7 July 2016, Dallas Police Department became the first to use an exploding robot to kill an armed suspect. A robot red-letter day. How, then, can we piece together these developments? Former secretary of defense Chuck Hagel unveiled the Defense Innovation Initiative, also known as the ‘third offset strategy’, on 15 November 2014. Underpinned by robotics, cyber warfare, autonomy, 3D printing, electric weapons, miniaturization, and the internet of things, this strategy is designed to sustain US technological dominance in the 21st century. The ‘third offset’ follows precedents in the Cold War. To offset Soviet numerical advantages in the 1950s, the US military invested heavily in nuclear weapons. The second offset strategy of the 1970s was driven by stealth, the Global Positioning System (GPS), and network-centric systems. In both cases, technology was translated into US military dominance. Yet, unlike in the Cold War, the robotic revolution today is sweeping across multiple nations (and non-state actors), not just the US and Soviet militaryindustrial complexes. Thus, US empire confronts a robotizing warscape that is both global and unpredictable. US empire: Towards a proxy army of robots In the preface to the 2015 National Security Strategy, US President Barack Obama declared, ‘We possess a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivalled in human history’ (White House, 2015). Rarely, however, is ‘empire’ used in official parlance. Yet, as Mabee (2004: 1360) suggests, ‘while “lonely superpower”, “unipolar”, and other monikers have been utilized, the US as empire seems to convey a richer understanding and a deeper resonance of America’s contemporary role’. But what exactly is empire? ‘Empires are usually states’, replies Zielonka (2012: 519), ‘but they are states of a peculiar nature.’ Can a statecentric understanding capture the global infrastructures of US military power? For Dalby (2005: 435), ‘If empire is to be of analytical use, it seems that none of the versions of it in circulation are quite adequate to grapple with nuances of the present.’ Accordingly, the concept of empire must connect the geographies of contemporary technics with past materializations. As Parker (2010: 128) concludes, ‘for all its differences from nineteenth- and twentieth-century examples, the geopolitics of empires is likely to be found in the present and in the future’. US history is inscribed by imperialism. For Munro (2014: 1567), ‘continuing to think of US history in imperial terms enables us to see how the present arrives already fundamentally shaped by past economic disparity, racial inequality, hetero-patriarchal oppression and a deep interrelation between the realms of foreign and domestic’. Accordingly, Heumann (2011) argues that the USA has always been an empire-state rather than a nation-state, inheriting the precedents of European empires. Practices of racial domination and expansionism underwrote US state formation and early capitalism, leaving a legacy of segregation. Fast forward to the 19th century, and the so-called Monroe Doctrine of 1823 articulated the belief that the USA was a guardian against European intervention in the ‘New World’. Under President Woodrow Wilson, this moral imperative was reworked into an idealistic vision for spreading democracy across the planet. The grim parade of US proxy wars and black ops during the Cold War – particularly in Latin America – entrenched the idea that the USA was the guardian of western civilization. Despite this history of foreign intervention, the USA has consistently escaped the label of empire (Johnson, 2004a). This did change during the ‘war on terror’, as the Bush administration adopted ‘a new ideological commitment to empire’ (Agnew, 2003: 883). Consider the now infamous boast of White House adviser Karl Rove: ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality’ (originally quoted in Suskind, 2004). Supporters of US empire ranged from liberal interventionists to neoconservative hawks. Under both visions, ‘the US state is thus seen as an imperial state overseeing a global empire which brings benefits to both other Western states and also the inhabitants of war-torn states’ (Stokes, 2005: 219). Or, as Michael Ignatieff (2003) declared, ‘The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known.’ Others find the idea of US empire implausible in an era of global capital (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 384). Empire is viewed instead as a deterritorialized form of capitalist world sovereignty. Yet globalization should not imply a flat and frictionless world of capital. The USA has long been the leader of an uneven world capitalism since the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. Accordingly, ‘there is a geography of globalisation: one that rests on an imperial centre’ (Mabee, 2004: 1360). Thus, while capitalist logics are vital in explaining geopolitics, so too are the planetary materialities of US empire. Empires entrench their power through technics. No human sovereign is as awe-inspiring as the technical background that secures humanity across the planet. The question then becomes, how will US empire materialize – and maintain – its dominance in an age of global robotics, technological diffusion, and powerful non-state actors? If the third offset strategy is an indication, US empire will reconstitute by shifting to a permanent, robotic proxy war. Since World War II, the practice of total warfare between states has diminished and proxy wars have increased (Kaldor, 2012). One of the most infamous examples in US history was the CIAfunded Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s. More recently, the Pentagon spent billions on private military contractors in Iraq. But rather than outsource military power to human contractors, US military surrogates of the future could be replaced by robots: private military contractors without flesh, risk, or vulnerability (or healthcare costs). As Mumford (2013: 43) suggests, ‘developments in communications and information technology have the potential to nullify the twentieth-century belief in “boots on the ground” as a proxy-war necessity’. An army of robots can entrench US power without humans on the ground. And, just as importantly, these artificial warriors are profitable commodities (Shaw, 2017). A robotic US empire thus advances proxy warfare – and capitalism – to its most logical conclusion.

#### The ontological condition of AI is INSEPERABLE from military domination—its autonomy establishes the basis for predicting and sustaining new warscapes

**Shaw ’17** (Ian G.R. Shaw, Associate Professor of Global Security Challenges at the School of Politics and International Studies, previous Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences of the University of Glasgow; 9/31/17, “Robot Wars: US Empire and geopolitics in the robotic age”, Sage Journals, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617713157> DOA 6/24/22)//nm

Autonomous futures Autonomy – and AI more generally – is central to the future of US geopolitics. The Defense Science Board (2016: 3) writes that the ‘ongoing rapid transition of autonomy into warfighting capabilities is vital if the U.S. is to sustain military advantage’. Unlike automation, an autonomous system possesses adaptable intelligence. This enables it to be ‘goal-directed in unpredictable environments and situations’ (US Air Force, 2016: 30). Autonomous weapons are not entirely new: since the 1980s the US Navy has installed autonomous Phalanx CIWS Gatling Guns on many of its battleships. Nonetheless, the contemporary warscape is being transformed by ‘an emerging class of robotic weapons, including drones, mobile sea mines, automated turrets, remote-controlled machine guns, as well as weaponized computer programs’ (Bolton, 2015: 41). Several autonomous drones – the US Navy’s MQ-8 Fire Scout, the UK’s Taranis drones, and the Anglo-French Unmanned Combat Air System – promise to revolutionize air combat. Fearing this geopolitical pathway, 1000 leading scientists called for a ban on autonomous robotics in 2015, citing the existential risks to humanity. Similarly, Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Clinic (2016) continue to demand the prohibition of what they term ‘killer robots’. The US military regularly produces roadmaps that imagine autonomous futures: from robots extracting causalities to swarms of drones overwhelming enemies. ‘Autonomy in unmanned systems will be critical to future conflicts that will be fought and won with technology’ (US Department of Defense, 2013: 67). Multiple reasons are given to justify the Pentagon’s quest for autonomy: future threats will be too complex for human reactions, autonomous robots can function if they lose radio contact, and using pilots to oversee multiple robots is more cost-effective. Finally, autonomous systems can analyze huge streams of real-time data ‘in ways that humans cannot by addressing volume, complexity, speed, and continuity’ (Defense Science Board, 2016: 47). Autonomy thus enables robots ‘to make and execute complex decisions’ (US Army, 2010: 65). Future pilots would direct swarms of intelligent drones with a geographic information system (GIS) program: on the loop but not in the loop. ‘The end result would be a revolution in the roles of humans in air warfare’ (US Air Force, 2009: 50). This standard of AI enables future drones to break with the restrictions of existing unmanned systems. ‘Future [unmanned aircraft] will evolve from being robots operated at a distance to independent robots, able to self-actualize to perform a given task’ (US Department of Defense, 2005: 52). This self-actualization enables the evolution from autonomous targeting to the more controversial step of autonomous attacking (US Department of Defense, 2007: 54). Yet, while the US military is a world leader in robotics today, it will face future ‘unknown unknowns’ from other militaries and non-state groups. For example, there is growing concern within the Pentagon that US soldiers are now vulnerable to (swarms of) terrorist drones on the battlefield. Accordingly, the drone-on-drone warfare of the future will produce highly contested airspaces, fueling a robot arms race of offensive and defensive systems. Autonomy, however, is more than just artificial intelligence: it is an ontological condition. Robots, like all technologies, materialize unique techno-geographies and techno-politics (Hecht, 2011). Rather than being slavish instruments of human minds, robots are geopolitical actors that disrupt and reinvent the worldly conditions of state power, installing ontological coordinates – predictable and unpredictable – for future military violence. The epistemological problem of if, or how, we go to war is inseparable from background material conditions. Drones, for example, continue to transform the ethics of targeted killing (see Walters, 2014). ‘Drones enable the (de)politicization of targets by abstracting human life into a techno-political entity that can be captured in clinical terms as data’ (Schwarz, 2016: 61). So, while robots do not straightforwardly determine military operations, they nonetheless recondition their field of possibilities. ‘Robots, then, may not only make it easier to start a war … they may actually change our military and political doctrines and activities’ (Coeckelbergh, 2011: 271). In short, robots always already possess a degree of ontological autonomy because they reconfigure the conditions of a more-than-human warscape.

#### **New harvesting of data in the global south perpetuates the old colonial structures**

Adams and Alvarado ’22 (Kimberly Adams, correspondent with Marketplace Tech covering the intersection between politics and the economy, with a special focus on how federal policy affects the bottom line for businesses and individuals. Jesus Alvarado, Assistant Producer at Marketplace by APM, May 10th 2022, “Will the future of AI repeat past injustices?” Marketplace, https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/will-the-future-of-ai-repeat-past-injustices/)

Artificial intelligence has changed our world in major ways: autonomous vehicles, speech-recognition technology and algorithms that change what we see and hear on social media platforms. But the technology and the data fueling AI is often powered by low-paid workers in developing countries, including many nations in the Global South. Some academics describes this as AI colonialism, suggesting that what goes into artificial intelligence is repeating exploitative colonial history. I spoke with journalist Karen Hao, who recently published a series on AI colonialism in MIT Technology Review. The following is an edited transcript of our conversation. Karen Hao: With artificial intelligence, what we now have is these really wealthy companies that have become the empires of people’s data, of computational resources. And they are going to other communities that don’t have the same financial resources, computational resources, taking their data, their precious voices, or their faces, or their body movements and then turning that into software that powers, essentially, our internet. Kimberly Adams: You write about how deep-learning AI techniques rely on “ghost work.” Can you explain what that is? Hao: One of the more famous ghost work examples is content moderation. There are actually thousands and tens of thousands of people that are labeling videos and saying “this has violence, this has nudity, this has some other inappropriate content.” So that’s what ghost work is, it’s like this entire economy of people, primarily in the Global South, that do work to make sure people in the Global North have a clean, efficient internet experience. Adams: Is this a legacy of colonialism, or a new kind of colonialism? Hao: I think it’s both. There’s a sort of path dependence that we now have, where because of our global history there are certain populations that now are sort of predisposed to do certain kinds of work in this AI development pipeline. But then we’re also seeing this history be codified into artificial intelligence, because these AI algorithms, when they learn on data, what they’re really doing is they’re learning on historical data. It’s essentially bringing our past into the future with us. Adams: Your series focuses on the Global South. Can you give a few examples of how this is showing up there? Hao: In the first story, we go to South Africa, and we look at the surveillance industry there, specifically AI surveillance technologies, so technologies that are built on the extraction of people’s movements and people’s faces to then reidentify them, to track them. South Africa, obviously, has this really awful history of apartheid. But what is also happening is it’s now sort of perpetuating a digital apartheid of sorts, because the people that are able to buy these surveillance technologies — because South Africa has a very privatized surveillance industry — are the people that traditionally have wealth. And so it’s predominantly white people. And then the people who are surveilled, and don’t have the wealth to actually object to this kind of surveillance, are the people who didn’t have wealth before — they’re predominantly Black. So we look at stories like this all around the world, where different phenomenons are playing out, where both the local population is subjected to something because of the dispossession that they had globally with former colonizers suppressing their economic development, and therefore leaving them at the bottom of the food chain, and also potentially perpetuating the hierarchy within the countries as well, because of these dynamics that play out. Adams: How much awareness do you think there is of this dynamic among the general population? Hao: I don’t think there’s even an awareness among artificial intelligence researchers, to be honest. With this series, what I was trying to do was really expand the surface of the conversation: Why does AI not fundamentally work for everyone? And only by identifying really the root of the issue, can we then eradicate it and actually reimagine an AI that does work for everyone. Adams: Who would be the major players involved in shifting the balance, or perhaps that are already involved in perpetuating the system? Hao: I think, in shifting the balance, really everyone can be involved. But the heavyweight AI players that are the ones that entrench these systems currently — those are the big tech companies, and all of the companies that support them. The smaller tech companies as well, they’re all sort of engaged in this stuff: Instacart, Uber, Lyft, the entire ecosystem of companies that use any form of algorithms and automation to increase the efficiency and convenience for people in the Global North. They are definitely part and parcel of this broader colonial dynamic that’s happening. And so to shift it, it really requires not just people within these companies to actually push and pressure their leadership, it also requires civil society to push and pressure regulators to introduce regulation. It requires international coordination, too. In my second story, when I talk about Venezuela and the fact that a lot of Venezuelans are now being caught up in this ghost work labor, a researcher said to me: “It doesn’t really matter if Venezuelans rise up and try to resist this, because then the company is just going to move to the next poor population.” And so there has to be sort of an international consortium of, not just tech employees, regulators and civil society organizations all have to coordinate as well, to figure out what are the norms that we should be establishing internationally to make sure that these technologies are more humane.

#### Data colonialism prevents the Global South rom accessing their own resources, deepening the economic and technical divide

Lmi ’20 ( Nima Elmi, head of government affairs at the World Economic Forum, November 11th 2020, “Is Big Tech Setting Africa Back?” Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/11/is-big-tech-setting-africa-back/>)

Technology transcends national borders, so it shouldn’t be surprising that, in 2020, private technology and telecommunication companies control more data on the average person than governments do. And it’s not just data ownership: Policymakers similarly fall behind in understanding the power of data. That’s a problem, particularly as social media platforms are able to influence political outcomes with few to no repercussions and geopolitics becomes a duopoly of technological trailblazers like the United States and China, with the rest of the world looking on as spectators—and reluctant participants. The coronavirus pandemic has moved many people’s lives online and demonstrated the revolutionary power of technology in driving economic growth despite physical stasis—whether in e-commerce, continuing employment for those able to work digitally, or virtual schooling. This dramatic shift wouldn’t have been possible without artificial intelligence (AI) embedded within now-essential services like Alexa, Siri, and Zoom. Artificial intelligence is usually talked about in sensationalist terms. But hyperbolic language can mask simple business truths: AI capabilities—understanding everything from shopping habits to future careers or propensity for criminality—will only ever be as good as the datasets that feed them and, without diverse data sets, the ability to innovate and enhance existing AI functionalities is limited. The de facto U.S.-China AI duopoly doesn’t accurately represent the cross-cutting, global consumer bases tech companies serve; for the game to go on, spectators need to pitch in—lest they lose their pastime. It is against this backdrop—a thirst for new data to keep the AI engine chugging—that colonialism has morphed into its latest form: data colonialism. Data colonialism is driven by the control of data as a proxy for the control of people and is quickly becoming the reality faced by many emerging economies today. Far from decolonized, these countries are subject to the whims of Big Tech’s unfettered rise; vulnerable peoples’ data is used to enhance companies’ innovations, entrench their economic and political might, and, in effect, occupy the daily lives of billions of people. Data extraction, monopolization, and monetization are data colonialism’s core tenets. Africa is ground zero for data colonialism. It is the continent with the largest number of countries; most cultural, linguistic and racial diversity; least connected nations; and its data protection regulations range from limited to nonexistent. Africa has always been a continent rich in natural resources, and, today, the diversity of the continent’s population renders it equally rich in data resources. But Big Tech’s exploitation of this diversity—heralded under the guise of internet-for-all initiatives—actually undermines the data sovereignty of African nations and impedes their ability to develop their own digital economies. That’s hardly a tide that lifts all boats. In 2017, data overtook oil to become the world’s most valuable commodity, but it remains hard to define. At its most basic level, data is us—humans—in digital form: how we look; the languages we speak; our viewing preferences, medical records, voices, learning habits, and music preferences. For AI, all data is valuable fodder—enhancing algorithms’ capabilities and generating revenue for the companies that collect it. When it comes to obtaining this data, the latest figures from the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development highlight just how vulnerable Africa is in comparison to its European counterparts. In Europe, 96 percent of countries currently have data protection laws in place—versus only 50 percent in Africa. Globally, only 43 percent of the U.N.’s designated Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have such laws; 33 out of the 47 LDCs are in Africa. As well as the unrivaled, diverse datasets that Africa offers tech companies, the continent’s relative absence of data protection policies—and a limited understanding of how valuable and influential data can be—is a central causal factor behind its vulnerability to data colonialism. There are myriad reasons for this vacuum in regulation on the continent, including a general lack of capacity, conflicting priorities, and political instability. Data colonialism is at times conflated with humanitarian efforts—after all, who can object to expanding digital access, which nearly all agree is crucial for economic growth? But corporations’ support for emerging economies may be a double-edged sword, as data extraction undermines African nations’ abilities to develop indigenous digital economies that can enhance their own capabilities. It’s farcical to assume corporations’ forays in Africa are chiefly compelled by goodwill: Corporations are ultimately accountable to their shareholders and driven by their bottom lines. That comes at a cost, of which Africa bears the brunt. Both Chinese and U.S. tech giants adopt a humanitarian framing in marketing digital infrastructure projects, but approach the ulterior motive of data extraction differently. Chinese corporations leverage political initiatives like Beijing’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative to secure contracts with African governments, whereby AI and other technology solutions are provided in exchange for access to local citizens’ data—like the deal between CloudWalk, a Chinese developer of facial recognition software, and the Zimbabwean government. Firms are relatively transparent about their goals, with little to no checks or accountability on how the information they receive will be used. Western corporations, by contrast, adopt a more covert approach, establishing digital hubs and offering free internet access. These include Google’s Internet Balloons and Facebook’s Undersea Cable, which encourage more Africans to get online, use their services, and, by convenient coincidence, relinquish their data in the process.

### Biotechnology

#### The 1AC’s new biotech is merely a rearrangement of US domination—the drive for metaphysical innovations are justified by fears of the uncertain states which must be controlled by the technologically developed US empire

**Jasanoff ’06** (Sheila Jasanoff, Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School, has authored more than 130 articles and chapters, founded and directs the security technology and sciences Program at Harvard, served on the AAAS Board of Directors and as President of the Society for Social Studies of Science, holds AB, JD, and PhD degrees from Harvard, and honorary doctorates from the Universities of Twente and Liège; 2006, “Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and Science”, JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507145?seq=1> DOA 6/25/22)//nm

PLANTS FOR THE PLANET: THE EMPIRES OF BIOTECHNOLOGY Apart from occasional radical social misfits such as the so-called Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski,43 few any longer question the vital role of science and technology in human development. Even opponents of particular technological projects—large dams,44 for example, or genetically modified (GM) foods45—rarely dismiss technology outright; rather they favor smaller, more transparent, or more locally governable technological systems. The question that preoccupies students of science and technology, then, is not whether, but how, to integrate innovation into people’s lives so as to make a positive difference. Years of research in the social psychology of risk perception46 and public understanding of science47 have established that popular fear or rejection of new technology often rests, at bottom, on an uneasiness about the ways in which technology is managed or, more accurately, governed. What do these observations imply for an industry with global ambitions, like agricultural biotechnology? How, more specifically, does biotechnology contribute to ways of political worldmaking beyond the nation-state, and what implications do the engagements between biotechnology and global politics have for democratic governance? In reaching for answers, it is useful to think of biotechnology operating politically in several different registers. It is, of course, most plainly a material technology: it makes new instruments for warding off harm and disorder, such as plants that resist insects, weeds, or drought, and it redesigns pieces of nature, such as genes, to perform new tasks in new environments. In this respect, biotechnology is, concurrently, a metaphysical device; it brings new entities into the world and through that process reorders our sense of rightness in both nature and society.48 At the same time, biotechnology is a discourse: to some, of progress and improvement, beneficence and utility; to others, of risk, invasiveness, and domination from afar. Proponents of agricultural biotechnology tell particular stories about a world in which plant genetic modification is possible, and these stories carry political and cultural weight. Lastly, biotechnology is an institution of governance; it shapes forms of social life by influencing how people choose to, or are able to, live with the products of bio-industry. Each of these registers, as we see below, has been activated in the global politics of biotechnology. The Resisting Multitude In May 2004, a scientific journal reported that German researchers were keeping secret the locations of some thirty sites planted with GM corn for fear that anti-GM activists would destroy the crops, as they previously had elsewhere in Germany.49 Failure to disclose these locations was contrary to the EU Directive 2001/18, which requires GM crop sites to be publicly registered. Noncompliance with European law in traditionally law-abiding Germany may have been newsworthy, but the threat to GM crops was anything but novel. From the late 1990s onward, attacks on field trial sites began evolving into a form of international protest that seemed to epitomize Hardt and Negri’s thesis about an emerging, assertive, global multitude: in Britain, hundreds of demonstrators dressed in decontamination suits uprooted GM plants in test fields in 1999; in India and Brazil, farmers’ unions organized similar protests; in France, José Bové, the charismatic head of the radical Confédération Paysanne (Peasant Confederation), became a folk hero by orchestrating the destruction of thousands of GM plants, as well as a partially built McDonald’s outlet, in 1999. His subsequent trial, fine, and terms of imprisonment left him and his supporters undaunted, indeed ready to resume battle as much as five years after their initial transgressions. Field trial sites were not the only theater of protest against GM agriculture. Antiglobalization activists early identified biotechnology as a symbol of the environmental, economic, and cultural homogenization they wished to resist. Demonstrations against Monsanto and GM corn (or maize), together with evocations of risks to nontarget species such as the monarch butterfly, were part of the repertoire of street protest during the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999. In this and similar episodes, representatives of a loosely networked global citizenry asserted their right to debate technological futures in terms other than those conventionally used by nation-states and their expert advisers: the formal discourses of law, molecular biology, economics, risk assessment, and bioethics. At stake was who had power to determine how much global harmonization there should be and which scientific, technological, and economic innovations should be allowed to diffuse throughout the world. Those opting for more local, bottom-up visions won a salient victory when Monsanto decided, under rising public pressure, to withdraw its plans to develop sterile seed technology, through use of the so-called Terminator gene;50 later, citing a drop in global demand, the company also announced that it would put on hold its plans to market genetically modified Roundup Ready wheat.51 Ideology and Enforcement Not everyone saw the antiglobalization movement as the promising vanguard of planetary resistance against an outmoded, corporate-dominated, neoliberal world order. Using the classical ordering machinery of science and the law, proponents of agricultural biotechnology sought to promote their visions of social and technological progress, stifling opposition and dissent. At the February 2000 annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond, Republican from Missouri, Monsanto’s home state, was openly dismissive of the Seattle protest. He represented it as a struggle between scientific expertise and the misguided, if exuberant, ignorance of youth: “The scientific debate is not being controlled by Ph.D.s but apparently by young people with a proclivity for street theater. . . . It’s coming to the point that scientists are going to have to get dressed up as corncobs to get the attention of the media.”52 At the same meeting, Madeleine Albright, President Clinton’s secretary of state, also cast the conflict as one between reason and unreason. “But science,” she said, “does not support the ‘Frankenfood’ fears of some, particularly outside the United States, that biotech foods or other products will harm human health.”53 Both speakers, from different political parties, enlisted science as their ally in defending biotechnology against its critics. This invocation of scientific authority in support of technological innovation is a marker of America’s commitment to a particular ideology of technoscientific progress.54 A look across the ocean at contemporaneous UK debates on biotechnology helps bring into relief the ideological dimensions of the American position. The term “Frankenfood” was widely used in the British tabloid press to reflect and, some said, reinforce public anxieties. But concerns were not restricted to the media and the ignorant public. The British scientific community had all along expressed greater uncertainty about the safety of GM crops than its American counterpart, particularly with respect to the environmental consequences of commercial use.55 These doubts led British experts to reject the official U.S. position that the process of genetic modification carries no special risks; all that matters for regulatory purposes is the end product. Scientific and public opinion in Britain united behind a more cautious approach, demanding more experimentation—for example, through farm-scale trials56— before authorizing the commercialization of GM crops. As doubts intensified, Tony Blair’s government decided on a highly unusual three-pronged review of the science, economics, and public acceptability of these products to reevaluate the case for their introduction.57 The immediate outcome of this process was a decision to approve the commercialization of only one variety of GM corn, at least to start. Thus, while American neoliberalism treated biotechnology as just another stream of products, adequately controlled by the market except for assessments of their safety to human health and the environment, Britain’s more cautious and communitarian political culture granted the public some say in deciding which products they wanted to allow into the market. Whereas consultative procedures such as Britain’s GM debate and referenda in countries such as Denmark and Switzerland sought to defuse public opposition, elsewhere legal sanctions were employed to beat down what biotechnology promoters saw as unacceptable acts of intransigence. Thus, demonstrators such as José Bové who destroyed GM crops were prosecuted for damaging property in several countries. At the international level, the United States brought a case against the EU at the WTO for imposing an allegedly illegal moratorium on the importation of GM crops and foods. Foundational to the U.S. case was the argument that there were no good scientific reasons for keeping these products off the European market, and that the moratorium therefore amounted to illegal protectionism.58 Intellectual property law, too, has been invoked in safeguarding the investments made by multinationals such as Monsanto in GM crops. Particularly interesting were the prosecutions brought against farmers in the United States and Canada who were found to be growing GM crops patented by Monsanto without a license. In the best known of these cases, a seventy-three-year-old Saskatchewan farmer named Percy Schmeiser was sued for growing genetically modified Roundup Ready canola, which he claimed had blown into his fields from neighboring farms. A 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld Monsanto’s patent infringement claim, saying that Schmeiser’s unlicensed use of seed containing Monsanto’s patented gene was sufficient to constitute infringement.59 In a Solomonic turn, though, the Court awarded no damages to Monsanto, on the ground that Schmeiser had not benefited economically from his unlawful act; equally, Schmeiser was not required to pay Monsanto’s court costs. The case warned GM crop producers that, under Canadian law, they would have a difficult time collecting damages for patent infringement; at the same time, they could be subject to potentially unlimited liability if their seeds accidentally contaminated, and thus damaged, the products of certified GM-free organic farms.

#### Biotechnology only works to reaffirm the power of commodities over individuals- it’s use to implement control over other countries as the ideology of imperialism is instead presented as a question of science and objectivity

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Legibility Advertisements for agricultural biotechnology frequently show fields of grain laid out in neat parallel lines, illustrating both the fertility and the increased control that genetic modification can allegedly deliver. One could hardly find more compelling images of the “legibility” described by Scott. Intrusive weeds, barren patches, unruly growth have all been eliminated in favor of healthy, predictable, quantifiable yields— achieved through the precision of genetic control. However, just as the midcentury grand planners’ dreams of legibility were achieved at a cost, so legibility in modern GM agriculture demands unseen labors of standardization, and consequent elimination of ambiguity, to achieve its surface regularity. Four dimensions of standardization are worth noting: ontologies, epistemologies, socio-ecologies, and forms of life. All four maintain traditional relations of power between center and periphery, and all can be illustrated through the case of “golden rice,” the poster crop for a new generation of nutrient-enriched GM crops to feed the developing world.60 The name was given to a strain of rice bioengineered to produce beta-carotene, which colors the grain a pale gold; when ingested, it converts to vitamin A in the body and protects consumers against vitamin deficiency leading to possible blindness. For the products of GM agriculture to locate themselves securely in global markets, there has to be broad agreement on what these entities actually are. This ontological question may seem straightforward at first—proponents of golden rice, for instance, claim that it is nothing more than a more nutritious plant variety—but food crops straddle too many categorical boundaries for their identity in the political domain to be anything but hybrid. There are, to begin with, regulatory classifications. Should a crop engineered to produce ingredients of medicinal value be considered a food or a drug? Even if such issues can be settled by formal administrative definitions, the North-South debate surrounding GM crops shows how difficult it is to achieve ontological closure around a commodity that is at once a natural kind (a plant with specific genes and traits) and a social kind (a product of particular economic and political orderings, and a potential reorganizer of society).61 How one should know the properties of GM crops is similarly open to question. U.S. authorities have insisted that the only proper basis on which to evaluate the impacts of these novel entities is through science-based risk assessment. Yet, as the dispute between the United States and Europe at the WTO graphically illustrates, vast disagreements persist about the epistemological status of risk assessment. Is it a “science” at all, in the sense of being a well-demarcated, uncontroversial, paradigmatic (in a Kuhnian sense) method of representing the world; or is it instead a patently political and culturally constructed instrument for managing the uncertainties that inevitably accompany large projects of reconfiguring nature or society?62 To accept producers’ contention that crops such as golden rice are “safe,” one has to buy the former, not the latter, characterization. If, however, risk assessment is an expression of political culture by other means, then one should not be surprised if that form of analysis does not travel friction-free across political and cultural boundaries.63 GM crops are developed in the laboratory, usually in science-rich Western nations, tested in the field, and transported thence for commercial propagation in both naturally and socially variable environments. Monsanto, in this respect, is like the Kew Gardens of the nineteenth century: a metropolitan “center of calculation”64 from which standardized products flow out to take root in the world’s economic and political peripheries. Key to sustaining this mode of production is the assumption that socioecologies are as standard as the crops grown within them—put differently, that social and ecological circumstances at the periphery are not so radically different from those at the metropolitan center as to defeat the project of global technology transfer. Yet accidents occurring even within the boundaries of single nation-states show that transfers from the laboratory to the field can bring unpleasant surprises. For example, in one costly U.S. episode, ProdiGene, a GM corn variety containing an insulin precursor, trypsin,65 was planted in an unmarked field in rural Iowa. The manufacturer agreed with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which approved the field trials, that the field would be quarantined the following year so as to remove any volunteer plants.66 In fact, the fields were not properly isolated and an undetermined quantity of the GM crop was harvested along with about 500,000 bushels of soybeans during the following season. Similar failures resulting from unforeseen couplings of technology, environment, and human behavior are all the more probable when transfers occur across disparate cultures of farming and of hazard control. Expanding on this point, it has become clear that complex technological systems are forms of life, uniting human and nonhuman components in a common purposive framework, as much as they are targeted attempts to improve upon aspects of human life by physical or biological means. Thus, transportation systems do not only move people about from place to place. They remake social structures and self-understandings. A car culture, for example, gives rise to different visions, and valuations, of time, distance, autonomy, community, environmental quality, and the cost of life than a culture dependent chiefly on bicycles or public transportation does. Similarly, industrial agriculture is organized and managed on different principles from small family farms; the two systems of production rest on different economic, social, and technological infrastructures, and their impacts on human solidarity and on the environment are correspondingly divergent. Conventional risk assessment methods take little or no account of the social and ethical ramifications of technological systems, including the threats they pose to long-settled patterns of living. This blindness to technology’s disruption of established forms of life, underwritten by the allegedly scientific power of risk assessment, has fueled much of the criticism of agricultural biotechnology in the global South.67 Identity and Community Empires, no less than nation-states, engender and depend on feelings of belonging. Devices for producing imperial imagined communities have included, besides the grand, polarizing, ideological discourses of the cold war, mundane practices such as performing national celebrations,68 teaching a common language, training administrative and judicial élites, and building infrastructures for commerce and communication. Science and technology, we have seen, have long served as agents of imperial governmentality, helping to produce the mission consciousness and the associated forms of knowledge and skill that serve as instruments for extending power. Modern biotechnology, similarly, provides a discourse of development that continues colonial traditions, although the agents, recipients, and specific mechanisms of the development project have been partially reconfigured in modern times. The discovery of Africa as a site for biotechnological development, through the propagation of crops such as golden rice, offers perhaps the clearest illustration. In the rhetoric of development specialists, and the scientific and industrial institutions that serve them, Africa is represented through tropes of crisis and charity that render the continent’s condition as dire and the offers of scientific and technological solutions as salvationary.69 In one instructive example, Gordon Conway, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, and a colleague wrote an article in the prestigious journal Science on biotechnology’s capacity to help Africans. Though presented as scientific, the article merged the empiricist register of science with a narrative register that was little short of missionary. At the center of the discussion was a fictional African housewife, “Mrs. Namurunda,” who the authors said was not a real person but “a composite of situations existing in Africa.”70 The story begins with Mrs. Namurunda, a farmer and single mother, eking out a hard-scrabble existence on fields infested with every form of insect blight, under adverse conditions of drought and soil degradation. It ends with scientific biotechnology solving her problems, enabling her to turn a profit and secure a brighter, better educated, more enlightened future for her children. This script follows Foucault’s delineation of biopower with uncanny precision. An entire continent becomes a medicalized body, requiring urgent therapeutic intervention, both as a collective and for its individual members. The fictional person of Mrs. Namurunda, unveiled in the pages of one of the world’s leading scientific journals, becomes a symbol for Africa’s “composite” ailments. Advanced societies’ power to develop and deliver the requisite treatments offers them the right, indeed the obligation, to engage in a new mission civilisatrice—built on a biomedical ethic of cure rather than, as in earlier times, a religious model of grace. But, this time, eschewing the forceful, state-led constellations of power that undergirded colonial rule, the neoliberal state works through a lightly regulated global industry and a largely selfregulating scientific community. Their expansion into new territories carries the promise of better jobs and higher incomes back in the home country, thereby allowing the economically more powerful state to justify itself where votes are counted, in its own national community of citizens. The sick and incapacitated recipient, however, has little or no say in either the diagnosis or the treatment of the alleged pathology

### Cybersecurity

#### Calls for increased cybersecurity reinforce the power of the military industrial complex while ceding control of politics to technocratic elites

Benjamin Verdi in 2020

YPFP’s 2020 Cybersecurity & Technology Fellow, and a Global Innovation Manager with Grant Thornton International Ltd.; The Coming Cyber-Industrial Complex: A Warning For New US Administration – OpEd; Eurasia Review; https://www.eurasiareview.com/25112020-the-coming-cyber-industrial-complex-a-warning-for-new-us-administration-oped/

Sixty years ago an outgoing, conservative American president warned both his more liberal successor and his fellow citizens to guard against a worrying trend he saw emerging during his time in office. President Eisenhower’s farewell address made infamous the term “military-industrial complex” as a summation of the rapidly increasing reliance of a peacetime economy on government contracts to develop military-grade machines, weapons, and information systems. He worried that the short-term benefits brought on by increased military investment in the private economy could blind public decision-makers and American society to the perverse incentives of greater, even continuous, involvement in violent conflict. Bidding adieu, Eisenhower asserted “the technological revolution during recent decades” was “akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture.”¶ Ike’s concerns remain relevant at this moment of transition, but in a new domain. Cybersecurity – cyber “defense” – presents a seemingly obvious need in this digital age. As the need for bigger, more connected, and integrated digital systems rises, so too will the risks associated with our reliance on those globally interconnected systems. Responsible governments must develop, promote, and maintain robust capabilities and sound approaches for deploying digital weaponry to defend themselves and their citizens from malicious actors, and they must rely on the aid and leadership of the world’s most innovative companies to do so.¶ Yet we must ask ourselves what kinds of cyber creatures we are comfortable introducing into the digital ecosystem, and whether those are preferable to more traditional forms of deterrence. Fear of vulnerabilities and the risks associated with interconnected networks is understandable, but governments and industry leaders need to take a longer-term view of the implications new cyber capabilities might hold for the future digital landscape.¶ Such a sustained and steady increase in cyber defenses has led to creeping calls from leaders in government and industry for what many trendily term cyber “offense.” Eisenhower might have predicted that those shouting loudest for the advancement of cyber offensive capabilities are the same institutions that view these tools as fundamental to their operational and tactical missions, as well as their budget lines.¶ It should be clear that these short-term motivations are entirely logical, but solutions to near-term problems should not be our only guides when it comes to strategic decisions about the cyber-industrial future.¶ A truly global cyber war would be more devastating than any traditional war ever could because it would not be confined to a physical battlefield. It might literally be waged on the devices in our pockets. Encouragingly, some thought-leaders are already pushing back on the race toward cyber “offense,” or are calling for a more intentional balance between the two functions. That said, their arguments are not necessarily any more tailored to the cyber realm than those they might normally make to oppose interventionist strikes on land, air, or sea. Framing the discussion of cyber “offense” along these familiar lines loses sight of what Eisenhower called “the total influence – economic, political, even spiritual” that peacetime economic dependence on wartime machinery could hold in “every city, every state house, every office of the federal government.” And, ironically, the very desire to pivot toward increasingly diversified digital security capabilities may ultimately leave militaries with fewer tools at their disposal to handle future conflicts. Cyberwarfare may someday become the best option for ensuring national security, but it should never become the only option.¶ Lest this concern be cast as an esoteric matter of federal budgetary priorities, we should return to Eisenhower’s warning that without national attention “public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.” While eyes may roll at the thought of a five-star general and two-term president worrying about the advancement of any too-powerful elite, his worries could just as easily apply to the tools of cyberwarfare as to guns and bombs.¶ While Eisenhower forcefully noted the necessity of military-funded innovation, he also reminded us of the correct order of operations for policy making. We ought to build the tools we want to ensure the security we need, not settle for the best security policy for which our tools allow.¶ Geopolitical strategy aside, the biggest problem with the enthusiasm for cyber “offensive” tools to complement those on cyber “defense” is a technical one. Words like offense and defense make as much sense in cyberspace as they do describing the relationship between a plug prong and an outlet.¶ Many if not most of the world’s most devastating cyber attacks have been propagated by bad actors who used tools initially developed for defensive purposes in offensive ways. A standard “ransomware” attack, for instance, involves a bad actor (often depicted wearing a black or red hat) using a form of encryption to steal data and hold it “ransom” from its rightful owner. Encryption in this case is an “offensive” capability, but it is generally a form of “defense” in most contexts. That is, encryption is the primary way in which systems prevent data from falling into the wrong hands. Thus even the simplistic, familiar dichotomy of “offense versus defense” breaks down in cyberspace, where tools are perpetually utilized beyond their intended purposes. Indeed, the internet and computers themselves – originally military innovations – are now used to perpetrate more heinous global crimes than any other tools in existence.¶ Foraging through other traditional frameworks to formulate global strategy is similarly unrewarding. Isolationism versus interventionism, realism versus idealism, and all the other lenses through which we might consider national security, allude to, but fall short of, a clear framework for the cyber age. Without picking sides, and more to illustrate the uselessness of these outmoded spectra, a true cyber “isolationist” would need a lot of home-grown servers to simply get through the day, and a cyber “idealist” would make a most juicy target for any number of phishing or social engineering hacks and scams.¶ And yet, perhaps the best guide to governing our current acceleration of cyber capabilities is still the sage advice of a 20th century president who was born in the 19th. In the same address in which President Eisenhower cautioned against the influx of military funding into US manufacturing and academia, he also noted: “Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.”¶ If digital weaponry cannot be so easily classified into the formal categories of offensive or defensive, good or bad, then we must begin with labels like “understood,” or more simply, “accounted for.” Moreover, if cyber tools are the world’s newest weapons, then cyber talent is the world’s newest, most valuable resource. Only through the education and cultivation of prepared, informed, and responsible digital citizens will the future of cyberspace be the secure, liberated, and prosperous world so many have fought so hard to make this one.

#### Cyber threats are political tools to increase the money received by cyber companies- the result is a corrupt industry that overhypes security risks

Pascal Brangetto, and Mari Kert-Saint Aubyn in 2015

Economic Aspects of National Cyber Security Strategies; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence;

Do we see the emergence of a cyber security industrial complex? Is it comparable to the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower was warning us against during the Cold War? Should we worry? Companies providing cyber security services are making money, as there is a¶ real market worth billions of dollars. Drawing from older examples, there are¶ some real concerns that governments may not be getting what they need for¶ the money they spend. For example, the US Government spent $1 billion on HP¶ telling the Navy what it did on information architecture overhaul and system¶ integration. This is the problem of the revolving door: it is difficult to trust the¶ expertise when people are worrying more about their future job than about¶ national interest. There is also the apt aphorism about the perfect weapon (for¶ example, the case the B-1 bomber) that has 435 parts – one for each¶ congressional district. A third of billboards on the Washington subway advertise¶ defence industries, including cyber security firms.¶ The ideas of ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’ and ‘cyber war’ have been around for a while,¶ used or derided by public figures, but they are clearly serving the interests of¶ cyber security companies. For instance, the private sector is interested in the¶ hack-back capability that a company like Crowdstrike can provide. They also¶ help them deploy honeynets of their own, assist them in the intelligence¶ gathering effort in order to find out who exactly is the attacker. Endgame is¶ probably selling zero-day exploits despite statements to the contrary; there are¶ a number of countries that are buying. Another phenomenon is the porosity¶ between the policy-makers’ world and the corporate world. Everyone sits on¶ everyone’s board. For example, Richard Perle helped establish Palantir in the¶ intelligence community. While, speaking of security rackets, Tiversa is a¶ company which scans P2P networks looking for private files and subsequently¶ offer protection for these files.¶ On another note, can we really frame this issue by declaring ‘private good,¶ public bad’ – ‘innovativeness and efficiency vs. capture and waste’? There can¶ always be the argument in favour of ‘blue skies’ research that might find an¶ immediate application, but some innovations are generated by the cyber¶ security industry. However, can this be sustainable without massive investment?¶ Brand names are established and it is very hard to enter the market. There have¶ been large-scale IT transformations with mergers, and large corporations can be¶ as bad as public sector.¶ The cyber security industry is a bonanza for arms producers. In Europe,¶ traditional security companies are expanding into the cyber security market via¶ acquisitions and partnerships (e.g. BAE and Detica). States are investing in cyber¶ security and companies are making use of their long-term good relationship¶ with states. The defence market is characterised as a monopsony and oligopoly,¶ and the Iron Triangle is also at work here. Critical information infrastructures¶ are largely privately owned and states do not have the capabilities to protect¶ them.¶ The arms market and the cyber security market have several common features:¶ security is a public good; there is a need for trust between the government and¶ the companies providing security; fear is often used as a legitimation of public¶ security policies; and there is an interest in sophisticated tools for both attack¶ and defence. But there are also differences: cyber security is usually not about¶ violence; the structure and composition of the markets are drastically different;¶ and states have to work with the wider ICT industry to make their products safer¶ by design, rather than only with security companies to fix the problems.

### Data/Digital Control

#### US dominance over the digital ecosystem ushers in a new form of colonialism over the global South

Kwet, Michael 2019 [Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School PhD Candidate, Sociology, Rhodes University; Digital colonialism: US empire and the New Imperialism in the Global South; Race & Class Volume 60, No. 4 (April 2019); Yale University; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3232297;]

This paper argues that an insidious new phenomenon, digital colonialism, casts a shadow on the Global South.3 Digital colonialism is a structural form of domination exercised through the centralized ownership and control of the three core pillars of the digital ecosystem: software, hardware, and network connectivity. As we will see, control of these pillars vests the United States with immense political, economic, and social power. As such, GAFAM (Google/Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft) and other corporate giants – as well as state intelligence agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA) – are the New Imperialists in the international community. Assimilation into the tech products, models, and ideologies of foreign powers – led by the United States – constitutes a 21st century form of colonization. The present structure of the tech ecosystem is not written in the stars. There are alternative technologies, models, and ideologies for constructing a digital society aligned with human rights, democracy, and socioeconomic justice. Decentralized ownership and control of software, hardware, and the Internet are necessary prerequisites in this endeavor. Activists, technologists, and intellectuals in the global Free Software community have been at the forefront of this movement, and they have developed some of the alternative technologies that can be used today. This paper proposes a theoretical and conceptual framework for assessing digital colonialism, drawing on South Africa as a case example. In doing so, it makes three contributions to scholarship: (1) it theorizes digital colonialism as rooted in control over the digital ecosystem, (2) it provides a conceptual framework for digital domination in the Global South, and (3) it recommends practical alternatives that societies can pursue.4 Section I of this paper briefly outlines the social context in South Africa. It then highlights similarities with classic colonialism to demonstrate how imposition of the Northern digital ecosystem constitutes digital colonialism. It outlines how the United States exercises economic domination through corporate colonization, imposes imperial control through architectural domination, casts the shadow of global surveillance capitalism over the world, and is expanding imperial state surveillance. Section II proposes a theory of a freedom-respecting digital ecosystem – People’s Technology for People’s Power, or People’s Technology for short – as a necessary antidote to digital capitalism. It discusses different models of infrastructural ownership and control over software, hardware, and the Internet. By contrasting the present ecosystem to People’s Technology, it details how the United States consolidates tech hegemony through ruling class conceptions of technological progress – a doctrine of Manifest Destiny for the digital age. The paper concludes that digital colonialism threatens the Global South, and recommends solutions consistent with human rights, liberty, and equality.

#### US control of cyberspace leads to digital colonialism- the US will use data security to exploit the global South

Kwet, Michael 2019 [Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School PhD Candidate, Sociology, Rhodes University; Digital colonialism: US empire and the New Imperialism in the Global South; Race & Class Volume 60, No. 4 (April 2019); Yale University; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3232297;]

Today, a new form of corporate colonization is taking place. Instead of the conquest of land, Big Tech corporations are colonizing digital technology. The following functions are all dominated by a handful of US multinationals: search engines (Google); web browsers (Google Chrome); smartphone and tablet operating systems (Google Android, Apple iOS); desktop and laptop operating systems (Microsoft Windows); office software (Microsoft Office, Google Docs); cloud infrastructure and services (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, IBM); social networking platforms (Facebook, Twitter); transportation (Uber, Lyft); business networking (Microsoft LinkedIn); streaming video (Google YouTube, Netflix, Hulu); and online advertising (Google, Facebook) – among others. GAFAM now comprise the five wealthiest corporations in the world, with a combined market cap exceeding $3 trillion.10 If South Africans integrate Big Tech products into their society, the United States will obtain enormous power over their economy and create technological dependencies that will lead to perpetual resource extraction. As an empirical matter, this point has been understudied. Nevertheless, early research and anecdotes suggest the economic impact of Big Tech intermediaries is detrimental to local African industries. Murphy, Carmody, and Surborg studied the role of ICTs among small, medium, and microsized enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa’s and Tanzania’s wood and tourism industries. They found that ICTs introduced the dominance of information intermediaries. Increased use of ICTs also led to greater worker surveillance in some instances. They concluded that ICT integration is, on balance, benefiting foreign-owned businesses and corporations.1 Similar conclusions can be derived from press accounts of the transportation industry. Since Uber began operating in Johannesburg in 2013, there have been labor strikes and violent clashes in the “South African taxi wars”. Several e-hailing taxi murders have been carried out by metered taxi drivers, who have warned that Uber will “burn” if it remains in South Africa. At the same time, many Uber drivers endure onerous working conditions for low pay.12 Uber has had devastating effects in Africa and beyond.13 The company takes around 25% commission for each trip, in addition to hidden costs,14 leading to an outflow of revenue from the local economy to foreign coffers. Moreover, they are able to undercut local markets by offering artificially low prices: Uber can operate at a loss – to the tune of billions – thanks to funding from Wall Street and other wealthy investors.15 With the backing of corporate finance, it leverages predatory subsidies, network effects, Big Data analytics, and the deregulatory effects of its position as an “intermediary” to stamp out competition and colonize the market. Within just two years, Uber sported a net worth of R1.65 billion (~$125 million) inside SA.16Similar problems have emerged in the media. In April 2017, the online news outlet GroundUp dropped Google Ads from its website. GroundUp’s Nathan Geffen explains the Google advertising model is “broken” for publishers who “have to put up with poor quality, misleading adverts in exchange for small change.” “The problem,” Geffen says, “is that nearly all the power in the online advertising relationship lies with Google.” The ad giant also serves up censorship threats: in one example, Google issued a warning to GroundUp for publishing a picture containing a painted bare breast as part of a protest action.17 In November 2017, Financial Mail’s Anton Harber wrote a feature story deeming Google and Facebook “the biggest threat to South African news media”.18 Google takes 70% of local online advertising, while social media – led by Facebook – takes another 12%. The major SA media groups are left with just 8% of the pie. The Google and Facebook “nemesis” are an expanding duopoloy: they take 77% of online advertising spend in the US and captured virtually all the ad growth in 2016.19 If this continues, Harber exclaims, “the big two could have a devastating effect on the media’s role in defining democracy”.20 These early case examples – the thin integration of ICTs into the wood and tourism industries in South Africa and Tanzania, Uber colonization of taxi markets, and the rising dominance of Google and Facebook in South African media – provide clear instances of digital colonialism whereby foreign corporations undermine local development, dominate the market, and extract revenue from the Global South. As we see next, this power is obtained primarily through the structural domination of digital architecture, which leads to more general forms of imperial control.

#### US control of digital infrastructure locks in a new imperial relationship that extracts value from the global South

Kwet, Michael 2019 [Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School PhD Candidate, Sociology, Rhodes University; Digital colonialism: US empire and the New Imperialism in the Global South; Race & Class Volume 60, No. 4 (April 2019); Yale University; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3232297;]

Under digital colonialism, foreign powers, led by the United States, are planting infrastructure in the Global South engineered for its own needs, enabling economic and cultural domination while imposing privatized forms of governance. To accomplish this task, major corporations design digital technology to ensure their own dominance over critical functions in the tech ecosystem. This allows them to accumulate profits from revenues derived from rent (in the form of intellectual property or access to infrastructure) and surveillance (in the form of Big Data). It also empowers them to exercise control over the flow of information (such as the distribution of news and streaming services), social activities (like social networking and cultural exchange), and a plethora of other political, social, economic, and military functions mediated by their technologies. The control of code is foundational to digital domination. In Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig (1999/2006) famously argued that computer code shapes the rules, norms, and behaviors of computer-mediated experiences in ways similar to architecture in physical space (e.g. imperial railways designed for colonization).23 As a result, “code is law” in the sense that it has the power to usurp legal, institutional, and social norms impacting the political, economic, and cultural domains of society. This critical insight has been applied in fields like copyright, free speech regulation, Internet governance, blockchain, privacy, and even torts. What has been missed, however, is how US dominance of code – and other forms of digital architecture – usurps sovereignty in foreign countries. The power of the United States over code and other digital infrastructure constitutes a new form of imperialism. Digital forms of power are linked together through the three core pillars of the digital ecosystem: software, hardware, and network connectivity.24 Software is the set of instructions that define and determine what your computer can do. Hardware is the physical equipment used for computer experiences. The network is the set of protocols and standards computers use to talk to each other, and the connections they make. Domination over these three elements – software, hardware, and networks – provides a great source of power over people. Let us consider each in turn. Software is the coded logic that constrains and enables particular user experiences. For example, software determines rules and policies such as whether or not users can post a message anonymously at a website, or whether or not users can make a copy of a copyright-restricted file like an e-book. The rules that a programmer codes into the software largely determines technological freedoms and shapes users’ experiences using their devices. Thus, software exerts a powerful influence on the behavior, policies, and freedoms of people using digital technology. Control over software is a source of digital domination primarily exercised through software licenses and hardware ownership. Free Software licenses allow people to use, study, modify, and share software as they see fit.25 By contrast, non-free software licenses grant a software designer control over users by precluding the ability to exercise those freedoms. With proprietary software, the humanreadable source code is closed off to the public, and owners usually restrict the ability to use the software without paying. In the case of Microsoft Windows, for example, the public must pay for the program in order to use it, they cannot read the source code to understand how it works, they cannot change its behavior by changing the code, and they cannot share a copy with others. Thus with proprietary licensing, Microsoft maintains absolute control over how the software works. The same goes for other proprietary apps, like Google Play or Adobe Photoshop.26 By design, non-free software provides the owner power over the user experience. It is authoritarian software. Control over hardware is a second source of digital domination. This can take at least three forms: software run on third-party servers, centralized ownership of hardware, or hardware designed to prevent users from changing the software. Let us consider each of these in turn. In the first instance, software is executed on someone else’s computer. As a result, users are dispossessed of their ability to control it. This is typically accomplished through Software as a Service (SaaS) in the cloud. For example, when you visit the Facebook website, the interface you are provided executes on third party hardware (i.e. on Facebook’s cloud servers). Because users cannot change the code running on Facebook’s servers, they cannot get rid of the “like” button or change the Facebook experience. “There is no cloud,” the saying goes, “just someone else’s computer.” Corporations and other third parties design cloud services for remote control over the user experience. This gives them immense power over individuals, groups, and society.27 In the second instance, people become dispossessed of hardware ownership itself. With the rise of cloud computing, it is possible that hardware manufacturers will soon only offer low-powered, lowmemory devices (similar to the terminals of the 1960s and 1970s) and computer processing and data storage will be primarily conducted in centralized clouds. With end-users dispossessed of processing power and storage, software and data would be under the absolute control of the owners and operators of clouds.28 In the third instance, hardware is manufactured with locks that prevent users from changing the software on the devices. By locking down devices to a pre-determined set of software choices, the hardware manufacturer determines which software is allowed to run when you turn on your device.29 Thus, hardware restrictions can prevent the public from controlling their devices, granting device manufacturers them power over users. Control over network connectivity is a third source of digital domination. Net neutrality regulation proposes that Internet traffic should be “neutral” so that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) treat content flowing through their cables, cellular towers, and satellites equally. According this philosophy, those who own the pipes are “common carriers” and should almost never be allowed to manipulate the data that flows through them.30 This constrains the ability of wealthy media providers to pay for faster content delivery speeds than less wealthy providers (such as grassroots organizations, small businesses, and common people). More importantly, by treating traffic equally, net neutrality prevents network discrimination against various forms of traffic critical to civil rights and liberties. For example, the Tor browser facilitates anonymous Internet communications, but the use of the Tor network can be detected by Internet Service Providers and throttled (i.e. slowed to a crawl).31 Net neutrality prevents this form of discrimination and protects the end user’s freedom to utilize the Internet as they wish, without third party favoritism, blocking, or throttling. Each of the three pillars of the digital ecosystem – software, hardware, and network – constitute a source of power and control. To illustrate the point, let us consider some concrete examples related to social justice in the Global South. The copyright industry is threatened by the mass sharing of paywalled publications over the Internet (what they derisively label “piracy”). Given that hard drive capacity and Internet speeds will rapidly increase over time, the capacity to share vast libraries of music, movies, books, and other media is steadily increasing. What will be done when each person has a 40 terabyte hard drive and can trade the entire collection of popular music from the last century within an hour? Advances in technology deepen the need for architectural control to police the copyright system. One way to stop file sharing is to control software. The industry built Digital Rights Management (DRM) software, for example, to prevent copyright-restricted publications from playing on a user’s computer unless the user pays to access it first. This works well with proprietary software because people cannot remove the DRM. However, if the DRM software is Free Software – which allows people the freedom to use, study, modify, and share the software – people can remove the DRM code that locks the content. Thus, industry is bolstered by proprietary software as a means to enforce copyright. A second way to prevent sharing is to take control of the hardware. If, for example, people stop running software on their own devices – and instead run their computer experiences through centralized cloud servers – then cloud providers can determine their “access” to copyrighted data. In this scenario, users cannot copy and trade media over the Internet because the data “streams” to their device from a content owner’s platform (e.g. Netflix or Spotify) which provides media content through their servers. Thus, the widespread distribution of storage capacity and broadband Internet threatens the copyright monopoly.32 A third way to prevent sharing media is to control the network. People may own and control their software and hardware, but if they can be spied on by an ISP or government, then they can be fined or arrested for copyright infringement, or have their Internet connection throttled or terminated. People might use privacy protection technologies to conceal their content sharing – such as the Tor network or Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) – but this can be thwarted by ISPs throttling Tor or VPNs. In this scenario, control of the network (ISP discrimination) is used to make anonymous content sharing impractical. Thus, public control of the network threatens copyright enforcement. To bring this back to colonialism, US multinationals have designed digital architecture which, in one way or another, allows them to accumulate vast fortunes based on rent or data extraction. In the case of copyright, control over software, hardware, or the Internet is used to protect the copyright monopoly in the name of intellectual property rights. Given that the marginal cost of producing digital works is near-zero, prominent intellectuals have challenged copyright paywalls in the interest of socioeconomic justice and out of concern that draconian technologies are needed to enforce digital forms of copyright.33 Free access to digital publications for all people on planet earth, irrespective oftheir wealth, could improve education, culture, equality, democracy, and innovation. Western technology has been engineered to block free sharing, which impoverishes poor people’s ability to obtain knowledge and culture and reduces communication between rich and poor. Facebook’s Free Basics service offers another case example of how Big Tech corporations expand empire in the Global South. Free Basics offers a stripped-down version of free Internet services to people with little or no disposable income. Facebook decides which content and websites the poor can access – while of course offering Facebook itself within the app. Free Basics is zero-rated by ISPs, meaning that data transfers inside the app are paid for by ISPs instead of their customers. The ISPs hope that the limited Internet experience will lead to paying customers who, having tasted a free sample, will purchase data for the full experience. Free Basics not only has Facebook playing Internet gatekeeper of the poor, it also violates net neutrality laws: zero-rated offerings place content providers on unequal footing. Several countries have terminated Free Basics, in part due to popular backlash.34 However, Internet.org has put over 100 million users from over 60 countries – including South Africa – into the Facebook platform, which channels them towards the Facebook ecosystem. Integrating platforms like Facebook outside the US does more than drain local advertising revenue: it undermines various forms of local governance. Seventy-five percent of web publisher’s traffic now comes from Google (46%) and Facebook (29%).35 Centralization of services into their hands provides them with centralized control over communications – by way of code. These two firms filter search results and news feeds with proprietary black box algorithms, granting them enormous power to shape who sees which news. Leftist outlets have published data suggesting that Google censors socialist views, while Facebook has been found to favor mainstream liberal media.36 Platforms also regulate freedom of speech and association.37 If an online social network detects certain keywords and forms of speech, they can censor it, or ban the user. Moreover, they can prohibit the right to associate with others in the pursuit of social, political, economic, cultural, and religious ends. This has been carried out against Palestinians (e.g. with the removal of the page for the political party, Fatah), as well as the far-right.38 As private overlords of critical information infrastructure, US multinationals have the power to regulate the press, speech, and association in foreign territories, as they see fit. These examples demonstrate how structural domination of the tech ecosystem undermines local sovereignty through privatized forms of political, economic, and social governance. This helps the US perpetuate copyright paywalls, control information flows, spread their platform monopolies, supplant local autonomy, filter communications, and deepen dependency on the US. In turn, corporations increasingly profit from Big Data surveillance, an exploitative human rights transgression against the Global South. We discuss this element next.

#### US global surveillance reinforces racial and social inequalities- companies decrease user privacy for government intelligence

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Today, the United States is at the center of a new, digital global surveillance apparatus. U.S. whistleblowers like William Binney, Thomas Drake, Kirk Wiebe, and Ed Lumis revealed that the U.S. government is conducting bulk surveillance on foreign and domestic populations. Their claims were confirmed by Edward Snowden, who leaked a massive trove of documents to journalists in June 2013. Various leaks and whistleblowers have revealed that the United States government partners with major U.S.-based technology corporations to conduct mass surveillance on domestic and global populations. The National Security Agency (NSA) is at the center of the new surveillance regime (Greenwald, 2014; Granick, 2017). The vast scope of NSA surveillance is indicated by various programs disclosed by whistleblowers. The two primary tools used to conduct surveillance are Upstream (which taps the Internet backbone, often with direct cooperation from U.S. corporations) and PRISM (which gives the NSA access to data from major corporate service providers such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Skype) (Macaskill and Dance, 2013). A program called XKEYSCORE is used to collect “nearly everything a user does on the Internet” and provide them with a Google-like search interface for surveillance targets (Greenwald, 2013; Dorling, 2013). Through BULLRUN, the NSA inserted vulnerabilities into popular protocols like HTTPS, voice-over-IP, and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) (Ball, et al., 2013) [29]. The NSA permits it to store any and all encrypted communications for as long as they wish, in hopes they may one day decrypt the content (Perloth, et al., 2013). The NSA’s new $2 billion facility in Bluffdale, Utah has four 25,000-square-foot data halls to store “rows and rows” of servers (Bamford, 2012). According to NSA whistleblower William Binney, Bluffdale was built to expand the NSA’s data storage capacity. He estimates “just for e-mails and phone calls alone they have approaching 20 trillion transactions of US citizens with other US citizens” (Binney, 2013). Banking, social networking data, and other services add trillions of more transactions. The mass interception and collection of electronic communications demonstrates that the United States and its allies aim to bring nearly all electronic communications under its vast global surveillance net. There are recent examples of Western intelligence agencies spying on South Africans. In June 2014, the Washington Post reported that the NSA provided legal certification “to intercept through U.S. companies not just the communications of its overseas targets but any communications about its targets as well” (Nakashima and Gellman, 2014). One hundred ninety three countries are certified targets, including South Africa (Washington Post, 2014). In 2014, Der Spiegel published slides detailing an NSA program, TREASUREMAP, which aims to provide a “near real-time, interactive map of the global internet” that plots every device connected in “a kind of Google Earth for global data traffic, a bird’s eye view of the planet’s digital arteries” (Müller-Maguhn, et al., 2014). The NSA includes South Africa among its “13 covered servers in unwitting data centers around the globe” (National Security Agency [NSA], n.d.). The data centers help the NSA “perform [DNS] monitoring covertly and to get a more global view on DNS name resolution and service availability” [30]. In 2016, Le Monde reported that Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), an NSA ally, tapped into telecommunications networks by targeting their managers. South Africa-based telecommunications corporation MTN Group was among those under surveillance (Leloup and Utersinger, 2016). The GCHQ also aimed to retrieve the briefings of the South African delegates to G20 and G8 summit meetings (Guardian, 2013). In 2015, the United Kingdom Investigatory Powers Tribunal found the GCHQ unlawfully breached the European Convention on Human Rights for spying on the South African-based Legal Resources Centre (LRC) (RDM Newswire, 2015). The LRC is known for its work protecting human rights. Within South Africa there is suspicion that domestic corporations and the state are conducting bulk surveillance. In 2011, Wikileaks published leaked documents from Stellenbosch-based VASTech SA Pty Ltd. showcasing equipment for bulk communications interception. The content of phone calls and e-mail messages, as well as metadata from telephone and Internet communications, can be swept up by VASTech’s Zebra, Badger, and Satellite Signal Analyser products (Swart, 2016a). The equipment was sold to Muammar Gaddafi, who used it for bulk surveillance of the Libyan population (Sonne and Coker, 2011). In October 2016, The Intercept published a leaked document revealing that VASTech has since developed more powerful “NSA-like” equipment it claims “rivals a government spy agency” (McLaughlin, 2016). During the mid-2000s, VASTech was subsidized by the South African government (Mchunu, 2013). It is not known if the government owns or uses VASTech’s mass surveillance equipment. However, the evidence suggests it desires to conduct bulk surveillance to counter political dissent. In June 2016, investigative journalist Heidi Swart reported contents of a leaked document, “The 2014 National Intelligence Priorities”. According to Swart, “The document states that countering the ‘most serious threats to our national security’ that require ‘immediate and sustained intelligence collection” involves the ‘maximum use of covert human and technical means’.’ The “intelligence gathering is justified by several ‘threats to national security’. For example, one intelligence priority for 2014 centered on national and provincial elections. The SSA Domestic Branch was tasked with investigating and counterplanning for a ‘so-called “Arab Spring” uprising prior to elections’”. “Another area of interest for the SAA,” Swart added, “was investigating and counterplanning for ‘violent industrial action’, with the investigation of ‘inter-union rivalry as a driver of violent industrial action’ high on the agenda. The transport industry was to be watched to allow for ‘counterplanning for violence in the taxi industry’”. Areas of surveillance include “terrorism, espionage, violence against foreign nationals, gangsterism, and the private security industry” (Swart, 2016b). Privacy advocates consider South African communications legislation too weak to adequately safeguard privacy (Right2Know, 2014). Under the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision Act (RICA), telecommunications service providers must deploy infrastructure to allow the monitoring and interception of communications, while Internet service providers are required to store citizen metadata for three–five years. Legislation fails to regulate the most powerful mass surveillance capabilities conducted at the National Communications Centre, and citizens are required to register SIM cards in a national database (Right2Know, 2016). The “2014 National Priorities” document and other facts about surveillance equipment and legislation make clear that all South African inhabitants face the threat of mass government surveillance. As digital technology spreads in South Africa, its inhabitants must also grapple with ubiquitous surveillance captured for big data analytics via the private sector. There are warning signs that this will have deleterious effects on civil rights and liberties. In May 2016, Angwin, et al. published a case study for ProPublica in which the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) computer software created by Northpointe corporation for the U.S. criminal justice system assigned a higher criminal “risk assessment” to blacks than to whites. ProPublica’s study assessed 7,000 people arrested in Florida. They found the risk assessment algorithm used to predict violent crime flagged black defendants as future criminals at twice the rate as white defendants. Northpointe’s algorithm is proprietary. As such, there is no way for the public to understand how it gave rise to this outcome. However, some details were provided to ProPublica. Northpointe does not categorize individuals by race, but they do assess factors correlated to race, such as educational degree and employment status. Northpointe’s founder, Tim Brennan, maintains that categories correlated to race like poverty, joblessness, and social marginalization must be included lest “your ... accuracy goes down” (Angwin, et al., 2016). Their predictive policing software is among the most widely used assessment tools in the U.S. criminal justice system. Commercial surveillance also threatens to reinforce socioeconomic inequality. For example, companies are seeking to exploit novel forms of data to determine credit scores. Social networking services like Facebook seek to determine creditworthiness based on “social credit scores” (data from social networking) (Packin and Lev-Aretz, 2016). A person’s Facebook friends, for example, might better indicate her creditworthiness than her financial history derived from a FICO score. As with Northpointe’s algorithm, facially neutral categories might adversely affect oppressed groups. In the case of race, if having personal wealth and wealthy friends raises your credit score, and white people have more wealth, then the algorithm would favor whites and reinforce race-based inequality [31]. Socioeconomic inequality is all the more prone to insidious reinforcement when race-associated attributes tacitly emerge through data analytics. This is sometimes called “latent trait inference” whereby algorithmic processes are able to accurately infer traits from data even if they are not disclosed. Facebook has been dancing around this issue. For example, their users do not disclose their race (there is no “race” category), but Facebook offers advertisers “ethnic affinity” categories such as African American, Asian American, and Hispanic. Given that any user from any “race” can fall into the category based on “indicators” (e.g., a white person who is a member of the African American Chamber of Commerce will help define their “ethnic affinity”), Facebook states they are not racially profiling (Newtiz, 2016). In March 2016, Business Insider revealed different users received different trailers for the film Straight Outta Compton based on their Facebook affinity group (McAlone, 2016). There were two different Straight Outta Compton trailers delivered to the affinity groups. The trailer shown to white people boxed into their own ethnic affinity group portrayed the film as a “gangster movie” full of violence and conflicts with police. The trailer shown to black people pegged into their respective affinity group portrayed the film as a biopic, with violence contextualized as “‘protest’ imagery created by the very relatable, beloved members of N.W.A.” (Newitz, 2016). In another instance, Facebook was sued by its users over “over alleged discriminatory policies that they say violate the US Federal Housing Act of 1964” (Farivar, 2016). The ethnic affinity grouping allowed marketers to offer housing advertisements that exclude ethnic affinity groups (Angwin and Parris, Jr., 2016) [32]. Under apartheid, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) also provided different media content for its official race categories. Channel TV1 was reserved for whites and TV2/3 was reserved for blacks. Their language policy called for “culturally authentic communication” [33]. English terms like “potato chips” and “toothpaste” were prohibited by TV2/3. There were no corresponding terms in Zulu, Xhosa, or Tswana, so advertisers were forced to describe them as “slice of potato fried in oil” or “the soap that cleans your teeth” [34]. Separate media content was designed to reinforce racial segregation. While big data content delivery does not filter as sharply, discriminatory content delivery via filter bubbles threatens to segregate cultural groups, with adverse effects on oppressed groups and social cohesion. The poor black majority thus has many reasons to worry about government and commercial surveillance. When asked about collection of student data, a high level e-education official, Sipho\* said, “There are a lot of contentious problems. It’s very much linked the right to privacy of individuals and so forth”. When asked about the fact that Google and the United States government will be tracking the youth from a young age, Sipho responded that “we are not having such a discussion at the moment” [35].

#### Data capitalism is driving millitarism – locks in war from lack of understanding of this system

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The collection and circulation of data is now a central element of increasingly more sectors of contemporary capitalism. This article analyses data as a form of capital that is distinct from, but has its roots in, economic capital. Data collection is driven by the perpetual cycle of capital accumulation, which in turn drives capital to construct and rely upon a universe in which everything is made of data. The imperative to capture all data, from all sources, by any means possible influences many key decisions about business models, political governance, and technological development. This article argues that many common practices of data accumulation should actually be understood in terms of data extraction, wherein data is taken with little regard for consent and compensation. By understanding data as a form capital, we can better analyse the meaning, practices, and implications of datafication as a political economic regime. Data has become central and essential for increasingly more sectors of contemporary capitalism. Industries focused on technology, infrastructure, finance, manufacturing, insurance, and energy are now treating data as a form of capital. No longer is data just a concern of scientists or a by-product of other processes. Until recently, companies simply deleted data or chose not to collect it because paying for storage did not seem like a good investment (Oracle and MIT Technology Review Custom, 2016). Now, though, companies are clamouring to collect data – as much as they can, wherever they can. For the increasing number of companies participating in the ‘data economy’ or ‘digital economy,’ deleting data because of storage costs would be like burning piles of money or dumping barrels of oil down the drain because renting a warehouse was too much trouble. While data is not the same as profit, they share a similar logic. Just as we expect corporations to be profit-driven, we should now expect organisations to be data-driven; that is, the drive to accumulate data now propels new ways of doing business and governance. It is a key factor in major corporate decisions, such as Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods for $13.7 billion (Stevens and Haddon, 2017), and of government policies such as investment in urban sensor networks (Heinzmann, 2014). Indeed, as The Economist (2017b) has noted, ‘Industrial giants such as GE and Siemens now sell themselves as data firms.’ In short, data – and the accumulation of data – is a core component of political economy in the 21st century. As a paradigm and logic, the idea of data-as-capital affects and transforms many spaces and sectors. Thanks to technologies like the Internet of Things, online platforms, and data analytics the list of things that now count as ‘digital products and services’ – and hence what counts as part of the digital economy – is growing at a rapid pace (Srnicek, 2016). This, in turn, means that data is a foundational form of capital for everything from the ‘smart home’ to the ‘smart city,’ finance to governance, production to distribution, consumer devices to enterprise systems, and much more (Kitchin, 2014). Without data, many of these technologies and organisations would not be able to operate, let alone be able to generate value. This article contributes to the study of data within contemporary capitalism by analysing data as a form of capital. The existing literature on the social, political and economic dimensions of data treats data as a commodity. Whether implicitly or explicitly, analyses in both academic and media outlets typically take this analytical frame as a given. Yet, as this article makes clear, the distinction between capital and commodity is important and we cannot assume data is always a commodity. By understanding data as a form of capital, we can better analyse the nature and dynamics of digital capitalism. Rather than data collection being seen as simply a way of producing and obtaining commodities that are somehow converted into monetary value, datafication takes shape as a political economic regime driven by the logic of perpetual (data) capital accumulation and circulation. Framing data as a form of capital casts new light on the imperatives motivating contemporary organisations, the ways value can be derived from data, and the normative importance of data extraction. There are now a variety of labels that refer to the political economic relationship between data and capitalism, such as ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Foster and McChesney, 2014; Zuboff, 2015), ‘informational capitalism’ (Fuchs, 2010), ‘communicative capitalism’ (Dean, 2005), ‘platform capitalism’ (Srnicek, 2016) and ‘iCapitalism’ (Duff, 2016). These different labels are not interchangeable, but they do share common themes and conclusions. This paper builds on three broad insights from the growing literature on critical political economy of data: (1) data is valuable and value-creating (Arvidsson, 2016; Roderick, 2014; Srnicek, 2016); (2) data collection has a pervasive, powerful influence over how businesses and governments behave (Bouk, forthcoming; Fourcade and Healy, 2017; Zuboff, 2016); and (3) data systems are rife with relations of inequity, extraction, and exploitation (Aitken, 2017; Andrejevic, 2014; Fourcade and Healy, 2013; Poon, 2016; Thatcher et al., 2016). Fourcade and Healy (2017) have argued that ‘modern organisations’ are now driven by a ‘data imperative’ that demands the extraction of all data, from all sources, by any means possible. ‘Storing and studying people's everyday activities, even the seemingly mundane, has become the default rather than the exception’ (Angwin and Valentino-Devries, 2012: n.p.). Fulfilling the data imperative involves more than just passively collecting data; it means actively creating data (IBM, 2014). This entails the (total) datafication and surveillance of people, places, processes, things, and relationships among them (van Dijck, 2014). Cisco, one of the companies building this all-encompassing system, calls it ‘the Internet of Everything.’ Similarly, IBM states that, ‘Everything is made of data these days’ (IBM, 2014). What does it mean to see the world in a way that asserts everything is data? This is not just a neutral observation about the nature or substance of the world. Such statements do not merely reveal or reflect the world. They order and construct the world (Boyd and Crawford, 2012; Kitchin et al., 2015). By operating rhetorically (Rosenberg, 2013), they change how we understand and interact with the world, and they put those with data capital in a position of access and authority. They establish the context through which accumulation and use of data not only occurs, but becomes a driving logic that influences behaviour. They perform the power/knowledge relationship: to know the world is to exercise power over it and to exercise power is to know it – to examine its features and characteristics, to sort it into categories and norms, to render it legible and observable, to exclude other metrics and methods of knowing it (Bowker and Star, 2000). Data mining is a misleading name; a more apt term would be data manufacturing. Data is not out there waiting to be discovered as if it already exists in the world like crude oil and raw ore (Gitelman, 2013). Data is a recorded abstraction of the world created and valorised by people using technology. The framing of data as a natural resource that is everywhere and free for the taking reinforces regimes of data accumulation. A 2014 video by Siemens, a major industrial manufacturer, illustrates the logic of the data imperative: ‘We live in a universe of data that gains not only in volume, but importance, every day. The question of how to generate business value from it becomes more and more essential to us. We need to understand that data is everywhere, and it is generated every second of the day. We need to understand data as an asset – and turn it into a value.’ (2014) It is not a coincidence that data is treated as a universal substance right at the time when there is so much to gain for whoever can lay claim to that data and extract it from every source. Indeed, there is a feedback loop: many control systems rely on the constant gathering and processing of data, and in turn those control systems enable more data to be generated (Sadowski and Pasquale, 2015). Flows of data correspond to flows of power and profit, thus the alchemy of datafication promises to produce infinite reserves of both. At the same time, the rhetoric of universality reframes everything as within the domain of surveillance/platform/digital capitalism. The goal of transforming everything into data and the search for new sources of data echoes imperialist modes of accumulation (Luxemburg, 1951; Thatcher et al., 2016). In short, as capitalism faces crises of accumulation, there is a need to find new sources of value and new places to offload goods. ‘Old strategies of accumulation are re-attempted in new spaces and new strategies are crafted through trial and error in the never-ending quest to surpass or displace the internal contradictions which lead to crisis’ (Greene and Joseph, 2015: 224). This could mean subjecting previously non-commodified and non-monetised parts of life to the logic of capitalism or colonising new territories so they are brought into the global capitalist web as sites of extraction (Moore, 2015). We can see this dynamic of ‘data colonialism’ when technology corporations like Facebook and Google move into territories like India and Africa (Thatcher et al., 2016). They do so under the guise of providing subsidised services that connect marginalised people to the Internet, yet the companies also benefit greatly by opening markets, locking people into their platforms, and tapping sources of data (Solon, 2017). These new places with new people provide new opportunities for data accumulation. The same imperialist tactics are being replayed now, but updated for the digital age. As we can see, this growing body of research on critical data studies (Dalton et al., 2016) has shown how the production, distribution, and use of data is situated within an emerging political economy that has wide-ranging implications across society: from the restructuring of cities and the state (Kitchin et al., 2015; Leszczynski, 2012), to the (re)development of electrical and computational infrastructure (Levenda et al., 2016; Pickren, 2018). Equipped with the findings of this literature, this paper can be seen as a call to go back to basics by further analysing foundational questions in the political economy of data: What is the economic form of data? How can value be derived from data? Why does data collection matter? Opening back up these questions, I argue, productively reframes how we understand the form and dynamics of data.The ‘Big Data strategist’ for Oracle, one of the largest software companies in the world, has said, ‘Data is in fact a new kind of capital on par with financial capital for creating new products and services. And it’s not just a metaphor; data fulfils the literal textbook definition of capital.’ (OracleANZ, 2015). This statement points to an emerging political economic shift in which data is created, collected, and circulated as capital. The previous section described how data has been critically analysed in the context of capitalism – implicitly or explicitly – as a commodity. However, as businesses and government bodies begin treating data as capital, there is a need for examining the characteristics and dynamics of ‘data capital.’ This section aims to do so by first reviewing two theories of capital, from Karl Marx and Pierre Bourdieu, then using them to analyse data. In Capital, Volume 1, Marx describes capital as a relationship between money (M) and commodities (C); namely, the ways they circulate and transform, which he simplifies into two general formulas. The first formula represents consumption, C-M-C: a commodity is sold for money which is then used to buy another commodity. Therefore, C-M-C is the cycle of using money to turn one qualitatively different thing (e.g. labour power) into another qualitatively different thing (e.g. coffee). The cycle of consumption is motivated by the use-value of a commodity and it is completed when money is turned into a commodity. The second formula represents capital, M-C-M′: money is used to buy a commodity which is then sold for more money. ‘The value [of money] originally advanced, therefore, not only remains intact while in circulation but increases its magnitude, adds to itself a surplus-value, or is valorised. And this movement converts it into capital’ (Marx, 1990: 252). The cycle of capital is motivated by exchange-value and the cycle does not complete because capital requires continuous circulation. When money is turned into a commodity for consumption, rather than invested to make profit, it ceases to be capital. In addition to ‘money capital’ (i.e., invested funds), Marx distinguishes between two forms of ‘real capital’ employed in the creation of surplus value. Constant capital is the means of production for commodities (i.e., factories, machinery, raw materials, etc.). Variable capital is the means of subsistence for labour power (i.e., the costs of hiring workers). Expanding on Marx’s foundational analysis, Bourdieu theorized two new forms of capital that are distinct from what he terms economic capital, ‘which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights’ (1986: 242). The other forms Bourdieu theorized, cultural capital and social capital, stand alone in their own right while also being ‘convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital’ (p. 242). They are, at their root, ‘transformed, disguised forms of economic capital’ (p. 251). Cultural capital contributes to a person’s status and success in ways that go beyond the idea of ‘human capital,’ which focuses on monetary investment in education and skills. Cultural capital is a representation of class and tends to be invested by a person’s family and transmitted from a person’s domestic environment. Bourdieu (1986) identifies three types of cultural capital: embodied (e.g. character traits), objectified (e.g. art collection), and institutionalised (university degree). Social capital, according to Bourdieu (p. 248), ‘is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.’ This form of capital accrues by being included in privileged groups, whether that means being inducted through rites of passage (e.g. fraternal orders) or through rites of inheritance (e.g. noble lineage). When people talk about the value of ‘who you know’ and ‘networking,’ they are talking about having and developing social capital. Building from Marx, we can now frame two common analyses of data in terms of a debate about what economic form data represents. On one hand, data is cast as a digital raw material – constant capital – necessary in the production of commodities. It is hard to read media articles and business reports about data without seeing it called ‘the new oil.’ For instance, the cover of a 2017 issue of The Economist (2017b) proclaims ‘The World’s Most Valuable Resource’ above an illustration of offshore oil platforms labelled with the names of major digital platforms like Facebook, Google, and Uber presumably drilling into an ocean of data. On the other hand, data is cast as a commodity produced by the digital labour of people posting on Facebook, clicking on Google, exercising with Fitbits, and all the other things we do that create data and that data is created about (Fuchs, 2014; Till, 2012). The cliché about the ‘free’ services provided digital platforms is that, ‘If you’re not the customer, you’re the product.’1 Through the work of using platforms and devices, people are turned into commodities that take the form of personal data, which is sold to advertisers and data brokers. In the age of mass media, this was termed the ‘audience commodity’ (Smythe, 1981). Now with social media it is called the ‘data double’ among other coinages (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). Therefore, at the risk of oversimplification, these two ways of analysing data – as raw material and as product of digital labour – can be recast as a debate about the relationship between real capital and commodities in the digital economy. Building from Bourdieu, I suggest a better framing of data is as a form of capital that is distinct from, but has its roots in, economic capital. Data capital is more than knowledge about the world, it is discrete bits of information that are digitally recorded, machine processable, easily agglomerated, and highly mobile. Like social and cultural capital, data capital is convertible, in certain conditions, to economic capital. But, as the next section ‘Deriving value from data capital’ shows, not all value derived from data is necessarily or primarily monetary. Data capital is institutionalised in the information infrastructure of collecting, storing, and processing data; that is, the smart devices, online platforms, data analytics, network cables, and server farms. Importantly, these characteristics of data capital mean it can be continually captured and circulated, thus data collection is driven by the logic of capital accumulation as described by Marx. ‘The circulation of money as capital is an end in itself, for the valorization of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The movement of capital is therefore limitless’ (Marx, 1990: 253). This unending accumulation of capital, represented by M-C-M′-C-M″-C-M‴… , is a defining feature of capitalism. In digital capitalism, data is not a substitute for money, but is rather elevated and put ‘on the same level as financial capital,’ as a report by Oracle and MIT Technology Review Custom (2016: 2) states. The imperative, then, is to constantly collect and circulate data by producing commodities that create more data and building infrastructure to manage data. The stream of data must keep flowing and growing. Ultimately, continuing the cycle of data capital becomes an intrinsic motivation, a driving force, for firms. As Marx explains, ‘Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit on any single transaction. His aim is rather the unceasing movement of profit-making’ (Marx, 1990: 254). The same can be said of data. The capitalist is not concerned with the immediate use of a data point or with any single collection, but rather the unceasing flow of data-creating. This point is illustrated by the fact that data is very often collected without specific uses in mind. Indeed, the practice of collecting data first and figuring it out later is increasingly a core part of how businesses and government bodies operate. ‘It does not matter that the amounts [of data] collected may vastly exceed a firm’s imaginative reach or analytic grasp. The assumption is that it will eventually be useful, i.e. valuable’ (Fourcade and Healy, 2017: 13). At a public talk in early 2017, Andrew Ng, an artificial intelligence researcher who has held top positions at Google, Baidu, and Coursera, was candid about this prevailing logic of data accumulation: ‘At large companies, sometimes we launch products not for the revenue, but for the data. We actually do that quite often ... and we monetize the data through a different product’ (Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2017). The conditions needed to convert data capital into economic capital may never arrive, but that does not stop the cycle of accumulation. The shift towards data capital takes advantage of the ideological and regulatory groundwork that has been laid since at least the 1980s to create a political economic landscape conducive to finance capitalism (Konczal and Abernathy, 2015). Under neoliberal governance, financial capital is treated as if it exists in transnational space beyond borders and governance (Major, 2012). The same attitudes are directly applied to data capital. This view was crystallised by Carl Bildt (2015), the former Prime Minister of Sweden and chair of the Global Commission on Internet Governance, in an op-ed for the Financial Times: ‘Barriers against the free flow of data are, in effect, barriers against trade.’ Bildt was rebuking proponents of ‘digital sovereignty’ rules in Europe, which would require non-EU companies to keep data about EU citizens in servers that are geographically based in Europe. Any restraints on the flow of data are said to hinder economic growth and technological innovation (Morozov, 2015). Trade deals like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (aim to) enshrine the free flow of data across countries and continents (Selby, 2017). Like finance, data is now governed as an engine of growth. If financial firms are free to shuttle capital from country to country, then similarly technology corporations must also be free to store and sell data wherever they want. This means, for example, that a company could collect the personal information of Americans, store the data in Taiwan, and sell it in Europe (Rossiter, 2017). The focus on data and datafication should not be seen as usurping financialisation, but rather as adding new sources of value and new tools of accumulation. There is a long history of crossover between innovations in information technology and innovations in finance (MacKenzie, 2018). Far from being in competition with each other, Wall Street and Silicon Valley are converging around data capital as the new frontier of accumulation and circulation.The question of what kinds of data are collected and how they are used is very important. So far, this paper has treated data in a generalised way for the sake of analysing it as a form of capital. Of course, not all data is the same, nor is it used in the same way. The same can be said of capital in general. Similarly, value is derived from data in a number of different ways. Different industries necessarily accumulate different kinds of data to fit their own motivations and goals. The focus is typically put on ‘user data,’ such as from exercise apps that collect data about people’s physical activity, vital signs, and geolocation. But, as the examples below show, value can also be squeezed from many other kinds of data about things like machinery, transportation, and moon phases. A full analysis of different types of data and in-depth theorising of how value is derived from data are both outside the scope of this paper. However, in this section, I provide an outline of five major ways data is used to create value. The list is not meant to be comprehensive. Future work is needed about the increasing number of ways and reasons that data capital is accumulated and valorised, especially by companies, governments, and organisations that are not typically treated as part of the ‘technology sector.’ Data is used to profile and target people. Many business models and services in data capitalism are based on the value proposition that knowing more about people will, in some way, translate to more profit and/or power. Some examples include: Internet-based companies often make their revenue by serving personalised advertisements. Data brokers collate data to create dossiers on individuals and categorise them into market segments. Credit bureaus crunch data so they can assign scores meant to denote a person’s financial risk and trustworthiness. Retailers can charge different prices based on the customer’s characteristics. Political consultants analyse data to decide who is susceptible to certain kinds of messaging and influence. Data is used to optimise systems. Processes can become more efficient by analysing data that reveals how to eliminate waste, improve productivity, and do more with less. This might mean an industrial manufacturer installing sensors on machines to monitor and adjust their operation. Or, city government using algorithmic analysis to assess how public services should be run. This way of deriving value is also the basis for Taylorism, starting with time–motion studies of factory workers in the early 1900s. Now, digital Taylorism is represented by wristbands patented by Amazon that are strapped to warehouse workers to track where their hands are at all times and provide ‘haptic feedback’ when they work inefficiently (Novak, 2018). Data is used to manage and control things. This is a power/knowledge relationship in which data is a digital, mobile, processable form of knowledge. The idea is that by amassing data about a thing, then the ability to exercise power over that thing – and, in turn, extract more data from it – is enhanced. This might be as mundane as a person keeping track of their diet and exercise so they can manage their health. Or, as worrying as police using body-worn cameras and drones equipped with facial recognition and license plate reader software. Or, as complex as an engineer overseeing the traffic patterns of a city so they can manage how millions of people move through space. Such data can be used to inform human decision-making or fed into automated systems that respond in real-time. Data is used to model probabilities. With enough data covering a wide range of variables over a period of the time – fed to the right algorithms and analysts – many companies promise they can predict the future. While these ‘predictions’ are actually probabilities, there is a growing market for data-driven forecasting tools. For example, police departments use ‘predictive’ systems to create ‘heat lists’ and ‘hot spots’ that name who and where has a high likelihood of criminal activity. HunchLab, a predictive policing tool, uses data about ‘dozens of other factors like population density; census data; the locations of bars, churches, schools, and transportation hubs; schedules for home games – even moon phases’ (Chammah and Hansen, 2016: n.p.). Similarly, urban control rooms process a constant stream of data to create simulations of events like disaster response and snapshots of what the city might look like at certain times and days in the future. Data is used to build stuff. Digital systems and services are often built on data. They require data to operate, they use existing stores of data, and they collect new streams of data. As services become platforms and devices become ‘smart’ they also become data-driven and Internet-connected to facilitate the flow of data. For example, Uber would not work without real-time data about drivers and passengers. Many upgrades to consumer goods (e.g. smart homes) and transformations to urban environments (e.g. smart cities) are premised on extracting and exploiting data. Advances in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and autonomous vehicles also require mountains of diverse data. Data is used to grow the value of assets. Things like buildings, infrastructure, vehicles, and machinery are depreciating assets. They lose value over time as the forces of entropy – or, wear and tear – take their toll. However, upgrading assets with smart technologies that collect data about their use helps combat the normal cycle of deterioration. As financier Stuart Kirk (2018) states, ‘Artificial intelligence combined with the internet of things will result in physical things becoming more adaptive and responsive – thereby extending their useful lives.’ Rather than depreciating, smartified assets can maintain and gain value. Or, if they do not grow value, at least data can slow its decay. Data extraction When we talk about data as being ‘collected,’ ‘gathered,’ or even ‘mined’, the image conjured is one of neutral accumulation, as if data existed out in the world as a distinct thing readily available to be harvested. However, analysing this process in terms of extraction emphasises the people targeted by, and the exploitative nature of, dataveillance. Much of the valuable data capital extracted from the world is about people – their identities, beliefs, behaviours, and other personal information. As Karen Gregory (2014: n.p.) puts it: ‘Big Data, like Soylent Green, is made of people.’ This means that accumulating data often goes hand-in-hand with increasingly invasive systems for probing, monitoring, and tracking people (Schneier, 2016). Surveillance – or, ‘dataveillance’ – capabilities are integrated into everything ranging from consumer goods to civic infrastructure. For businesses, much of the value produced by ‘smart’ technologies does not necessarily come from you buying the good, but rather from you using it. (Or, even just having it around since many smart technologies are always in sense and record mode.) Interacting with smart technologies – especially ones integrated into your everyday, personal life – generates reams of data that would otherwise be out of reach to the companies that want it. And, it seems, to the governments that want that data: In February 2016, the then US director of national intelligence, James Clapper, admitted to a Senate panel that government agencies may treat networked smart technologies as a portal into people’s homes and lives: ‘In the future, intelligence services might use the [Internet of Things] for identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials’ (Ackerman and Thielman, 2016: n.p.). A typical example of a smart update to an everyday technology is the refrigerator. The regular refrigerator is a passive object: it just keeps food cold. The smart refrigerator is an active object: it keeps food cold, but it also keeps track of things like your favourite brands, what foods you eat at what times, and when your food is almost out or expired. The smart refrigerator can then take that data and use it, for example, to send targeted advertisements, recommend sponsored recipes, monitor your dietary intake, and purchase replacement food from the grocery store. The smart refrigerator can also be used for other purposes that are far from fridge-like, such as a surveillance device remotely accessed by police who wish to peek into the owner’s house (Butler, 2017). This is how the logic of accumulation works: it transforms the refrigerator into a data producing, collecting and transmitting machine. The same logic is behind the growing stable of smart technologies that are increasingly embedded with sensors, processors and network connections. ‘The genuine Internet of Things wants to invade that refrigerator, measure it, instrument it, monitor any interactions with it; it would cheerfully give away a fridge at cost,’ argues Bruce Sterling (2014: loc. 68). The pushback against business models based on data capital are already starting to play out: In 2017, an American appliance maker, Whirlpool, filed trade complaints that asked the US government to impose tariffs on its Korean competitors, LG and Samsung, because the Korean companies are selling smart appliances at cheap prices, which is eating into the market share of companies like Whirlpool. LG and Samsung are able to do this because they recognize, as The New Yorker observed, ‘the way to win in a data-driven business is to push prices as low as possible in order to build your customer base, enhance data flow, and cash in in the long-term’ (Davidson, 2017: n.p.). While Whirlpool is looking to cash in on the purchase of an appliance, LG and Samsung are banking on the data that comes from people using the appliance. Thus, rather than existing only as a commodity to be sold, a smart device becomes (perhaps primarily) a means of producing data. This logic influences the design of systems ranging from robotic vacuum cleaners secretly mapping users’ homes so the manufacturer can exploit that data (Deahl, 2017) to the methods of urban planning deployed to manage cities (Barns, 2017). Data accumulation drives many key decisions about technological development, political governance, and business models. As Shoshana Zuboff explains, within the context of what she calls ‘surveillance capitalism,’ ‘The logic of accumulation organizes perception and shapes the expression of technological affordances at their roots. It is the taken-for-granted context of any business model. Its assumptions are largely tacit, and its power to shape the field of possibilities is therefore largely invisible. It defines objectives, successes, failures, and problems. It determines what is measured, and what is passed over; how resources and people are allocated and organized; who is valued in what roles; what activities are undertaken – and to what purpose. The logic of accumulation produces its own social relations and with that its conceptions and uses of authority and power.’ (Zuboff, 2015: 77) When data is treated as a form of capital, the imperative to collect as much data, from as many sources, by any means possible intensifies existing practices of accumulation and leads to the creation of new ones. Indeed, following in the footsteps of other extractive enterprises through capitalism’s history such as land grabs and resource mining (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2017), many of the now common practices of data accumulation should actually be understood in terms of the more forceful practice of data extraction, wherein data is taken without meaningful consent and fair compensation for the producers and sources of that data. The terminology used to describe the ways data is accumulated – especially data about people – elides the fact that this data is often acquired in hidden ways for purposes unknown to the targets of dataveillance (Andrejevic, 2014). The question of consent is relatively straightforward. The problematic way technology firms treat consent is no secret; it is an issue raised often by journalists and academics. When companies seek consent to record, use, and/or sell a person’s data, it is typically done in the form of a contract. The most common kind is called an end-user licensing agreements (EULA). They are a hallmark of digital technology and account for most of the contracts we enter into – almost on a daily basis if you use the Internet or software (Thatcher et al., 2016). These are the pages on websites and applications that make you click ‘agree’ or ‘accept’ before you can use the service. EULAs are known as ‘standard-form’ or ‘boilerplate’ contracts because they are generically applied to all users (Zamir, 2014). They are one-sided, non-negotiated, and non-negotiable; you either agree or you are denied access. ‘It is hard, therefore, to consider them to be free and voluntary arrangements since one party has no power to enact their demands’ (Birch, 2016: 124). Companies are routinely caught smuggling dubious clauses into their EULAs; like, for example, requiring users to give up rights to ownership of their data or to restrict what kind of data is collected and how it is used (Hutton and Henderson, 2017). Moreover, EULAs are designed to prevent even the most enterprising person from being informed of the binding terms and conditions. They are long, dense legal documents. One study concluded it would take 76 days, working for 8 hours a day, to read the privacy policies a person typically encounters in a year (Madrigal, 2012). EULAs are the ideal-type of pro forma ‘consent,’ which may be better-termed acquiescence (Pasquale, 2015). That is, EULAs are less a method of consent in any meaningful and more a form of compliance. As Jaron Lanier (2013: 314) argues, ‘The reason people click 'yes' is not that they understand what they're doing, but that that it is the only viable option other than boycotting a company in general, which is getting harder to do.’ Thus, even in many cases where people must actively agree to their data being accumulated, this agreement bears little resemblance to common meanings of consent – let alone robust forms of informed consent. When a thing is taken without consent we call it ‘theft.’ Just because the thing taken here is information about a person, rather than some material object, the ethical relevance should not be nullified. It is extraction nonetheless. The question of fair compensation is more complicated, in large part because it can be difficult to put a fair price on personal information. Different types of data are valued differently by different businesses. The value of data also rises non-linearly in relation to the amount of data. The larger and more diverse a data bank, the more information and uses can be derived from it. So one individual’s data may not be readily converted to economic capital, but the aggregated data of hundreds, thousands, millions of individuals can be immensely valuable. Even though it is difficult to price data, we can judge the fairness of compensation in at least two ways: (1) what kind of compensation, if any, is offered for data and (2) what is the difference between the compensation for data producers and the value obtained by data capitalists? First, compensation most often comes in the form of access to services like Facebook’s platform and Google’s search engine. Rather than charging money to use the service, the owner collects data as payment. Even if we concede that some people think this is perfectly fair compensation, these service providers are outnumbered by the countless companies that collect, use, and sell personal data often without the knowledge of – let alone compensation for – those whose data they possess (Bouk, forthcoming; Crain, 2016). Many companies fail the first test right away: receiving nothing can hardly be seen as fair. Second, the value of data capital is massive. Some of the wealthiest companies in the world, like Facebook and Google, are built on data capital. The data broker industry is estimated to generate $200bn in annual revenue (Crain, 2016). The three biggest data brokers alone – Experian, Equifax and Transunion – each bring in billions of dollars annually. Even for relatively small data brokers, the difference between the value of data and the compensation provided for it is striking (Roderick, 2014). Additionally, other major sectors like finance, insurance and manufacturing are increasingly relying on data capital to generate value. For many of these companies the data they use is primarily about people and created by those people doing things. These companies are accumulating billions of dollars in surplus value from the ‘digital labour’ done by people (Scholz, 2012), while paying little to nothing in return. Thatcher et al. (2016: 994) argue that these extractive practices go so far as to ‘mirror processes of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession that occur as capitalism colonizes previously noncommodified, private times and places.’ When a person does not receive a fair offer for the work they have done or thing they have sold, we call it ‘exploitation’ – and this level of exploitation and inequity is indicative of extraction. Before concluding, it is important to note that not all data extraction is equal. There are crucial issues related to the ways identity and class affect how, what, and why data is extracted. At times, data is disproportionally extracted from certain groups, such as when poor people of colour are subjected to systematic tracking by government agencies and financial institutions (Eubanks, 2018). At other times, certain groups are missing from data sets, such as when facial recognition systems inaccurately identify people of colour because they have been trained with data composed of mostly white male faces – people who look like their programmers (Lohr, 2018). While it is beyond the scope of this article, there is a need for further analysis of the unevenness of data extraction. Such work should build from critical studies of information technology; some relevant, recent books include: Digital Sociologies (Daniels et al. 2016), The Intersectional Internet (Noble and Tynes, 2016), Programmed Inequality (Hicks, 2017), Algorithms of Oppression (Noble, 2018), and Automating Inequality (Eubanks, 2018). My hope is that this article also lends theoretical support to this future work. Conclusion This article has centred data as a core component of political economy in the 21st century. It has analysed the way in which data is collected and circulated like capital and is treated by governments and firms like capital. By applying the theories of Marx and Bourdieu, data is analysed as a form of capital that is distinct from, but has its roots in, economic capital. Data collection is thus driven by the perpetual cycle of capital accumulation, which in turn drives capital to construct and rely upon a world in which everything is made of data. The supposed universality of data reframes everything as falling under the domain of data capitalism. All spaces must be subjected to datafication. If the universe is conceived of as a potentially infinite reserve of data, then that means the accumulation and circulation of data can be sustained forever. The imperative to capture all data, from all sources, by any means possible influences many key decisions about business models, political governance, and technological development. Following this imperative leads to accumulation by extraction in which personal data is taken with little regard for consent and compensation. By analysing surveillance technology and the data economy in terms of extraction, critical work can move beyond focusing (almost exclusively) on privacy and security. As important as these issues are, they elide the systemic issues of inequity and exploitation that are endemic to the contemporary political economy of data (Coll, 2014). Moreover, conceiving of many common practices of data collection as extraction helps lay the normative groundwork for political and legal responses to rampant, invasive data accumulation. Such responses could include regulations – essentially capital controls – on what types of data companies can collect, how they can collect it, where they can send and store it, and how much data a company can possess, both in aggregate and about individuals. It could also include new models of data ownership and governance like, for example, ‘managing crucial parts of the data economy as public infrastructure’ (The Economist, 2017a: n.p.). The fact that a featured article in The Economist would recommend that governments take over parts of the data economy and break up monopolistic firms like Google should be seen as a bellwether for how powerful Big Data (as in Big Oil and Big Finance) has become. This illustrates the need for further critical thought about the political economy of data, as well as reforms and alternatives to data capitalism. The analysis in this paper is not meant to mark a new epoch in political economy wherein – as executives and engineers in Silicon Valley are fond of saying – everything has changed and nothing will ever be the same. Instead, data capitalism is more of a shift in focus; it is a transition toward conceptualising a new kind of capital and new methods of accumulation. This transition follows from one of the dominant socio-economic regimes of the past few decades: finance capitalism (Davis and Walsh, 2017; Krippner, 2005; Konczal and Abernathy, 2015). As this article has shown, there are similarities between financialisation and datafication. Both have significant ‘implications for the production of space, corporate governance, accumulation regimes, and everyday life’ (Fields, 2017: 1). Both seek to maximise value extraction by using innovative methods of capital creation and circulation, whether through complex financial instruments or complex information technologies. Both use technically opaque systems that shield them from oversight (Pasquale, 2015), use their political influence to skirt regulation (Roderick, 2014), and use their powerful capabilities to engage in exploitative and predatory practices (Taylor and Sadowski, 2015). In addition to these similarities, there is direct overlap between the two regimes, such as credit agencies using large sets of personal and demographic data to create hyper-individualised policies and scores (Hurley and Adebayo, 2017) and Wall Street traders using ‘high frequency trading’ algorithms to circulate capital at hyper-speed (Arnoldi, 2016). The institutions leading the way in data capitalism are explicit about the connections between financial capital and data capital. They are not calling for one to replace the other, rather they are arguing that finance and data should be seen as different but equal forms of capital, which supercharge each other. Datafication, like financialisation before it, is a new frontier of accumulation and next step in capitalism. Compared to financialisation, datafication is still in its early days, but the level of wealth and power wielded by data capitalists is already massive and still growing. The theories and methods used to analyse finance capitalism and information technology must now be synthesised and applied to studying the meaning, practices and implications of datafication as a political economic regime.

### Data/Digital Infrastructure

#### Data collection is now a form of capital used to fuel digital capitalism

Sadowski 19, (Jathan Sadowski, Senior Research Fellow in the Emerging Technologies Research Lab // Department of Human Centred-Computing // Faculty of Information Technology // Monash University. January 7, 2019 “When data is capital: Datafication, accumulation, and extraction” Sadowski, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2053951718820549)-Cayden> Mayer

The goal of transforming everything into data and the search for new sources of data echoes imperialist modes of accumulation (Luxemburg, 1951; Thatcher et al., 2016). In short, as capitalism faces crises of accumulation, there is a need to find new sources of value and new places to offload goods. ‘Old strategies of accumulation are re-attempted in new spaces and new strategies are crafted through trial and error in the never-ending quest to surpass or displace the internal contradictions which lead to crisis’ (Greene and Joseph, 2015: 224). This could mean subjecting previously noncommodified and non-monetised parts of life to the logic of capitalism or colonising new territories so they are brought into the global capitalist web as sites of extraction (Moore, 2015). We can see this dynamic of ‘data colonialism’ when technology corporations like Facebook and Google move into territories like India and Africa (Thatcher et al., 2016). They do so under the guise of providing subsidised services that connect marginalised people to the Internet, yet the companies also benefit greatly by opening markets, locking people into their platforms, and tapping sources of data (Solon, 2017). These new places with new people provide new opportunities for data accumulation. The same imperialist tactics are being replayed now, but updated for the digital age. As we can see, this growing body of research on critical data studies (Dalton et al., 2016) has shown how the production, distribution, and use of data is situated within an emerging political economy that has wide-ranging implications across society: from the restructuring of cities and the state (Kitchin et al., 2015; Leszczynski, 2012), to the (re)development of electrical and computational infrastructure (Levenda et al., 2016; Pickren, 2018). Equipped with the findings of this literature, this paper can be seen as a call to go back to basics by further analysing foundational questions in the political economy of data: What is the economic form of data? How can value be derived from data? Importantly, these characteristics of data capital mean it can be continually captured and circulated, thus data collection is driven by the logic of capital accumulation as described by Marx. ‘The circulation of money as capital is an end in itself, for the valorization of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The movement of capital is therefore limitless’ (Marx, 1990: 253). This unending accumulation of capital, represented by M-C-M0-C-M00-C-M-. . . , is a defining feature of capitalism. In digital capitalism, data is not a substitute for money, but is rather elevated and put ‘on the same level as financial capital,’ as a report by Oracle and MIT Technology Review Custom (2016: 2) states. The imperative, then, is to constantly collect and circulate data by producing commodities that create more data and building infrastructure to manage data. The stream of data must keep flowing and growing. Ultimately, continuing the cycle of data capital becomes an intrinsic motivation, a driving force, for firms. As Marx explains, ‘Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit on any single transaction. His aim is rather the unceasing movement of profit-making’ (Marx, 1990: 254). The same can be said of data. The capitalist is not concerned with the immediate use of a data point or with any single collection, but rather the unceasing flow of data-creating. This point is illustrated by the fact that data is very often collected without specific uses in mind. Indeed, the practice of collecting data first and figuring it out later is increasingly a core part of how businesses and government bodies operate. ‘It does not matter that the amounts [of data] collected may vastly exceed a firm’s imaginative reach or analytic grasp. The assumption is that it will eventually be useful, i.e. valuable’ (Fourcade and Healy, 2017: 13). At a public talk in early 2017, Andrew Ng, an artificial 4 Big Data & Society intelligence researcher who has held top positions at Google, Baidu, and Coursera, was candid about this prevailing logic of data accumulation: ‘At large companies, sometimes we launch products not for the revenue, but for the data. We actually do that quite often ... and we monetize the data through a different product’ (Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2017). The conditions needed to convert data capital into economic capital may never arrive, but that does not stop the cycle of accumulation.

### Experts/Think Tanks

#### Think tanks, armed forces, and contractors work in conjunction to naturalize and expand military domination

James M. Cypher in 2022

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After what seems a couple of decades of near quietude, Dwight Eisenhower’s bête noire, the military-industrial complex, is again fashionable. We see it in the 2021 outpouring of articles and books, a (now rare) U.S. Senate hearing, and even an extended encyclopedia entry.1 A more accurate and meaningful term, which could lead the inquisitive to the structural roots of U.S. militarism, would be the industrial-military-congressional complex. Nonetheless, it must come as some relief to those who leverage the Pentagon, and did so with the better-named U.S. Department of War (1789–1947), that the focus is on the military in the first instance and not on the industrial interests that usually determine (or steer) the larger dynamics of procurement, geostrategic diplomacy, and military strategy.2 An adequate encapsulation is the iron triangle, with (1) military contractor corporations forming one side (the base) of the equilateral triangle; (2) the military forces, intelligence agencies, expedition-ready National Guard units, mercenary private security companies, and veteran organizations forming another side; and (3) the civilian national security state (headed by the chief executive, the secretary of state, the National Security Council, congressional members of key arms and security committees, NASA, and military-/contractor-funded but seemingly independent Washington DC think tanks) on the remaining side. The complex interdependent dynamics of the iron triangle take form as strategy, political-economy factors, and international affairs shift and drift—with constant, but varying, pressure (particularly from its base and both sides) to expand the resources it commands.3¶ Certainly, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has provoked a bit of reflection that sometimes leads to reprising the structural interests and embedded powers that keep military expenditures rising, or never falling much for long. But normally a bit of dismaying information regarding Pentagon “waste, fraud, and abuse” is as far (and as deep) as critics care to go. Lodged in U.S. historical memory, the military-industrial complex at best provides a hazy, often misleading, construct. As U.S. military spending in the fiscal year 2022 reaches $1.6 trillion for the broadly defined military sector, there is more—much more—to consider.4

### External Threats

#### Policy justifications resting on external threats serve to obfuscate the structural nature of violence and reinforce the power of militarism over society

Booker and Ohlbaum in 2021

Salih Booker, president & CEO, Center for International Policy¶ And Diana Ohlbaum, senior strategist and legislative director, foreign policy, FCNL; Dismantling Racism and¶ Militarism in U.S. Foreign Policy; Center for International Policy; <https://www.fcnl.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/DismantlingRacism.16.pdf>

If the Racism-Militarism Paradigm were merely a body of beliefs, narratives,¶ myths, dogmas, or principles, it could be more easily countered or rejected.¶ Its power lies not only in its ability to remain hidden, avoiding full scrutiny¶ and interrogation, but in the manner in which it is propagated and reinforced¶ by economic, political, and social-cultural institutions.¶ At the level of people and personnel, it operates through the twin strategies¶ of exclusion and exploitation. Particularly in the national security space and¶ at the highest levels, the influential voices are overwhelmingly white, male, ¶ and upper class—educated at Ivy League institutions and removed from¶ the daily challenges facing most Americans. Only a select group of elites¶ who accept the paradigm’s basic precepts is admitted to the rooms where¶ consequential decisions are made.¶ Adding to this exclusivity is the revolving door of lobbyists, policymakers,¶ and government contractors who ensure that the narrow interests of the¶ arms, extractive, and related industries are kept front and center. Among¶ the professions that intersect meaningfully with foreign policy makers—¶ academia, media, business, law—conformity with the basic precepts of the¶ paradigm is equally ubiquitous.¶ In this environment, women and people of color rise in proportion to their¶ willingness to accept the Racism-Militarism Paradigm. Their credibility as¶ experts and the relevance of their experience is judged by their adherence to¶ traditional ways of thinking. Diversity is accepted, and more recently even¶ promoted, as long as the rules of the game are preserved.¶ Under a system of white supremacy, Black, brown, and Indigenous people¶ are trapped at the bottom of the economic and social order. Without an¶ adequate social safety net, worker protections, a living wage, universal¶ health care, quality education, and affordable childcare, tens of millions of¶ Americans (nearly half of whom are white) are mired in debt and chronic¶ poverty. The Racism-Militarism Paradigm helps perpetuate these conditions¶ by politicizing fear, directing it externally, and demanding ever-expanding¶ resources for organized violence. The ruling class relies upon this atmosphere¶ of fear to guarantee its continued control over the levers of government.

### NATO

#### NATO is the pinnacle of US militarist and imperial aggression- it diverts resources toward military endeavors and engages in offensive operations to secure US interests, making war inevitable

Nick Wright in 2014

NATO: Imperialism’s key military tool; 21 Manifesto; https://21centurymanifesto.wordpress.com/2014/08/28/nato-imperialisms-key-military-tool/

It was described as “the war to end all wars,” but today, a century later, the military potential to destroy lives and a liveable environment is at a terrifying level and continues to rise.¶ Everyday, all over the world, people suffer from armed conflicts, military build-up, occupation, acts of intimidation and aggression, modernization and proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The capitalist economic crisis is further aggravating peoples’ life while profits of the war industries are growing. The ground for military aggressions and imperialist wars was never determined by accidental events or personal decisions.¶ The centenary of World War One should be a moment for reflection, for strengthening peace and for encouraging international friendship and solidarity on the basis of equality and respect for the sovereignty of the peoples.. It must be directed toward ending economic domination of the monopolies and multinational corporations as well as towards aggressive military alliances. Therefore, we should act against NATO, the number 1 war machine in the world.¶ The World Peace Council, founded shortly after the end of the World War II under the slogan “No more War-No more Fascism” underlines the need to draw conclusions from the period which led to the Nazi invasion to Poland on 1st September 1939 and the beginning of the second World War. The growing imperialist ambitions of Nazi Germany then met with the imperialist agenda of other forces, who did not oppose the German expansion to the East in the beginning. The glorious resistance of peoples against Fascism and Nazism in combination with the struggle and the tens of millions of victims of the USSR, led to the liberation of Europe from fascism and the victory of the peoples. The post war international situation, the foundation of the UN and its charter created a new situation for the peoples and their strive for freedom and sovereignty. All this is being fiercely challenged and overthrown today, efforts to substitute often the UN by NATO are at place, neo-fascist forces are on the grow in many parts of Europe serving reactionary ideologies and plans against the peoples. The WPC opposes the growing militarization of international relations, the imperialist plans for the “Great Middle East”, the “Pivot of USA to Asia”, and the interference in the sovereign affairs of peoples and nations in Latin America.¶ NATO: Imperialism’s key military tool- 65 years of crimes against humanity NATO is the largest, strongest and most aggressive military alliance in the world today. Firmly dominated by US-imperialism, NATO is also a pillar of the European Union’s defense strategy. NATO currently has 28 member states across North America and Europe. Another 22 countries are engaged in the so-called Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Next to this another 19 countries are engaged with NATO through programs such as the “Mediterranean Dialogue”, the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” or the “Partnership for Peace” across the globe.¶ Since 1991, NATO’s has aggressively expanded its membership and theatre of operations. This fact alone reveals its fundamental purpose: to be a key tool of Western imperialist domination of the globe.¶ NATO is an enemy of peace. NATO is committed to the doctrines of first strike and pre-emptive strikes. As an offensive military alliance it stands ready to intervene before diplomacy has been given a proper chance, if such is in the interest of Western imperialism. NATO’s expansion and provocations – as the current crisis in Ukraine demonstrates – are directly responsible for destabilization, unrest, violence and war.¶ NATO is an enemy of the peoples. When it intervenes, its members regularly use toxic weapons containing depleted uranium or white phosphor. Moreover, NATO considers nuclear weapons to be a fundamental part of its defense strategy. The alliance aggressively pursues and promotes military provocation and intervention all around the globe, and the results are always increased destruction, displacement, and death. The examples of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the creation of the protectorate of Kosovo, in Afghanistan and Libya, as well as the aggression against Syria, all bear witness to the disastrous humanitarian impact of NATO’s intervention. In Iraq, where NATO took on part of the reconstruction effort, it brought neither peace nor democracy.¶ NATO is an enemy of peace and of the peoples. Without any public debate, NATO’s European member states are hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory. In 2010 a secret agreement on the deployment of modernized versions of B61 warheads extended this presence by several decades, not leaving any space for democratic debate on the matter. Through its Article 5 as well, the NATO alliance imposes obligations on member states that are incompatible with the sovereign right of states to decide on peace and war.¶ The coming summit of NATO in Wales will adopt and further develop the Lisbon summit decisions (2010), will use old and new pretexts for its role as “world sheriff” securing markets, energy resources and spheres of influence, to the detriment of the peoples rights and needs.¶ The dissolution of NATO must be a priority for those defending peace, social justice and progress, along with the right of every people to struggle for the disengagement from it.

#### NATO is the key force in American militarism and imperialism- it’s a tool to expand US dominance in an effort to prevent the rise of other economic powers

Hearse in 2022

Phil Hearse is a member of Anti\*Capitalist Resistance and joint author of both Creeping Fascism and System Crash; NATO, Imperialism and the War; Socialist Project, The Bullet; https://socialistproject.ca/2022/03/nato-imperialism-and-the-war/

Raising the slogans of ‘No to NATO Expansion’ and ‘No to Nuclear War’ is clearly correct for the anti-war movement, but cannot be the central demands, which remain Russian troops out and stop the war. Nonetheless, NATO’s role in Eastern Europe since the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been pernicious. American President George Bush Sr. absolutely refused to respond to the demise of its military enemies in Russia and Eastern Europe by disbanding NATO or responding to Mikhail Gorbachev’s project of a ‘Common European Homeland’ of states outside military pacts. Disbanding NATO would have disrupted the key instrument of American military, and hence political, control. Moreover, the United States has insisted on expanding the boundaries of NATO right up to the borders of Russia in every case. This of course is something that the United States – the inclusion of Mexico or Canada in a hostile military alliance on US borders – would never accept.¶ The iron grip of NATO is designed to ensure American dominance, and hence, loyalty in inter-imperialist conflicts of European states to the United States. It is no wonder then that the question of NATO has become a key line of a divide as far as the Keir Starmer leadership in the Labour Party is concerned. Starmer and his parliamentary whips threatened to exclude 12 Labour MPs from the Parliamentary Labour Party if they spoke at a rally with an anti-NATO message. Starmer has repeatedly stated Labour’s complete loyalty to NATO, a message to the British capitalist class that under him Labour can be trusted. Technically, any member of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) could be excluded from the Labour Party because of the campaign’s anti-NATO position, although, for the moment, this is unlikely to be implemented. In the context of Starmer’s prostration before NATO and British capitalism, it is strange to find a left-wing website attacking Jeremy Corbyn for making ‘an anti-NATO speech.¶ In the context of the present war, it is utterly cynical for Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov to excuse atrocities committed by Russian forces by reference to what the West did in Iraq and Afghanistan. ‘If you can commit anti-civilian atrocities, then so can we’ is unlikely to be a convincing argument as far as world public opinion is concerned. Even worse, Russian commentators on Channel 4 News merely say ‘war is hell, this is war’. The death, pain, suffering, and misery imposed on the Ukrainian people cannot be justified by any reference to the crimes of the West, whether the leading Western states were wearing their NATO hats or not. The central slogans of the Left and all progressive forces have to be against the Russian war, for a ceasefire and a withdrawal of all Russian troops.¶ In Britain, there is an enormous mobilisation of ordinary people and even whole communities to give material aid to refugees from Ukraine. Polish centres up and down the country, as well as Ukrainian community centres, are awash with donations of money, clothes, sleeping bags, and other necessities that refugees might need for their onward journeys. Of course, this outburst of social solidarity is promoted by the awful scenes of carnage and destruction in Ukraine. It’s true that the incredible brutality of the Western-backed and organised bombing campaign by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has not produced such an outpouring of solidarity because it has been barely covered in the mass media, and because Ukrainians are ‘people like us.’¶ Nonetheless, people who collect support for Ukrainian refugees, and millions more, are rightly horrified by the Russian attacks and their dreadful consequences. The anti-war movement cannot turn its face away from these people but should participate, to the best of our ability, in such actions. We must encourage people to give material aid and demand refugees be admitted to Britain.¶ Because of the ongoing inter-imperialist conflict, there are competing narratives about what is happening on a world scale. The overwhelming narrative in the Western media is about the defence of democracy against Russian and Chinese dictatorship and aggression. But in reality, there is a huge and developing inter-imperialist conflict, in which the United States is a major source of militarisation and aggression.¶ Regrettably, a lot of people on the Left internationally do not clearly condemn the Russian invasion and champion the right of the Ukrainian people to self-defence. It is easier, as they see it, just to take sides with one imperialist camp or another. This we should refuse to do. Our understanding of the role of NATO and the United States cannot lead us to downplay or in any way excuse the Russian attack. On the morning of February 24, within minutes of hearing the news of the invasion, I posted on Facebook condemning the attack as an act of criminal brutality and irresponsibility; I said thousands would die in the initial fighting. It is this attack that must remain the target of left-wing mobilisation and protest, despite our understanding of the developing global inter-imperialist conflict.

#### NATO is a tool for US imperial expansion- it secures global resources for American based companies

Leonard 19

(Tom Leonard. Head Librarian and Professor of Journalism at Berkeley. "Imperialism and NATO at 70". 12-3-2019. International Socialists. https://www.socialist.ca/node/3987. 6-21-2022.)-cg

Two contradictions between the ideals professed in the Washington Treaty and actually existing reality were present right from NATO’s birth. The professed commitment to democracy was belied by the fact that the original signatories included Portugal, at that time ruled by the quasi-fascist police state of Antonio Salazar. Portugal did not become democratic until Salazar’s Estada Novo was overthrown by a popular revolution in 1974, twenty-five years after NATO’s founding. NATO member Greece, which joined the alliance in 1952, was ruled by a military junta from April 1967 through its overthrow in 1974, but NATO supported the junta throughout.¶ The commitment to peace is likewise questionable. Consider that NATO is the most powerful military organization on the planet, and has been since it was founded. NATO member countries collectively spent more US$900 billion on military expenditures in 2016 (roughly US$600 billion of which was spent by the United States), more than half of the approximately US$1.7 trillion spent globally on the military that year. Even in its founding year 1949, the twelve NATO members collectively spent an estimated US$116 billion (in year 2000 US$) on military expenditures, compared with the estimated US$84 billion spent by their principal opponent the USSR. From these figures, it is clear that NATO has enjoyed military superiority over its rivals since its inception.¶ When one adds to this the approximately US$218 billion spent collectively on the military by close NATO allies Saudi Arabia, India, Japan and South Korea in 2016, the military dominance of the alliance becomes even clearer. NATO members and these four countries accounted for two-thirds of global military spending in 2016, compared with the US$66 billion spent by Russia (approximately 4% of the global total). To put Russia’s military spending into perspective, NATO member the U.K., hardly a great power any longer and completely incapable of launching a war on its own, spent more than US$60 billion on its military that year, which is 90% of the Russian figure. The U.K. is one of 29 NATO members and not the largest military spender in the alliance, by an order of magnitude. There is simply no comparison between the military capacity of NATO and the military capacity of Russia. China comes closer, but the US$228 billion spent by China (approximately 13% of global military spending) is still dwarfed by the amounts spent collectively by NATO members. Even if the massive spending of the United States is removed from the equation, NATO members still collectively spent substantially more than China did on its military in 2016, and approximately four times what Russia did.¶ The alliance now directly touches Russia’s borders in the Baltic, and if Ukraine and Georgia were to join, would add thousands of kilometres of shared border in Russia’s west and south. This at a time when the Russian state probably controls less territory than at any point in history since the reign of Catherine the Great. As has been noted elsewhere, NATO has now achieved what neither Hitler nor Napoleon were able to – the encirclement of a territorially reduced Russia by a hostile military alliance.¶ This policy of enlargement is not an accident, but rather a reflection of the wider dynamic of competition in the international state system. In a capitalist economy, individual firms compete with each other for greater shares of a given market, and thus greater profits. The dynamic of competition in the economy compels individual firms – units of capital – to constantly seek technological innovations so as to produce their goods more cheaply and undercut their competitors. Those firms that fail to innovate go bankrupt, with their assets bought up by other firms. So there is a tendency in a competitive economy for individual firms to become smaller in number but greater in size over time. Eventually, a given market becomes dominated by a small number of very large firms. Think about internet search, for instance – after proliferation of different search engines in the 1990s, a very small number of firms dominate today, with one of them, Google, being preponderant.¶ This market ‘maturation’ compels firms to seek out new markets elsewhere as they can no longer grow their profits in their home market. So successful firms tend to grow beyond the borders of the state in which they’re based. This brings them into competition with firms (capitals) based in other states, internationalizing the economic competition between units of capital and compelling national states to compete with each other, each defending the interests, markets and profits of their ‘own’ firms. So, the economic competition between capitalist firms tends to become political competition between capitalist states. This political aspect of capitalist competition is conducted with all the means at a state’s disposal - trade deals and regulations, tariffs, alliances both economic and military, and the threat of or actual use of military force.¶ The expansion of NATO is best understood through this lens. Russia and China are capitalist societies, just as are the United States and its allies, including Canada, and the other states mentioned here, such as Saudi Arabia and India. All of them are locked in a system of competitive rivalry as each tries to out-maneuver the other to gain a strategic advantage. There may very well be differences of approach between this or that state, different conceptions of what the ‘national interest’ is and how best to pursue it at a given moment, and different conceptions of the ideal end-state to which they all strive. But all of them are locked in a competitive system of imperialism, ultimately driven by the dynamics of capitalist competition.

#### NATO is a tool of U.S. imperialism – increases U.S. military sales and provides excuses to maneuver armies

Hassan 08 (Ghali Hassan is an independent writer living in Australia. “NATO: A Tool Of U.S. Imperialism,” 8/25/8, https://countercurrents.org/hassan250808.htm)

The U.S.-controlled North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has lost its purpose to continue as a defence alliance. However, its aggressive expansion is endangering world peace and the survival of the planet. Despite its irrelevant role, NATO has become part of the U.S. military. Instead of dismantling the once defence alliance, the U.S. pushed to enlarge NATO and expand its boundaries. The U.S. has lured most European nations, including former Warsaw Pact members, the so-called “New Europe”, to join its military. Poland, Hungry and the Czech Republic joined in 1999; Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuanian, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania in 2004, others are waiting in line. Becoming a NATO member proves to be a profit bonanza for U.S.-Israeli weapon industries and arm dealers. All new recruits into NATO are obliged to increase their “defence” budgets to modernise and enlarge their military arsenals at the expense of vital public services. It is important to bear in mind that the U.S.-NATO demands for expansion have met with opposition from Russia, China – with a legitimate concern against unprovoked threat – and nations such as Germany, the Netherlands and France. Almost all new mini-dictators supported the illegal U.S. aggression against the Iraqi people. They are in complete complicity in the war crimes committed by the regime of George Bush despite overwhelming majority of their citizens’ opposition to U.S. aggression. From the criminal U.S. aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the ongoing murderous occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, the new European armies have become U.S. foot soldiers serving U.S. imperialist interests. Engineering and using crisis in Europe and elsewhere, the U.S. cancelled the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in order to locate ABMs and to lure more nations to sign up for the system, including Australia, South Korea and Japan. Under the fraudulent pretext of defence against “rogue” states, the U.S. has just signed a “deal” with Poland to station on Polish soil U.S. “interceptor missiles”. The provocative deal is seen by Russians as a dangerous opportunity for the U.S. to expand its military presence and threat across the world. Poland hailed the deal as a counter to Russian “threat”. Of course Poland is fully aware that the missiles are against Russia not Iran, as the U.S. continues to mislead the public. After Poland, the U.S. is planning to build a twin anti-missile radar system in the Czech Republic. Many Poles as well as Czechs are against the deals and rightly believe their countries are becoming vassal states of a dangerous U.S. militarism. Since the end of the so-called “Cold War”, the U.S. aim has always been a quest for imperialist domination of the globe through U.S. militarism, including the establishment of U.S. military bases in strategic areas of the world. The U.S. policy of destabilising Russia and undermining Russia’s integration with Europe is aimed at controlling Eurasia’s natural resources . The events of 9/11 provided the U.S. with a pretext to justify the U.S. war on Islam and a global imperialist expansion. It is hard to believe that the recent unprovoked aggression by Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili against the semi-independent district of South Ossetia wasn’t engineered by the U.S. ruling class in Washington. The aggression came at the time when Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was at the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony and President Dmitry Medvedev on holiday. Georgian air force and heavy rocket and artillery indiscriminately attacked the town of Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia at midnight destroying schools, hospitals, homes, and even the University, leaving much of the city in ruins. Hundreds of innocent civilians were killed in the first hours of the attack. Saakashvili’s U.S.-Israeli trained Special Forces shot 10 Russian peacekeepers stationed there under an international peace agreement. Saakashvili’s aim was to take control of South Ossetia and ethnically cleanse it of its majority Russian inhabitants. Saakashvili thought that destroying Tskhinvali and terrorising the population may go well with his plan to please Washington and joins NATO as a new U.S. proxy army. Meanwhile, the aggression provides the U.S. and its vassals with a pretext to use “humanitarian aid” deliveries to Georgia as cover for a military build-up in the Black Sea. Whatever the outcome, Saakashvili (like Bush) must be suffering from lack of rational thinking. Saakashvili’s aggression may have enhanced U.S. anti-Russian propaganda, it has encouraged a rethinking among many European heavy weight nations (who rightly see Russia as an important part of Europe), that playing with fire close to Russia’s border is not a very good idea. With several European countries – France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Norway, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg and Portugal – still have their doubts, Georgia’s bid to join NATO may have suffered a terminal setback as a result of Saakashvili’s war crimes in South Ossetia. Russia has a legitimate right to protect its citizens. Most Ossetians are Russian citizens and do not want to be dominated by a racist Georgia. Russia’s response to Saakachvili’s aggression was swift and in full compliance with international laws. Saakashvili’s army of mercenaries – trained and armed by the U.S. and Israel – has suffered a deserving humiliating defeat that should be a lesson to all those “new” European vassals who think they can participate in U.S. war crimes and count on U.S. help. Yet despite Georgia’s unprovoked aggression, Western-Zionist mainstream media led by the BBC, CNN, NBC, Fox News, New York Times and Washington Post turned the aggressor into a victime. In a grotesque display of distortion and dishonesty, Western media lauded Saakashvili as “democrat” defending democracy against the “Russian Bear”. Of course, forgotten are the U.S.-staged rigged elections that brought Saakashvili to power, Saakashvili’s corrupt authoritarian rule, the banning of news broadcasts, mass arrests of dissidents and Georgian police and masked thugs firing on peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi and the imposition of marshal law. Playing on the prejudice and ignorance of their populations, Western media is demonising Russia in order to create an enemy and divert the public from ongoing war crimes perpetuated by Western governments. The ongoing anti-Russian propaganda is reminiscent of Nazis propaganda during World War II to manipulate the people and create an anti-Russian sentiment. All of this is in accord with U.S. quest for an imperialist control of the planet and the application of Neocons-fascist ideology of global hegemonic control. Meanwhile, George Bush (speaking on behalf of the “West”) unashamedly condemned Russia’s legitimate response to Georgia’s unprovoked aggression as “disproportionate”, and added: “[It] is unacceptable in the 21st Century”. The hypocrisy and double standards continued: “This is not 1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia where Russia can threaten a neighbour, occupy a capital, overthrow a government and get away with it”, ranted Condoleezza Rice, the tireless Secretary of Travelling. Did Bush and his Rice forget the U.S. premeditated and illegal invasion of and destruction of the Iraqi state, including the murder of members of Iraq legitimate government? Before criticising Russia, the U.S. ruling class should take a hard look at U.S. history of massive atrocities and serious war crimes committed around the world. Indeed, the U.S. government is the only government who get a way with any crime it commits. Hence, the U.S. ruling class and their complicit media must be suffering from the contagious diseases of moral bankruptcy and classic hypocrisy. The U.S. ruling class, the Bush regime in particular, has no moral standing whatsoever to criticize Russia for protecting Russian nationals and defending South Ossetia against unprovoked aggression. After more than five years of murderous Occupation, the Bush regime is directly responsible for the premeditated killing of more than 1.3 million innocent Iraqi civilians. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians are imprisoned and tortured on regular basis, and at leas 5 million Iraqis have been displaced as refugees living in appalling conditions. The entire sovereign nation of Iraq is destroyed in a premeditated act of aggression justified by outright lies. Moreover, despite the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people’s opposition to the Occupation, the Bush regime refused to withdraw U.S. troops and mercenaries from Iraq and end the murderous Occupation of their nation. Finally, it is obvious that Western governments and their mainstream media are demonising Russia even if Russia is not the aggressor. As Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister told the media: “NATO is trying to make a victim of an aggressor and whitewash a criminal regime - save a collapsing regime - and is taking a path to the rearmament of the current leaders in Georgia”. Saakashvili as perpetrator of war crimes has become the victime by embarking on an ill-advised act of aggression not dissimilar from U.S. recent acts of aggression. World peace is greatly served by multilateralism and international institutions without an aggressive U.S. military expansion. The transformation of NATO into a tool of U.S. imperialism is endangering the survival of the planet.

#### **NATO reinforces militarism, committing international war crimes along the way**

Trippe No Date, (Clara Trippe, an intern with CODEPINK, "NATO Should Indeed Be Obsolete: 70 Years of Militarism is Enough," CODEPINK - Women for Peace, <https://www.codepink.org/nato_should_indeed_be_obsolete_70_years_of_militarism_is_enough)-Cayden> Mayer

It’s unfortunate that Trump has focused on military spending, jettisoning his original—and correct—notion that NATO should be obsolete. NATO was originally founded by the US and 11 other Western nations as an attempt to curb the rise of communism in 1949. Six years later, Communist nations, led by the Soviet Union, founded the Warsaw Pact and through these two multilateral institutions the entire globe became a field for the warring interests between the US and the Soviets. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, but NATO continued to exist and in fact expand--growing from its original 12 members to 29 member countries. While claiming to be a force of peace, it is clear from NATO’s origin and continued actions that the organization was created to expand Western influence using military intervention. To this day, NATO plays a key role in military conflicts and commits human rights violations around the globe under the pretense of peacebuilding. In 1999, NATO engaged in military operations without UN approval in Yugoslavia. Its illegal airstrikes during the Kosovo War left hundreds of civilians dead. NATO has continued illegal military actions, including attacks on civilians, torture of prisoners, and unauthorized airstrikes, particularly in the Middle East region. NATO has been waging war in Afghanistan since 2001. In 2011, it illegally invaded Libya, destabilizing that country and creating a failed state. Even though NATO’s bombing of Libya caused masses of people to flee, NATO refused aid to desperate migrants on the Mediterranean, causing thousands to die. NATO’s actions continue to destabilize the regions they occupy, mainly through indiscriminate attacks that regularly kill civilians. In more recent years, NATO has exacerbated Cold War-era tensions as it has expanded to Russia’s borders, despite earlier promises not to move eastward. In response, tensions between Western powers and Russia have been rising. This has led to multiple close calls between military forces. It has also led both US and Russia to bolster their nuclear arsenals, spurring a new arms race. While organizations like Amnesty International have accused NATO of war crimes, the organization avoids accountability because of the shared power of its member countries. It’s impossible to say that NATO has conformed to its original premise to increase freedom and security around the globe. Instead, its role has been one of increasing conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. In a world where people are desperate to end war and are anxious to see a transfer of public funds from the military to human needs , NATO should indeed become a relic of the past. Seventy years of militarism is enough.

#### NATO is a tool for neolib expansion through free market reforms

Levytskyy ‘11

(Andriy Levytskyy, DePaul University college for Liberal Arts and Social Sciences; “Security misread: A critical analysis of Ukraine's debate on NATO”, DePaul University, 11/11, <https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1109&context=etd> DOA 6/21/22)//nm

NATO as a Dutiful Agent of Neoliberalism While the IMF and World Bank have been the most powerful advocates of neoliberal reforms in the developing world over the last three decades, NATO, WTO and the European Central Bank joined the race to spread neoliberalism shortly after the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. If Central and Eastern Europe‟s integration into the Western Alliance‟s institutional framework was recently accomplished and consolidated, Ukraine‟s reorientation has attained an advanced stage in the economic and political spheres. Rachel Epstein argues that international institutions have had a significant influence on post communist countries which have set themselves on a free market reform trajectory.405 According to Epsein, the liberal, or as I call it neoliberal, worldview that currently prevails in the minds of political and economic elites of Eastern and Central Europe is supported “by a perception of where authority is grounded.” 406 For most parts of Eastern and Central Europe, the transition to political pluralism and free market enterprise “has been marked by a shift from domestic sources of authority, such as historical experience and nationalist striving to international sources of authority, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Bretton Woods institutions.”407 Epstein‟s claim that “Domestic actors view international institutions as authoritative sources of information and, as a consequence, seek their approbation,” is very persuasive.408 International institutions not only exercise power over policymaking elites and consequently determine an international orientation of states, they also influence the “domestic balance of power among groups in society.” 409 International institutions, whose main priority is to develop new policy programs, persuade and shape the actions of domestic actors and should be viewed as active agents of domestic and global change.410 While I realize that a number of different theoretical approaches can be relevant for the evaluation of the role of the state in today‟s internationalized world and extremely useful for our understanding of how international institutions and regimes can transform political dynamics, this section attempts only to highlight the point that international organizations have promoted consensus around the neoliberal policy manifestations in the countries undergoing transition. More important, the point is that multilateral institutions play a key role in regional and global processes of monitoring and implementation of free market-oriented knowledge structure while disciplining alternative knowledge, ideas, policy options, and practices. As previously mentioned, for Ukraine, Euro-Atlantic integration means not only being a member of collective security system, but fostering of economic development through a neoliberal political and constitutional framework. If for Walt, Ukraine‟s participation in the transatlantic cooperative security arrangement can increase the state‟s strength in relation to Russia and enhance its regional influence, according to Brett Leed‟s and Andrew Long‟s hypothesis, Euro-Atlantic integration means more for Ukraine than just being an associate of military organization.411 Leeds and Long assert that military allies unconditionally have positive economic consequences, and members of the collective security system are expected to facilitate economic growth, development and trade.412 For scholars, the security externality and the reaction of commercial institutions are the main motives and explanations for intensive engagement in mercantilism. Leeds and Long conclude that “When firms feel secure that conflict between their state and that of their trading partners is unlikely to occur and that the states will work together to promote commerce between their respective businesses, they are more likely to invest in trade.”413 As determined by the liberalist theoretical perspective of international relations, Ukraine‟s membership in NATO will provide a well-balanced and secure framework for regional and international economic activity, and thereby will encourage close trading relationships and reassure the international community that economic cooperation remains safe. Namely, the liberal view with its ideas of complex interdependence and functionalism ascribes to NATO a crucial role in driving states to collaborate in a much more widespread way than they had done before. Liberal explanations for the incorporation of Ukraine into NATO derive from the idea that all states are bound to benefit from interdependency and cooperation. This argument stresses that while NATO reduces the threat for nascent democracies and thereby promotes and extends the liberal community, the Alliance also continues to play a security role. Liberal scholars see NATO as one of many multilateral mechanisms to promote security and transnational cooperation through reinforcing democracy and free market economies. In fact, my point is that the only arguments which demonstrate security advantages for Ukraine joining NATO seem to rely more on particular Wilsonian liberal internationalism or constructivist notions about the constitutive role of alliances rather than realist conventional wisdom. According to Epstein, countries who are not even members of the Alliance yet, but have joined the path to its membership, already demonstrate their devotion to Western political and economic models. Through the Partnership for Peace, a program directed at creating trust between NATO and non-members, a process of denationalization of defense planning and foreign policy in majority of countries of Eastern and Central Europe has already taken place.414 Furthermore, while the partnership commits to extend defense cooperation between a non-member state and the Alliance, it pushes a cooperative non-member state to transform power relations from an executive-led model to a model of democratic civil-military relations.415 One of the main focuses of NATO has always been the establishment of “a system of check and balances in which the executive, government, parliament, and society, through the media and nongovernmental organizations would share in oversight.”416 Moreover, particular transformations in defense will not only lead to further distributional consequences, but signify a transformation of “previously contested ideas into commonly held assumptions.”417 It follows, therefore that NATO uses its membership requirements not only to regulate the behavior of societies, but also to define new tasks, create new categories of actors and shape social reality in ways that favor a market-oriented approach. Alexandra Gheciu‟s book NATO in the “New Europe” The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War is an analytical examination of NATO‟s role in building of construction of Western liberal norms and practices in former Communist states. While analyzing the practices of NATO in Eastern and Central Europe, Gheciu argues that NATO has been deeply involved in socializing “Central and Eastern European political, military, and functional elites into adopting Western-defined liberal democratic norms and building corresponding institutions in their states.”418 Through NATO‟s involvement in the numerous processes of domestic politics, the organization has “played an important role in post-Communist efforts in Central and Eastern Europe to (re) draw boundaries between reasonable/unacceptable definitions of national identity and interests”419 While Gheciu unifies a great number of arguments that are useful for my study, the claim that NATO has been deeply engaged in a relatively broad set of activities aimed at projection of a particular kind of liberal state identity in Central and Eastern Europe, “while simultaneously rejecting alternative norms and institutions as inherently flawed” is important. 420

### NATO Human Security

#### Even seemingly benign calls for NATO to focus on “human security” only serve to obfuscate the alliance’s role in spreading militarism and securing a US led imperial order

**Acheson ’21** (Ray Acheson, Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, represents the organization on the International Steering Group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for highlighting the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and working with governments to negotiate and adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, has an Honours BA in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Toronto and an MA in Politics from The New School for Social Research; 2/21, “The patriarchal militarism of NATO’s reflection group”, Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 A response to the official NATO Reflection Group, NATO Watch 2021, page 17, <https://natowatch.org/node/2495> DOA 6/21/22)//nm

The NATO reflection group report has a patriarchy problem. Given that NATO is primarily a military alliance, this is not surprising. But for a report that is looking ahead for the next decade, it offers retrogressive views not just on human security and the so-called Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, but also in terms of how it addresses concepts such as “cohesion” what it considers to be the biggest threats to NATO, and how it thinks the alliance should best deal with those challenges. Overall, the report embraces patriarchal approaches to “security”, dissention within NATO and where the alliance should go from here. The recommendations further entrench NATO members in a militarist pursuit of dominance, rather than true community and cooperation either internally or internationally. NATO members should reject this approach. The abolition of NATO would be the most straightforward way to allow its individual members to pursue genuine collective security with others. In the interim, NATO members that authentically care about peace, justice, international law, human rights and dignity, and cooperation need to renounce the violent masculinities1 espoused in this report, including by rejecting nuclear weapons and working to remove all weapons of mass destruction from NATO’s doctrine. They could also withdraw from NATO and adopt feminist foreign policies, finding common ground with other members of the world community for the nonviolent pursuit of peace and justice. NATO, WPS and human security A one-page section in the 67-page report deals with “Human Security and Women, Peace and Security” (WPS). These subjects come across as an afterthought of the report’s authors, who were perhaps seeking to check the ‘gender box’ that is increasingly a staple of checklists within many intergovernmental agencies. This suspicion deepens when reading the text, in which NATO both simultaneously positions itself as a progressive leader in respecting “human dignity” while making it clear that any efforts within these agenda items are exclusively for public point-scoring, not for serious policy development. The report urges NATO members to promote the alliance’s “work” on human security by including it in public messaging, especially to the “younger generation”. It suggests NATO should “leverage existing partnerships with civil society organisations” in order to “build a group of emissaries for its work in human security and in WPS, including female role models from countries where NATO has made a positive contribution”. It goes on to assert, “The personal stories, experiences, and engagement of such a group would provide NATO with a strong asset in ongoing efforts to raise awareness of the Alliance’s constructive role in promoting stability and addressing drivers of conflict” (p.43). Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 18 February 2021 Note that it doesn’t suggest NATO actually address drivers of conflict—just that it should spend more time telling people that it does. However, NATO does not address root causes of conflict. NATO members themselves drive many of the ongoing conflicts in the world. Their individual and collective policies of militarism, and the violent masculinities these policies reflect and further entrench, are part of the root causes of conflict. Rather than working within the human security and WPS agendas in order to prevent conflict, or seek nonviolent, non-militarised solutions to conflict, NATO reflexively turns again and again to weapons, war, aggression, and threats in order to promote and protect its interests. The challenges posed by institutionalising WPS The WPS agenda has, to a large extent, become about strategically instrumentalising women’s participation in order to legitimise existing practice. Academics Marie Bell and Milli Lake have well-articulated this problem, noting that “Adding certain excluded groups into existing institutions will ultimately reinforce the same patriarchal, capitalist, and militarist logics of hierarchy and exclusion that denied those groups access to power in the first place”.2 While women’s participation—and gender diverse people—is imperative and should be automatic, the way that the WPS agenda has been implemented over the past twenty years unfortunately has reinforced rather than challenged or changed the underpinnings of militarism throughout security discourse and practice. Rather than challenging the patriarchal structures and systems that have created the militarised world order, once inside these systems, most women tend to actively maintain it in order to maintain their positions. Nor do many of these women believe they should have to “carry the burden” of changing policies or structures. In a study from New America about women’s participation in the US nuclear weapon complex, for example, several women interviewed felt they were dismissed by male colleagues on the assumption that they would favour weapon cuts or disarmament. They had to prove, as former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller said she sought to do, that “women aren’t afraid of nuclear weapons”.3 As feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe says, “You can militarise anything, including equality”.4 You can also apparently whitewash anything, including NATO’s role as an aggressor in international politics. In its section on human security and WPS, the reflection group’s report asserts that “emphasising the value of human dignity and security differentiates NATO from authoritarian rivals and terrorist groups, which are among the world’s human rights abusers” (p.43). Yet NATO members have led and been involved in bombing raids that have killed civilians and destroyed cities and towns leaving civilians without housing, hospitals, food, schools, or basic water and sanitation.5 NATO members are also, for the most part, hostile towards or lacklustre about the current international political process to end the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, which is essential for protecting civilians and achieving human security.6 In keeping with this position, the report recommends that NATO continue to prioritise “military necessity” over protecting civilians. It admits that NATO forces could perhaps improve in terms of their “sensitivity to the need to protect vulnerable populations and sites” (p.43), but falls far short of suggesting that NATO stop bombing populated areas, or that its members stop leading wars of aggression, carrying out extrajudicial killings through drone strikes, or allowing their soldiers and military contractors to commit war crimes with impunity.7 If NATO wants to legitimately incorporate human security and WPS into its strategy, it cannot remain a military alliance. Human security cannot be achieved through militarism and violence. It is built through equity, justice and safety for all; through investments in housing, education, food, water and sanitation, and environmental protection; it is built through initiatives to end racism, sexism, homophobia and ableism.

### Realism

#### Realism’s exclusive focus on nation-states and its belief in the universal rules governing their affairs masks the imperialist nature of international relations and re-entrenches Eurocentrism in IR

Tarak Barkawi in 2010

Department of International History, The London School of Economics and Political Science; Empire and Order in International Relations and Security Studies; International Studies; https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-164

As a consequence, security studies and IR lack a coherent and developed body of inquiry on questions of empire (Barkawi and Laffey 2002). There is little in the way of an ongoing conversation traversing older and contemporary scholarship on which a review essay conventionally can report. This is an astonishing but also constitutive absence. For many, the modern world took shape around the imperial encounter between Europeans and the Americas, Africa, and Asia (Said 1993; Wolf 1997; Bayly 2004). From this perspective, a social science of “international relations” that failed to address empire and imperialism, or in significant measure orientate inquiry around hierarchy and domination, is not adequate to the experiences and histories of most of the peoples and places on the planet (cf. Buzan and Little 2000). Alternatively, such a social science is written by and for the powerful (Hoffman 1977). IR and security studies scholars, and their university departments, research centers, thinktanks, journals, and publishers, are mostly located in the West, and chiefly in the US, shaping perspectives in manifold ways (cf. Tickner and Waever 2009). Considering the heavy traffic in the US between the academy and thinktanks, policy planning staffs, and government, there are power/knowledge problems yet to be fully understood or confronted (Simpson 1998; Amadae 2003; Gilman 2003; Oren 2003; Laffey and Weldes 2008). Unlike anthropology, IR and security studies have not come to terms with their own implication in imperial power and what this might mean for how they understand the world (Asad 1973; Fabian 1983). Postcolonial critiques of Eurocentrism in social and political inquiry do not have wide currency in the discipline (Chatterjee 1986; Chakrabarty 2000; Slater 2004; Barkawi and Laffey 2006).¶ Of course, it is all in how one defines “international relations.” The absence of empire and hierarchy is constitutive in that inquiry is oriented around sovereignty and anarchy instead. The central problematic in the discipline is that of a system of independent wills, figured as sovereign states, relating to and competing with one another in the absence of higher authority. “None is entitled to command; none is required to obey” (Waltz 1979:88). This problematic requires “units” that are “formally” alike, in that they are sovereign entities, even if they differ in their relative power and capabilities. The inattention to hierarchy is principled and systematic, not inadvertent (cf. Lake 2009). A consequence in IR and security studies is that Westphalian terms of reference often occlude and distort imperial relations. One purpose of this essay is to reveal these moments of misidentification and misconception, especially in the form of broad suppositions at work in the literature, and in so doing to open new spaces for research.¶ The central focus of IR situates discussion of imperialism and hierarchy outside the core of the discipline, and on its fringes where scholars from other disciplines engage with IR and security studies literature. Similarly, in respect of security studies in particular, the focus is mostly on major war between great powers, not “small wars” between the strong and the weak. When “small wars” are considered, as well as other conflicts in the global South, inquiry is all too often informed by sovereign conceptions of the international system, as in many studies of civil war and in the democratic peace literature (Licklider 1995; Ray 1995). In a framing engendered by the idea of the sovereign state, “civil war” in the global South is primarily conceived as an internal phenomenon (e.g., Holsti 1996:25–26). This is so despite the past and present role of former imperial powers, the activities of international organizations, states, and commercial enterprises, as well as the global economic relations that help produce and sustain “civil wars” (Reno 1998; Duffield 2001; Mamdani 2001; Nordstrom 2004; Gleditsch 2007). Alternatively, much literature on “counterinsurgency,” “counterterror,” and other conflicts involving Western powers is baldly written from the perspective of “how to do it better”; that is, from the point of view of imperial power, a policy science for the powerful (Pape 1996; Johnson and Mason 2008; cf. Al-Qaeda n.d.; Mao 1937). Such studies are not generally placed within an overall account of international hierarchy or the long run of imperial conflicts and histories. Yet defeating indigenous armed resistance and determining the conditions under which foreign peoples are governed is the stuff of imperial power. So another task for this essay is to situate existing literature on “small wars,” “civil wars,” and “low intensity conflict” within a framework of imperialism and international hierarchy, rather than the formal juridical categories of the sovereign state system.¶ Forgetting empire is often a function of Eurocentrism, of the unreflective assumption of the centrality of Europe and latterly the West in human affairs. In IR this often involves placing the great powers at the center of analysis, as the primary agents in determining the fate of peoples. Too easily occluded here are the myriad international relations of co-constitution, which together shape societies and polities in both the global North and South. For how else would we be able to address the impact generated by a war in far-off Vietnam on the US, and its subsequent role ever since in shaping American society, politics, and foreign interventions? Vietnam was neither the first nor the last “small war” to have such big consequences, but understanding how and why requires an “imperial turn” in IR (Doty 1996).

### Russia Threat

#### The 1AC’s claims of Russia as a security threat are means of legitimizing neoliberal power

Levytskyy ‘11

(Andriy Levytskyy, DePaul University college for Liberal Arts and Social Sciences; “Security misread: A critical analysis of Ukraine's debate on NATO”, DePaul University, 11/11, <https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1109&context=etd> DOA 6/21/22)//nm

The Russian perception of the Atlantic Alliance and its enlargement elicits an antagonistic reaction from Moscow and is an important factor in Ukraine‟s desire to join NATO. In the minds of the Russian political elite as well as the average Russian, the prospect of a new wave of NATO expansion to include Ukraine indicates a “continuation of the policy aimed at pushing Russia out of its traditional spheres of influence, and a move that signifies Russia‟s encirclement with international protectorates or mandate territories of a Bosnia-Kosovo type.”117 For Russia, on the basis of the historical assumptions, the process of NATO‟s eastward enlargement seems to be motivated by the Western intentions to exploit Russia‟s weakness and should not be viewed as a peaceful process. In fact, a strong opposition to the idea of Ukrainian membership in NATO and the Alliance‟s continuous expansion all the way to Russia‟s borders is a clear sign of NATO‟s dismissal of Russian interests, and therefore evokes a harsh reaction from the Russian political establishment. If the inclusion of three Baltic countries heightened Russia‟s sense of isolation, the Ukrainian accession to NATO, according to the average Russian, would be decisive evidence of Western attempts to isolate and subordinate Russians at the same time.118 The point is that while Western World perhaps views NATO as being transformed into a political organization, in Russia**, the Alliance is considered in purely military terms.** From the Russian perspective, plans to incorporate Ukraine into the Western military alliance along with the American proposal to deploy anti-ballistic missile (ABM) components in Eastern Europe are grounded on realist reasoning and are targeted against Russia, regardless of whether there is an authoritarian or democratic form of government. Western behavior has been interpreted as aggressive, and an extension of NATO‟s influence as a threat to Russia‟s security Within Russian society it is generally accepted that the process of NATO enlargement is connected to Western perceptions of Russia as being a potential enemy.119 Such an assumption is based on anti-Russian opinions, prevalent mostly in the United States and Eastern Europe, which are rooted in the past dating back hundreds of years, and which since the end of the Cold War have continued to be full of hostility.120 The growth of Russia‟s defense spending, its attempts to preserve its traditional sphere of influence and its elimination of domestic opposition have contributed to an image of Russia as a potential threat. This view of Russia as a source of danger was recently reinforced by the depiction of war in Georgia by the Western mass-media. While rejecting Georgia‟s role in starting the conflict along with ignoring the importance of the U.S. material support to Saakashvili's regime, Western journalists, according to historian Herbert Bix, “Fostered Russophobic sentiment by disseminating completely one-sided war news, demonizing Russia as the evil aggressor, and championing „democratic‟, peace-loving Georgia.”121 While realizing that it is not possible to completely grasp the objectivity and being willing to adjust myself to the relativity of truth claims, I tend to agree with this viewpoint. Moreover, this debate clearly demonstrates how power relations contribute to the formation of certain knowledge and leads to conclude that perceptions play a critical role in the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO. As seen from Moscow, a new round of hostility towards Russia clearly confirms that the West‟s struggle against communism and the Soviet Union had not ideological, but exclusively geopolitical meaning. This viewpoint finds its support in different schools of thought regarding the strategic geopolitical importance of the area of the former Soviet bloc precisely to the United States. Nevertheless, to provide a clear and a strong explanation for NATO‟s engagement with the countries of the former Soviet Union, it is necessary to refer to the geopolitical views of one of the prominent advocates of NATO‟s membership for Ukraine which is motivated by the resentment toward Russia. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor in the Carter administration, has portrayed Russia‟s exercise of its influence on neighboring states as a extension of uncivilized and “proto-imperial approach”, and has argued for the adoption of the Western policy of “geopolitical pluralism” that should seek as its primary objective to guarantee that Russia would not become a “mighty supranational state and a truly global power.”122 According to Brzezinski, the political, military and economic integration of the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe should be a basic strategy of the Western geopolitical approach.123 Furthermore, in terms of Russian-Ukrainian relations, Brzezinski confirms this mode of thinking by arguing that “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”124 Therefore, as it can be seen from this realist analysis of the role and place of once-Soviet states in Europe, it is clear that NATO‟s engagement with Ukraine is a part of a broader policy directed to oppose Russian interests in the region. Unfortunately, being great supporters of Ukraine‟s NATO membership, the majority of Western thinkers and policymakers such as Brzezinski simply ignores both the real interests of ordinary Ukrainians and their everyday reality and has been consciously pushing Ukraine into a culturally driven conflict with Russia.125

## Impact/Turns Case/RC

### US-China War

#### Biden’s imperialist expansions causes nuclear war between China and the US

Damon ’21 (Andre Damon, Writer and editor for the World Socialist Web Site specializing in geopolitics and economics, March 16th 2021 “US imperialism puts China in its sights” World Socialist Web Site, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/03/17/pers-m17.html)

Behind the backs of the American and world population, the Biden administration and the US military are preparing an escalation of military tensions against China with incalculable consequences. Earlier this month, the Japanese Nikkei news service published excerpts from the Pentagon’s Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which calls for stationing offensive missiles, previously banned by the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, along a string of densely populated islands that includes Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. To fund this initiative, the Pentagon requested an annual Pacific budget, in the words of Nikkei, of “$4.7 billion, which is more than double the $2.2 billion earmarked for the region in fiscal 2021.” Against the backdrop of these plans, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin visited Japan this week, threatening to “push back” against “aggression” by China. While Blinken and other US officials habitually speak of Chinese aggression, it has been the US under Obama, Trump and now Biden that has aggressively confronted China in the Indo-Pacific to prevent any challenge to American global hegemony. In a brief and tightly choreographed press conference, the two US officials and their Japanese counterparts, together with the vetted press, ignored the burning question: 75 years after American bombers obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were their policies exposing the people of Japan and China to a similar fate? While the question was not directly addressed, the answer was clear. “We reconfirmed the strong commitment of the United States regarding defense of Japan, using all types of US forces, including nuclear,” said Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi. Even as more than 1,000 people die from COVID-19 every single day in the United States, and the disease surges around the world, the US is preparing for a conflict that risks incalculable human suffering. Joining this offensive is the United Kingdom, with the highest COVID-19 death rate of the major European countries, which announced Tuesday a massive expansion of its nuclear weapons program, calling China a “major threat.” It is not COVID-19, but China that the US has planted firmly in its sights. As Blinken made clear, “Several countries present us with serious challenges, including Russia, Iran, North Korea… but the challenge posed by China is different. China is the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power” to “challenge” the United States. On March 10, Adm. Philip Davidson, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing he believes that China is likely to invade Taiwan within the next six years. “I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years,” Davidson said. Given that the United States has, in the words of Defense Secretary Austin, “commitments to support Taiwan’s ability to defend itself,” to predict that China will invade Taiwan within the next six years is to predict a major Sino-American war within that same time period. To this end, Davidson stressed, “We absolutely must be prepared to fight and win should competition turn to conflict.” What would the world look like if “competition turned to conflict?” A preview of this reality is provided by Adm. James Stavridis, former supreme allied commander of NATO, who published a book titled 2034: A Novel of the Next World War just one day before Davidson’s comments. The novel depicts a nuclear conflict between the United States and China, involving the total annihilation of major cities on both sides. Stavridis writes that after an American nuclear attack on Shanghai, one of the largest cities in the world, “These many months later the city remained a charred, radioactive wasteland. The death toll had exceeded thirty million. After each of the nuclear attacks international markets plummeted. Crops failed. Infectious diseases spread. Radiation poisoning promised to contaminate generations. The devastation exceeded… capacity for comprehension.” The American survivors of a Chinese nuclear attack on San Diego are left to live in “wretched camps,” where “cyclical outbreaks of typhus, measles, and even smallpox often sprouted from the unbilged latrines and rows of plastic tenting.” What is most striking is the contrast between these graphic depictions of mass death and the imminent danger of what Stavridis calls a “world war,” and the degree to which the public is unaware that these preparations are even underway. How many people in the US know that the United States is preparing to deploy offensive missiles in highly populated areas off the Chinese coast? And how many people in Japan? The evening news and major newspapers are silent on these war preparations, even as they relentlessly and falsely demonize China. Leading the charge has been the Washington Post, owned by Amazon oligarch Jeff Bezos. In an editorial on March 14, the Post accused China of “genocide” against its Muslim population, echoing the declarations of the Trump and Biden administrations. The Post demanded that the United States withdraw from the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, declaring that to attend “when the Xi regime is actively seeking to destroy a group of more than 12 million people would be unconscionable.” At the same time, the Post has continued its campaign to falsely assert that COVID-19 could have been created in a Chinese laboratory. It condemns the findings of the World Health Organization, which declared that, in the words of the Post, the “laboratory hypothesis was ‘extremely unlikely’ and would not be further studied.” In response, the Post declares that the “WHO needs to start over” and consider “both the zoonotic and laboratory hypotheses.” These efforts to demonize China are sheer propaganda. A major aim is to divert mounting social tensions outward toward an “external” enemy.” The 20th century’s horrific wars were prepared with such propaganda, designed to obscure the real war aims of capitalist governments. In the 21st century, the costs of a major war are greater than ever. In the 20 years of this century, despite perpetual wars and proxy conflicts, there has never been a full-scale clash between nuclear-armed states. But exactly such a war is threatened by the massive US military buildup against China. The workers of the United States and China have nothing to gain from such a horrific conflict. It is they, not the generals and politicians, who would bear the cost. If a relapse to the bloodshed of the 20th century is to be avoided, it is the working class that must prevent it. The fight against imperialism and the danger of a new world war must be developed as a revolutionary movement of workers throughout the world, in opposition to the homicidal policies of the ruling elites and the entire capitalist system

#### US imperialism results in cold war tensions with china that could spill over

Singh ’18 (Ajit Singh, journalist and graduate student. He is a contributing author to Keywords in Radical Philosophy and Education: Common Concepts for Contemporary Movements, April 9th 2018, “China’s rise threatens U.S. imperialism, not American people” MROnline, <https://mronline.org/2018/04/09/chinas-rise-threatens-u-s-imperialism-not-american-people/>)

Washington’s hostility towards Beijing is rooted in the foundation of modern U.S. foreign policy. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and end of the Cold War, ushered in an era during which the U.S. has sought to establish unipolar global dominance. Explicitly outlined in a 1992 Defense Policy Guidance paper authored under neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz, the principal objective of U.S. foreign policy in this period has been “to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival” capable of challenging U.S. aspirations for global hegemony. In the quarter-century since, the U.S. has aggressively pursued this aim, engaging in endless wars, “regime change” efforts, and military build-ups around the world, now operating over 900 military bases globally. Despite these most destructive efforts, the U.S. has been unable to stop China’s momentous rise, which has emerged as the primary obstacle to U.S. aims for unipolar dominance. Although Washington has sought regime change in Beijing ever since the socialist revolution of 1949, the U.S. has generally pursued a strategy of “containment through engagement” following the normalisation of bilateral relations in the 1970s. In part, Washington had hoped that China’s economic reform and the fall of the Soviet Union would lead to political reform in Beijing and the abandonment of Communist Party leadership and socialism with Chinese characteristics, in favour of Western-oriented neoliberalism. History has confirmed that China has no such intention. Recognizing its own declining leverage and that China will not become “more like us”, Washington is attempting to launch a new Cold War against China. The identification of China as the primary target of U.S. foreign policy originated during the Obama era with the “Asia pivot” seeking to encircle China, shifting 60 percent of U.S. naval assets to Asia by 2020. As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton argued that the U.S. must reorient the focus of its foreign policy from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific to ensure “continued American leadership well into this century.” The developments under Trump, mark an escalation of this bipartisan strategy. The unipolar-multipolar struggle The importance of U.S.-China relations cannot be overstated, with the two countries at the core of a broader unipolar-multipolar struggle over the shape of the international order. While the U.S. seeks to secure global dominance, China’s rise is central to a multipolarisation trend, in which multiple centres of power are emerging to shape a negotiated, more democratic world. China’s political orientation has been fundamentally shaped by its history of subjugation to foreign powers during its “century of humiliation” and anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, China has always identified itself as part of the Third World or global South and the collective struggle of formerly colonized and oppressed nations against the global inequality wrought by imperialism. Under the banner of “South-South cooperation”, China continues to champion this collective struggle today, promoting greater say for developing countries in global governance and the construction of a rules-based international order in place of the unilateral actions of major powers, in particular the U.S. More than mere rhetoric, China provides crucial investment, infrastructure construction, technology transfers, debt forgiveness, and diplomatic support to developing countries. Most importantly, unlike the U.S. and West which engage in destructive foreign interventions, China abides by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and does not impose conditions on its relations. China’s respect for the self-determination of other countries has made it an indispensable partner for nations resisting foreign domination and pursuing independent development, including Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Zimbabwe, Syria, Iran, and North Korea. It is for this reason that the late Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro declared in 2004 that “China has objectively become the most promising hope and the best example for all Third World countries … an important element of balance, progress and safeguard of world peace and stability.” Venezuelan foreign minister Jorge Arreaza echoed these sentiments last December, saying “Thank God humanity can count on China,” as his country faces sanctions, economic sabotage, and threats of regime change from the U.S. Contributing to the declining global authority of the U.S, China’s international relations have prompted Washington to cynically accuse China of fostering dependency in Africa and being an “imperial power” towards Latin America. In fact, rather than behaving in a predatory manner, China provides sorely needed funding, on favorable terms, to African borrowers, and as we have seen above China supports Latin America’s struggle against imperialism. That China is praised by fiercely independent nations of the global South and faces such charges from the U.S.—the most powerful empire in history—reveals the absurdity of such claims. Anxious about its own decline, the U.S. seeks to both drive a wedge between China and the South, and also restrict the right of developing nations to choose their own partners and path. China has demonstrated that its rise is compatible with the self-determination of other nations—whether capitalist or socialist; what it comes into contradiction with is U.S. imperialism. It is important to recognize that U.S. hostility towards China is not simply a product of narrow competition with the Asian power, it is a resistance to the empowerment of the global South and democratization of international relations. China is the primary target of U.S. imperialism because of its strategic importance at the heart of the world multipolarisation trend.

#### The 1ac’s struggle for technological expansion is a means of extending US imperialism to contain and dominate china—this leads to indirect forms of war

**Chen ’21** (David Chen, PhD student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Toronto; December 2020, “Rethinking Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class: China, the United States, and Twenty-First Century Imperialist Rivalry”, Guilford Press Periodicals, <https://guilfordjournals.com/doi/10.1521/siso.2021.85.1.82> DOA 6/26/22)//nm

The Sino–U. S. struggle for high-tech supremacy and the U. S. plan to torpedo China’s state-initiated program, “Made in China 2025,” which aimed to push the Chinese economy up the global value chain, is suspected to be the real reason behind the Huawei prosecution (Tabeta and Kawanami, 2018) and for the trade war (Zhou and Wang, 2019). President Donald Trump, for example, has frankly admitted when speaking to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chair Ajit Pai, “We cannot allow any other country to out-compete the United States in this powerful industry of the future. We are leading by so much in so many different industries of that type, and we just can’t let that happen. The race to 5G is a race America must win” (U. S. White House, 2019). The U. S.’ attempted takedown of Huawei therefore signifies a larger battle for high-tech supremacy between the two countries: one is positioned as the Lockean heartland hegemon and the other as a Hobbesian contender state challenging a weakened American hegemon (van der Pijl, 1998). The technology war and the trade war have unveiled a larger geopolitical and geoeconomic contest. The United States’ Pivot to Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are two grand strategies being used to counter one another. The Pivot to Asia is a foreign strategy first developed under the Obama administration to target the emerging China by shifting the geographical focus from the Middle East to East Asia, which constitutes economic as well as 86 SCIENCE & SOCIETY political–military means. The U. S. government has planned to deploy 60% of its naval power to Asian and Pacific regions by 2020 (Shifrinson, 2018; Wang, 2016). The military reinforcement parallels arms sales to Taiwan, ongoing navy presence in South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, soaring military budgets, and improving state relations and deepening military cooperation with China’s neighboring countries. The economic arm, in contrast, has been exercised in a less coherent but increasingly forceful way with the regime change from Obama to Trump. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) previously constituted an essential part of the Pivot to Asia, which, by building one of the most massive free trade zones in history, was also seen by the United States and its allies as a geopolitical weapon to curb China’s rise (Harvey, 2018, 161). The TPP therefore aimed to exclude rather than to engage China (de Graaff and van Apeldoorn, 2018; Yu, 2017). Robinson (2017) cannot be more mistaken when citing the TPP as a victory of transnational capital rather than an indicator of an escalated Sino–U. S. geopolitical struggle. The TPP was dropped by the Trump administration and yet the Sino–U. S. geopolitical struggle did not cease thereafter; instead, it has been carried out on other fronts, which involves more head-to-head combat. The mounting trade war and technology war (with Huawei being at the center of the storm) are important examples of the increasingly naked confrontation. Even though the Pivot to Asia is not a new invention but more a continuation of the long-term U. S. policies to engage and simultaneously to contain China (Rachman, 1996; Wang, 2016), it does show signs of growing hawkishness in the U. S.’ China policy: from a rather minimal containment approach to comprehensive containment (Etzioni, 2016). Similarly, China’s BRI (complemented by the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [AIIB]) was launched with both economic and political–military ambitions. The BRI project was first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 with the sequential foundation of the AIIB to allocate support funds for the project (Yu, 2017). It can be seen as a new development as well as a continuation of China’s previous efforts — with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, for instance — to deepen its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence (Womack, 2013; Yu, 2017). On the one hand, the BRI is aimed to cope with the country’s economic challenges, such as overcapacity, growing energy dependence, and economic slowdown, by GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL 87 reconstructing the ancient (land and maritime) Silk Roads that allow Chinese capital and products to go westward: a land road traversing through central Asia and the Middle East to reach Europe, and a sea route spanning the South China Sea through the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean (Shambaugh, 2018). Such an economic corridor is expected to include over 60 countries and regions and “is believed to be the world’s most promising economic zone” (Wang, 2016, 456), which would act as a counterbalance to the TPP. On the other hand, the BRI was also launched with a political– military objective: to act against the geopolitical dimension of the Pivot to Asia by expanding China’s regional influence and deepening economic integration with its neighboring countries through infrastructure building and cross-border trade (Shambaugh, 2018). Infrastructure modernization projects that link other Asian countries with China will foster not only economic interconnections but also political exchanges, which can help reiterate China’s win-win notion that stresses the country’s peaceful rise (Womack, 2013). The BRI therefore is rooted as part of China’s geopolitical strategy to renovate relations with its neighbors that deteriorated over the past decade (Wang, 2016; Yu, 2017). At the least, it is hoped to ameliorate the tensions and concerns regarding China’s rapid military expansion, including its island building in the South China Sea which is also claimed by other countries, ballooning defense budgets, ambitious navy modernization project, and threat of using armed force against Taiwan.

#### US imperialism driven to constrain China’s sovereign equality requires increasing nuclear arsenal and encircling the territory to assert hegemonic dominance—that explodes to war

**Foster ’21** (John Bellamy Foster, American professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review, received his PhD from York University; 7/1/21, “The New Cold War on China”, Monthly Review, <https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/> DOA 6/26/22)//nm

China’s Third Revolution and the U.S.-Led Global Counterrevolution In his October 18, 2017, report to the Nineteenth National Congress of the CPC, Xi stated that “the Chinese nation, which since modern times began had endured so much for so long [an allusion to the Opium Wars and the Century of Humiliation], has achieved a tremendous transformation: it has stood up, become better off, and grown in strength; it has come to embrace the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation.”[74](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en74) For those aware of the history of the People’s Republic of China, it was clear that Xi was speaking of the entire revolutionary process of national rejuvenation. Mao famously declared that, with the Chinese Revolution, China had stood up. The Deng Xiaoping era, often referred to as the second era in the process of national rejuvenation, was just as clearly about China becoming better off, through rapid economic development and integration within the capitalist world economy. The New Era, in the period of Xi’s leadership, has been directed toward constructing a strong, self-sufficient, and sustainable Chinese system, aimed at “building a moderately prosperous society in all respects” by 2021, and “of moving on to all-out efforts to build a great modern socialist country” by 2049.[75](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en75) Each stage in the Chinese Revolution has meant a major shift in the revolutionary process, so that the Mao, Deng, and Xi periods are sometimes referred to as China’s First, Second, and Third Revolutions.[76](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en76) The “principal contradiction” in the New Era (or Third Revolution), the surmounting of which is necessary if China is to achieve its objectives, according to Xi, is the “unbalanced” or uneven and thus “inadequate” nature of Chinese development, characteristic of the capitalist growth model. This is manifested in deepening class inequality, divisions between rural and urban areas, promotion of economic development at the expense of cultural development, and an unsustainable human relation to the environment.[77](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en77) Hence, a socialist-motivated shift toward greater economic equality, national self-sufficiency, ecological civilization, rural revitalization, cultural development, and the forging of a “dual circulation” model (designed to reduce China’s dependence on foreign markets and technology) are all seen as crucial to China’s emergence as a “great modern socialist society.”[78](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en78) The CPC leadership has continued to define China as “the world’s largest developing country,” albeit one in “the primary stage of socialism,” thus emphasizing its direct connections to the Global South of which it sees itself a part. Its official international stance is dictated by the “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” defined as: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3) mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.[79](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en79) Although China as an emerging global power has been increasingly accused of setting a new agenda and seeking to overturn the existing rules-based international order imposed by the core capitalist states, this, rather than presaging anarchy or “might makes right,” as indicated by Blinken at the March 18 bilateral meetings, has largely taken the form of a strong defense of the concept of sovereign equality, which necessarily goes against the structure of the existing imperial system.[80](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en80) The path forward in China’s Third Revolution will not of course be easy, and what Xi has referred to as the “principal contradiction” in the form of uneven development is evident in vast struggles taking place at all levels in the society—and in China’s external relations. It would not be an exaggeration to say that China’s Third Revolution has been greeted by the United States and the other core capitalist powers with a combination of disbelief, shock, and anger. Unaccustomed to thinking historically and dialectically, relying on mere formalistic frames of analysis, and believing in the inevitable triumph of capitalism, the dominant ideology in the West has been one quite literally of “the end of history.”[81](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en81) The idea that China’s sovereign project would eventually lead to a critical challenge to, rather than absorption within, the existing capitalist and imperialist order was thus scarcely entertained in Washington. As Kurt M. Campbell, former assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the Barack Obama administration, and Ely Ratner, Biden’s nominee for assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, wrote in “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations” in Foreign Affairs in February 2018, the notion that “U.S. power and hegemony” would fail to “mold China to the United States’ liking” was until recently completely foreign to the U.S. establishment. Even more shocking was the discovery that China’s New Era, associated with Xi, would begin to look in many ways more like the revolutionary China of Mao than the reform era of Deng.[82](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en82) The enraged response of the U.S. power elite to China’s undeterred pursuit of its own sovereign project has been to launch the New Cold War centered on China (also encompassing its allies like Russia and Iran). This is now seen in U.S. ruling class circles as a new war for hegemony—though minus any genuine historical analysis, which would require an honest assessment of imperialism past and present. Rather, Allison’s Destined for War, which directly influenced Biden, drew its supposed historical frame, not from a conception of the capitalist world system, or from an understanding of the imperial imposition of unequal treaties on China. Instead, it turned to a transhistorical law of conflict associated with the “realist” perspective on international relations, derived from Thucydides, the ancient Greek historian of the Peloponnesian War, who wrote in 411 BCE: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”[83](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en83) In contrast, from a Marxian perspective, any meaningful assessment of hegemonic transition in the context of the modern world must be seen as a product of the internal dynamics of the capitalist world economy, which has been characterized throughout its history by the imperialism of the core directed at the periphery and by periodic wars over imperial hegemony: the only “answer” that the capitalist system is capable of providing to the question of world power.[84](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en84) Reflecting this logic, the New Cold War on China initiated by the United States seeks to draw together the leading imperial capitalist states in a global alliance aimed at binding Beijing, together with its allies and the entire periphery of the capitalist system, to the rules-based international order controlled by the triad, while at the same time keeping the Chinese economy, the motor of world economic growth, going. China, it is recognized, is too big simply to be conquered, and too big economically to be allowed to fail. What is required, therefore, according to the ruling Washington Consensus, is a counterrevolution unleashed by the reigning powers directed at reimposing a new global set of unequal treaties on China, along with the bulk of the developing world. The object is less to contain than to constrain China. Ultimately, such a strategy is to be backed up by military force. This was what Bill Clinton’s secretary of state Madeleine Albright was to call “assertive multilateralism.” For Hillary Clinton, speaking at Chatham House on May 6, 2021, it is essential in this context for the United States to “take back the means of production” from China to ensure that the latter is kept in a perpetual subaltern state.[85](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en85) To say that these conditions puts the world’s population in an era of almost unprecedented danger would be an understatement. No New Cold War can take place without a nuclear arms race and increased danger of thermonuclear war. China, whose nuclear warheads are in the low 200s, compared to the 1,400 deployed nuclear warheads of the United States, is seeking to double its number of warheads by 2030. The United States, for its part, is currently committed to spending $500 billion on its nuclear forces alone over the next decade, $50 billion a year. This includes $100 billion on its so-called Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, a land-based nuclear missile system designed to replace the aging Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system. The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent missiles will be capable of traveling six thousand miles with greater throw weight and accuracy, each one carrying a warhead twenty times as powerful as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.[86](https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/the-new-cold-war-on-china/#en86) The world survived the Cold War. We do not know if it will survive the New Cold War. Twenty-first-century humanity is now faced, in every sphere of its existence, with an inescapable choice: “ruin or revolution.”

### US-Russia NW

#### Capitalism generates resource competition that makes global war inevitable- specifically causes US-Russian conflict that goes nuclear

Williams in 2022

Sam, economist and author, Comparative Advantage, Monopoly, Money, John Maynard Keynes, and Anwar Shaikh; A Critique of Crisis Theory; https://critiqueofcrisistheory.wordpress.com/comparative-advantage-monopoly-money-john-maynard-keynes-and-anwar-shaikh/

According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the “collective West” launched a “total hybrid war” against Russia. The shooting war in the Donbass (1) and Ukraine is only part of it. Thousands of dead Ukrainian and Russian soldiers are bad enough. But this is only the beginning of the story. The disruption of trade as well as grain and fertilizer production — of which both Russia and Ukraine are critical suppliers — is threatening to create global food shortages and, in some areas, full-scale famine. Food shortages bring death to people of the Global South and beyond. Deaths occur not only from starvation but also from weakening immune systems making them more susceptible to COVID and other infectious diseases. But the biggest threat is that it could end in nuclear war. What has led to this dangerous, disastrous state of affairs in the relationship between the two powers?¶ Anyone who has taken college-level economic courses has run into the theory that claims that comparative advantage, not absolute advantage, rules international trade. This theory holds that free trade is equally in the interests of all nations regardless of their degree of economic development. Yet the governments of underdeveloped nations showing any independence from imperialism often follow policies neoclassical economists call neo-mercantilist. Comparative advantage supporters claim that such policies are harmful to both developing and developed countries alike.¶ Left-wing economists who reject neoclassical economics generally support neo-mercantilist policies for developing countries. These economists learned the theory of comparative advantage from neoclassical teachers. But, unlike orthodox neoclassical economists, they admit the law of comparative advantage doesn’t work out as the textbooks say it should.¶ Left economists claim that if free competition genuinely prevailed, comparative advantage in international trade would work for the benefit of all nations. But they and other heterodox economists believe the growth of capitalist monopoly negates those laws. Anwar Shaikh rejects this analysis. He says monopoly isn’t necessary to explain why comparative advantage doesn’t work the way it is supposed to. He says comparative advantage does not govern international trade under capitalism at all. He also believes the capitalist with the lowest costs wins the battle of competition in the home market as well as in international trade and therefore absolute advantage prevails in international trade as well as domestic.¶ Shaikh doesn’t agree with Lenin’s theory that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism. He says the whole history of capitalism is imperialism. I have a lot to cover before examining Shaikh’s view that a monopoly stage of capitalism does not exist. I will cover this at a later date.¶ The concrete history of capitalism is that of wars between capitalist nation-states. Before Lenin developed his theory of imperialism, Marx and Engels used another concept, that of commercial wars. From Lenin’s point of view, modern imperialist wars are a special kind of commercial war. We are not interested in the special case of modern imperialism based on monopoly capitalism. We want to know why wars occur throughout capitalism’s history.¶ Some eras have seen more commercial wars than others. These more peaceful eras are marked by the domination of one powerful capitalist nation. The period between 1815 and 1914 was an era of domination by Britain. Another relatively peaceful era is the era since 1945. This was marked by the domination of the United States. This relative peace now threatens to come to an end.¶ Even in relatively peaceful eras, wars between capitalist nations of various degrees of capitalist development never stopped. Are these wars, big or small, the result of evil leaders like Adolf Hitler, or more recently, George W. Bush? Bush ordered the invasion of capitalist, though non-imperialist, Iraq. Or are wars of capitalist countries the result of false political and economic policies, such as those pursued by France and Britain toward defeated Germany after World War I?¶ If false policies and evil leaders are to blame for wars there is hope the capitalist state can learn from history and avoid policies giving rise both to evil leaders and wars. If wars are the result of capitalist production combined with the nation-state, there is little hope of ending wars between them as long as they continue to exist. The current state of relations of the United States and NATO with capitalist Russia makes a correct answer to this question urgent.¶ If wars between capitalist states are not inevitable, we might be able to muddle through for a while longer, though the climate crisis makes this dubious. If total hybrid war between U.S.-NATO and Russia is not due to evil Vladimir Putin or evil Joseph Biden, but the result of capitalism and the nation-state, then how much longer can capitalism last before nuclear bombs go off?¶ The inevitably of war between capitalist states¶ Long before Russia launched its special military operation on February 24, there was talk about a New Cold War between the United States and Russia. I have never liked the term “New Cold War” to describe the crisis in relations between the two countries. First, we can’t be sure this new war will remain cold. But a more important reason: The original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union involved a struggle between two different classes presiding over two different economic and social systems. The U.S. capitalist class vs. the Soviet working class ruled over two different systems. The U.S. capitalist system vs. the Soviet socialist system under construction. (2) That Cold War was a global class war.¶ Today, the United States and Russia are both ruled by the capitalist class, and the capitalist economic and social system prevails. Even the political systems are similar: Both have federated republics with presidential systems. There are only some minor differences in constitutional details.¶ But there are important differences between the two, that if ignored, will cause grave political errors. Russia produces raw materials and agricultural commodities it exchanges for consumer commodities. It has a classical colonial or neocolonial relationship within the global capitalist economy. Economically, if not geographically, Russia belongs to the Global South. To paraphrase Malcolm X, the Global South begins at the north pole. (3)¶ One thing the two countries have in common is that both underwent the process of deindustrialization. The processes have different characters and causes in each country. Large-scale deindustrialization in the U.S. began with the 1979-1982 Volcker Shock. The U.S. deindustrialization has not gone as far as Russia’s. There are similarities between the conditions found in many former Soviet industrial production centers and the rust belt of the United States. But U.S. deindustrialization is fundamentally the product of uneven development, a consequence of capitalism.¶ Russian deindustrialization began at the end of the 1980s as a consequence of the 1985-1991 political and social counterrevolution (4) restoring capitalist rule in the former Soviet Union republics. This more radical deindustrialization reflected a transition from a higher mode of production to a lower one. This regressive transformation of production’s social relations was achieved with the destruction of the productive forces of former Soviet republics.¶ Both countries produce raw materials, agricultural commodities and gold bullion. But the United States is the center of world finance capital. The U.S. dollar remains the world’s chief reserve currency. The international monetary system can be called the dollar system. The Russian ruble has never been used as a reserve currency. As Lenin stressed in his book “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism” finance capital is dominant over industrial capital. And while both countries have huge arsenals of nuclear weapons, the United States spends about 12 times more than Russia on defense. (Source: Military Spending by Country 2022)¶ The United States only maintains a high level of military spending because it leads the world in finance capital. The U.S. dollar as the global currency plays a key role. This allows the huge military budget beyond Russia’s financial capacity.¶ Russia engages only in defensive wars near its borders. In contrast, the United States maintains military bases and fights aggressive wars across the globe. Russia became an oppressed nation in the world capitalist economy due to the 1985-91 political and social counterrevolution. The United States remains the leading oppressor nation in the world, with Britain a distant second, and France and other imperialist powers trailing behind. However, this doesn’t change the fact that both Russia and the U.S. are capitalist countries, politically ruled by the capitalist class.¶ Since Russia has adopted the U.S. social, economic, and even political system, there’s no basis for a global class war between them. Yet relations are now so bad that a shooting war is at least as close as during the Cold War.¶ How did we arrive at this state of affairs and what is behind it? During the counterrevolution in the Soviet Union dubbed “perestroika,” its supporters justified their policy of surrender to U.S. imperialism on the grounds it would end the danger of global nuclear war. Newspapers of the time quoted Soviet political scientist Georgi Arbatov, a perestroika supporter, as saying: “We are going to do a terrible thing to you. We are going to deprive you of an enemy.”¶ Now 30 years later it is clear the claim that the Soviet surrender to global imperialism freed the world from the threat of nuclear war was an illusion. A study of 20th-century history should have proved that Russia’s embrace of capitalism could only increase the threat of nuclear war. Let’s look at the 20th-century’s world wars.¶ During World War II, the United States and Britain went to war against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Both had capitalist economies much like the United States and Britain. Japan had a parliamentary system. In the late 1930s and 1940s, Japan was imperialist, militaristic and repressive, but it wasn’t a fascist dictatorship. This did not prevent Washington and London from claiming World War II was to defeat global fascism represented by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan.¶ Going back to World War I, there were no fascist dictatorships. The chief powers involved were Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Czarist Russia and the United States. These powers all had similar social, economic and political systems. There were differences concerning the degree of capitalist development and the extent of the lingering elements of feudalism. Instead of feudal remnants, the United States had the aftermath of modern slavery. (5) This existed in the form of the Southern states’ legal Jim Crow system and second-class citizenship for the descendants of the African slaves in all the other states.¶ France had the least feudalism thanks to the French Revolution of 1789-94, while Japan and Russia had the most. The United States, under racist President Woodrow Wilson, claimed to represent democracy as opposed to autocratic Germany. Germany had an autocratic monarchy and the feudal remnants of the militarist caste of Prussian Junkers. It also had a mass workers party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Slavery had never existed in Germany. The U.S. Socialist Party was weak. The working class in the U.S. was less well-organized than in Germany. And we shouldn’t forget that none of them, the democratic-republican United States, France, monarchical-autocratic Germany, or Czarist Russia, allowed women to vote.¶ Differences in political systems did not line up with the alliances of the contending powers. Czarist Russia was allied with republican France!¶ Today, the Biden administration is embarrassed by the similarities between U.S. and Russian social, political, and economic systems. It is reduced to claiming the current war is about democracy and autocracy, reminiscent of the claims made by World War I’s Wilson administration. In contrast, during the Cold War, there really were differences between the social, political and economic systems of the two countries.¶ The current struggle is not over forms of government, nor is it ideological. It is not a class war, since the governments and states of both countries have the same class character. This struggle is about the drive of U.S. imperialism to bring Russia’s and Ukraine’s colossal wealth in natural resources under its control.¶ Both countries are rich in farmlands as well as mineral- and fossil-fuel-bearing lands but this isn’t enough for the economic needs of U.S. imperialism that have long outstripped the resources available within its borders. U.S. imperialism wants the resources of Western Asia, Africa, Latin America, Ukraine, and Russia under its control. Russian capitalists are forced to fight to maintain control of their own natural resources. Russia’s capitalists are too weak to control the resources of the rest of the world. This war now threatens to turn into a global war and a nuclear holocaust.

#### Militarism makes conflict with Russia inevitable- it leads to expansion that heightens Russian nationalism and encourages aggression

**Smith 4/22** (James Smith, political and historical relations analyst; 4/22/22, “Obsession with NATO expansion: a deeply ideological move inevitable in provoking conflicts”, Global Times, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202204/1257438.shtml> DOA 6/21/22)//nm

Although NATO was initially a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, the ideological triumphalism which followed the events of 1991 saw it orient itself into an offensive proponent of consolidating the "New World Order" and these aforementioned regime changes. Thus, even though there was no major state adversary, the US subsequently violated its promises to post-Cold War Russia that the alliance would not be enlarged. In fact, the West subsequently began to expand NATO eastward, citing the self-determination of the countries involved as an ideologically irrefutable choice, a position that remains to this today. The post-Cold War Russia was not initially an enemy of the West, and sought to integrate itself into it. However, the country found that having made peace and goodwill with the West in the late days of the USSR, ceding influence over Western Europe and gutting its own economy in favor of Western capitalist dominion would in fact be a mistake which would leave Moscow inherently worse off. The 1990s in Russia were characterized by poor living standards for ordinary people, where new mega wealthy "oligarchs" exploited the new environment and of course for what? For the West not to see Russia as an equal partner in a new consensus of peace, but to effect just continue in a bid to strategically subjugate the country anyway. The expansion of NATO combined with Western intervention in Yugoslavia were both critical turning points which promulgated a new Russian distrust toward the intentions of the West. NATO and the EU's attempts to subsequently encroach Russia's own periphery would prove to be the decisive straws which "broke the camel's back" and provoked conflict. It is a logical feature of international relations theory, as reiterated by leading scholar John Mearsheimer, that attempting to ensnare and encircle one country with a hostile military alliance is a straight route to conflict. The West makes no apology for it, believing that it is their ideological right and destiny to do so, as the "end of history" logic goes. Western expansion soon provoked in the Euromaidan crisis of 2013 in Ukraine, sparking a tidal wave of anti-Russian nationalism which then opened up a geopolitical struggle over the future of Ukraine. The West in turn failed to acknowledge how the ultra-nationalist assault on Russian identity and language in the country has also been humiliating to Moscow. The US and its allies in their hubris refused to compromise, setting off a chain reaction of events leading to the present day. Russia's reactions to this context are branded as aggression and zero-sum moral evil. However, they are in the strategic sense necessary for Moscow to safeguard its own national security and offset military and political domination by an adversarial military alliance. This whole scenario was ultimately preventable. But Western governments and media continue to gravely mislead the public about its causes. They're pushing the never-ending ideological crusade that Western liberal democracy, must without any questions and at all costs for that matter, dominate the entire earth. It's an attitude the Western world has held since 1991, and it is on that note ironically that such an attitude become a self-fulfilling prophecy in instigating the largest conflict in Europe since the World War II. An opportunity to build a consolidated peace and unity on the continent was jeopardized by ideological and strategic puritanism. This is, as what Mearsheimer titled in his signature book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

### K Turns Cyber

#### K turns the aff- expanded cybersecurity industry results in technology being sold to adversaries- it undermines US national security objectives

Adi Gaskell in 2022

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Kaspersky's recent advanced persistent threat report highlighted the growth in state-sponsored hacking groups, with the likes of the Kremlin-backed APT29 and Nobelium prime examples of the willingness of nation-states to deploy private-sector hackers for geopolitical ends.¶ It’s part of a growing cyber military-industrial complex that is emphasized in a recent report from the Atlantic Council, which attempts to shed some light on what has often been a murky and secretive industry.¶ "State cyber capabilities are increasingly abiding by the “pay-to-play” model—both US/NATO allies and adversaries can purchase interception and intrusion technologies from private firms for intelligence and surveillance purposes," the report says.¶ Into the shadows¶ The murky nature of this industry is largely something that suits both sides, but it has made a detailed analysis of it hard. The paper attempts to correct that and shed some light on both the active players in the market and their capabilities.¶ The researchers were able to identify a wide range of actors offering a panoply of interception and intrusion technologies before exploring how these entities accessed the market and who they are selling to.¶ The authors believe that they have been able to identify a number of firms headquartered in both the Middle East and Europe that are actively selling their wares to adversaries of NATO and the United States. What's more, many of these firms are not shy in promoting their wares, with an active presence at major international trade shows, such as Security & Policing UK and Milipol France.¶ A booming industry¶ The scale of the industry was reflected in the finding that 75% of companies selling these technologies have done so outside of their home continent. The companies, which the authors brand as "irresponsible proliferators", have found especially willing buyers outside of NATO and the United States.¶ "By marketing to these parties, these firms signal that they are willing to accept or ignore the risk that their products will bolster the capabilities of client governments that might wish to threaten US/NATO national security or harm marginalized populations," the authors warn. "This is especially the case when the client government is a direct US or NATO adversary."¶ The global nature of the industry illustrates the growing proliferation of advanced cyber capabilities around the world, with these companies increasingly willing to use their nation-state clients to provide them with an air of respectability and legitimacy. It's an argument that rests on flimsy ground, however, not least due to the fact that nation-states are willing and able to shift the focus of attacks into other intelligence areas once capabilities have been established.¶ In total, the researchers analyzed over 200 firms operating in the surveillance space, including Israeli firm Cellebrite, which develops a range of forensics and phone hacking tools that are commonly deployed in countries such as China and Russia. Indeed, the company’s technology was used during the Chinese crackdown of anti-government forces in Hong Kong.¶ National security concerns¶ The authors argue that both the nature of the technology and its customers should trigger significant national security concerns, with the breadth of sales signifying considerable problems with oversight, especially as the firms appear to show no real willingness to self-regulate who they sell to or for what purpose.¶ The phrase “irresponsible proliferators” is deliberately provocative, with the authors hoping that it will encourage lawmakers to do more to regulate the sector and help protect what are often extremely vulnerable groups.¶ Various governments have made moves in this direction in recent years, with the European Union adopting more stringent rules on surveillance technology in a bid to make the industry more transparent than it currently is. Meanwhile, the US has also introduced new licensing rules to help regulate the sale of intrusion tools, with the likes of Israeli spyware firm NSO Group among those who have been blacklisted.¶ “While some argue for an arms-control treaty for cyberspace, regulating cyber capabilities themselves is largely ineffective,” the authors say. “Instead, shaping the behaviors of companies proliferating cyber capabilities, and limiting their activities where they conflict with national security priorities, should be the top priority.”¶ Tackling the industry¶ To do this, you first have to be aware of the true extent of the industry and the behavior of those operating in it. The authors hope that their report will be a useful first step towards achieving this. With the UN recently warning against the use of cyber-mercenaries, it is clear that there is growing concern about the use of cyber-criminals to cause real damage in the real world.¶ “It is undeniable that cyber-activities have the ability to cause violations both in armed conflicts and in peacetime, and thus that a whole variety of rights are engaged,” Jelena Aparac, Chair Rapporteur of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries, said. “This includes the right to life, economic social rights, freedom of expression, privacy, and the right to self-determination.”¶ Successfully controlling the industry is made that much harder by the obfuscation that surrounds it, with various shell companies and resellers making it hard to truly identify either the buyers or the sellers. Nonetheless, there is a growing appreciation that even tools developed for “friendly” regimes often end up in unsavory hands, and therefore there is a strong need to better govern tools that can do so much harm, not least by limiting the access to the kind of cyber-surveillance events that allowed the researchers to examine the industry in the first place.

### War/Structural Violence

#### Militarism is the root cause of mass war and structural violence by fostering the buildup of military power in the name of securing a capitalist economic order- policy makers must prioritize structural violence over the inflated threat scenarios of the 1AC

Acheson in 2022

Ray Acheson is the Director of WILPF’s Disarmament Programme, which provides analysis, research, and advocacy across a range of disarmament issues from an antimilitarist feminist perspective; Militarism Cannot Prevent War: An urgent call for de-escalation, demilitarisation, and disarmament in relation to Ukraine and beyond; NATO Watch; https://natowatch.org/default/2022/militarism-cannot-prevent-war-urgent-call-de-escalation-demilitarisation-and

Behind this current crisis lies a history of militarised and economic violence. Both Russia and the United States are settler colonial states, forging their countries by expanding their “frontiers” and killing and repressing Indigenous populations. Both engage in imperialist actions outside of their now-established borders, interfering, through military and economic action, in countries they deem to be within their “spheres of influence”. Both use militarism, aggression, and forced economic ties to guide their conduct in international relations, and both deal with domestic inequality, poverty, and resistance through policing and punishment.¶ The governments of both countries critique each other for the same type of behaviour. Russia criticises US imperialism, yet invades and occupies its neighbours, bombs civilians, and engages in cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure that harm ordinary people. The United States criticises Russia as an autocracy yet overthrows democratically elected governments if they threaten US interests, builds military bases and engages in wars and military operations in hundreds of countries around the world, and spends billions of dollars a year on militarism while so many of its citizens live without health care, housing, or food security.¶ Both countries have built up their militaries, military alliances, and nuclear arsenals to challenge the other. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s expansion eastward is about constraining Russia, just like Russia’s invasion of countries to the west are about constraining NATO. Ukraine, in this context, is a pawn being used by both “sides”.¶ This gamesmanship runs the serious risk of mass destruction. Between them, Russia and the United States possess more than 11,850 nuclear weapons. NATO members France and the United Kingdom have a few hundred each. The US also stations about 100 nuclear weapons in NATO members Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. These weapons are not remnants of a past Cold War — they are actively deployed right now, ready to be used. The stockpile numbers, alarming as they are, don’t convey the sheer horror each weapon packs within it. Every single bomb is designed to melt flesh, burn cities, decimate plants and animals, and unleash radioactive poison that lasts for generations. Even the use of one of these weapons would be disastrous. A nuclear exchange would be catastrophic.¶ Russia and the United States, along with France, United Kingdom, and China, together recently agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, echoing a statement from Gorbachev and Reagan in 1985. Yet each of these countries has been investing billions in the “modernisation” and expansion of their nuclear arsenals, preparing not for nuclear disarmament but for nuclear Armageddon. Each maintains doctrines and policies for the use of nuclear weapons. And some within the US nuclear complex, at least, apparently believe that nuclear war can be fought — and won. This is an incredibly dangerous message to be sending to those responsible for the potential destruction of the world, but one that benefits the military-industrial complex.¶ There are other corporate interests behind the festering conflict, including in relation to weapons production and sale, pipelines and “energy security,” and access to “natural resources,” with profits to be made at the expense of human lives as well as the protection of the planet. In the midst of a climate emergency, in which capitalist extraction and exploitation has decimated biodiversity, ecosystems, and land, water, and air, the governments of NATO members and Russia continue to use fossil fuels and refuse to embrace a degrowth economy that would drawdown the use of energy, especially in the global north, and prioritise the creation of systems of care and equality for people and planet.¶ Militarised world order and the abstraction of harm¶ There is plenty of blame to go around when it comes to the current crisis and the historical moments that have led us here. All parties involved have contributed actively to this situation; arguing that one side or the other has been “provoked” only serves to obscure the reality that each of the countries involved have together, deliberately, built a militarised, capitalist world order that exclusively serves the interests of the war profiteers and the political and economic elite.¶ What is happening right now over Ukraine is bigger than Ukraine. Tectonic shifts in global geopolitics are taking place and Ukraine is but one field of “play” for the heavily militarised states. Gamesmanship between the United States and China is on the rise; proxy wars, occupations and aggression, and military and economic pressure is occurring throughout the world; extraction primarily by the global north and exploitation of the so-called global south is rampant, exacerbating and accelerating poverty and inequalities and environmental devastation; militarism and military spending is on the rise globally. Approaching the situation in Ukraine without recognising this larger context is like applying a band aid to a global haemorrhage. It is a piece of a much bigger puzzle: of a world order dictated and dominated by the militarised elite.¶ This is a world order that sees war as a legitimate means to an end. It celebrates militarised masculinities, empowering the culture of militarism and violence as brave and noble pursuits, while rendering invisible the gendered and racialised harms of militarism. It is a world order that uses a technostrategic language to sanitise the image of war. Think tanks and politicians, media, and war gamers act as if countries are chess pieces and people are numbers on a page. US government officials, for example, have estimated that a war in Ukraine could kill 25,000 to 50,000 civilians, 5,000 to 25,000 Ukrainian military personnel, and 3,000 to 10,000 Russian soldiers. The fighting since 2014, in eastern Ukraine it should be noted, has already killed more than 14,000 people and displaced millions.¶ Instead of seeing these people as individuals, whose lives have value and meaning, who are part of families and communities, the number crunchers calculate “acceptable loss” and risks of “collateral damage,” and look the other way as the bodies pile up. Also accounted for is the disruption to daily life — the interruption of education, of food production, of supply chains; the destruction of hospitals, homes, markets, water and sanitation facilitations, and all of the other critical infrastructure that people rely on to survive. These numbers don’t take into account the psychological terror of living in conflict, of hearing bombs dropped or drones hovering overhead, of being afraid to leave your house, of watching loved ones die. These figures also don’t take into account the environmental impacts of war, the toxic or explosive remnants of weapons, the damage to land and water and animals.¶ These humanitarian and environmental impacts should be at the forefront of all policy making decisions. Yet they are completely ignored by those talking in board rooms in capital cities far from where the harm will be felt, deciding what choices to make for the sake of “geopolitical strategy” or “balance of power”.

### Racialized Violence

#### Militarism results in racialized violence around the globe as the US secures its interests through the exploitation and control of other populations

Booker and Ohlbaum in 2021

Salih Booker, president & CEO, Center for International Policy¶ And Diana Ohlbaum, senior strategist and legislative director, foreign policy, FCNL; Dismantling Racism and¶ Militarism in U.S. Foreign Policy; Center for International Policy; <https://www.fcnl.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/DismantlingRacism.16.pdf>

To many living between its shores, the United States is a land of freedom and¶ promise, a haven for unfettered practice of religion, a place where the son of a¶ black man from Kenya and a white woman from Kansas can not only dream¶ of a better future but rise to become president. To many outside U.S. borders,¶ the torch of liberty offers a beacon of hope for equality and opportunity.¶ But to others—particularly people of color at home and abroad—the reality¶ is very different. The United States is a country that has failed to publicly¶ acknowledge, apologize for, or make amends for its long history of genocide¶ and slavery—despite loudly proclaiming itself as a leader in combating these¶ very evils in other countries.¶ It is a nation that explicitly seeks global military primacy and conducts¶ aggressive military operations on multiple continents with seeming disregard¶ for their impact on innocent civilians. It is a country whose political leaders¶ are willing to spend trillions on senseless foreign wars and weapon systems¶ but not on building racial, economic, and environmental justice.¶ American political culture celebrates the nation’s virtues while demonstrating¶ collective amnesia about its sins. Particularly, but certainly not exclusively,¶ in the foreign policy and national security sphere, elites ignore, reject, and¶ rationalize the enormous harms that the United States has caused through¶ its long history of imperial expansion, structural racism, and economic and¶ military domination. This is not accidental: it is a result of belief systems—¶ manifested in policies and institutions—that we refer to collectively as the¶ Racism-Militarism Paradigm.¶ The Racism-Militarism Paradigm is a way of looking at the world, widely¶ shared among the U.S. policymaking community and much of the public,¶ that arises from a largely unacknowledged doctrine of white supremacy¶ and the necessity of using violence to uphold it. This paradigm establishes¶ a rigid hierarchy, based on race, that values white lives above all others—at¶ home and abroad. It embraces militarism as the most effective mechanism to¶ guarantee this ordering of society and the world.¶ The Racism-Militarism Paradigm has a number of core theories/myths and is¶ manifested in a myriad of concrete and abstract ways. The principal belief is¶ in the racial superiority of whites and their entitlement, exceptionalism, and¶ indispensability. This is then used to justify global military domination and¶ economic exploitation by the United States. The paradigm assumes that we¶ live in a zero-sum world defined by scarcity and competition over resources¶ and that humans are by nature selfish and greedy. In such a world, each man is therefore “out for himself”—but the needs and desires of white men are¶ viewed as synonymous with those of the United States as a nation and are¶ thus considered more important and more valuable than those of all others.¶ A key component of this paradigm is the belief that violence is effective.¶ Domination through the use of military force is considered a necessity that¶ offers the ultimate guarantee of protection of rights and physical safety to¶ those who wield it. For example, since 2018 the United States has engaged¶ in combat in eight countries and conducted military counterterrorism¶ operations in 85 countries. The Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen,¶ and other wars have cost U.S. taxpayers at least $6.4 trillion and resulted in¶ the deaths of at least 800,000 mostly brown and Black people.¶ The Pentagon budget, nearing $750 billion, is higher now than at the peak of¶ the Vietnam War or the Cold War and is larger than the defense budgets of¶ the next ten highest-spending countries combined. It also constitutes more¶ than half of the discretionary funding requested by U.S. presidents and¶ approved by Congress—for decades.¶ A corollary to this paradigm is the old European justification for colonialism¶ and imperialism known as the white man’s burden, which holds that African¶ and Asian nations and peoples need European and white American tutelage¶ and discipline and that the white race has a moral obligation to civilize such¶ people. These racist and paternalistic attitudes permeate not only official¶ U.S. diplomacy and development efforts, but also the civilizing mission of¶ many churches and private voluntary aid organizations.¶ The evolution of this paradigm is not surprising, given that America’s¶ economic and military might were built on land stolen from the Indigenous¶ people of North America and the labor of enslaved Africans. From genocide¶ and enslavement to westward expansionism, hemispheric domination, and¶ global imperialism, the United States has consistently relied upon coercion,¶ intimidation, and violence to enforce white supremacy while describing it¶ throughout history as a mission of enlightenment.¶ With the conscious and unconscious establishment of the Racism-Militarism¶ Paradigm in the minds of most Americans, those who are defined as¶ others, both domestically and internationally, are routinely marginalized,¶ dehumanized, and exploited. The narrow interests of wealthy and powerful¶ white men are mythologized and legitimized as the national security interests¶ of the United States. ¶ In parallel, the national faith in violence is romanticized as patriotism, and¶ as a result, Americans treat the U.S. armed forces and law enforcement¶ personnel with cultish devotion, affording them unparalleled resources,¶ trust, and respect.¶ This addiction to militaristic solutions heightens the fear of chaos, propels¶ a lust for strength in all its forms, and engenders a culture of military¶ reverence. The military capabilities of rival countries are interpreted as¶ threats, and U.S. credibility is defined by the ability and willingness to carry¶ out violence to destroy others. Superior capacity for violence is purported¶ to keep Americans safe.¶ War crimes, police brutality, mass incarceration, border militarization, and¶ capital punishment are excused as unfortunate but unavoidable means of¶ deterring crime and aggression. Other types of coercion and intimidation—¶ often economic, but with harmful physical impacts—are also used routinely¶ and without question.¶ It is essential to note that acceptance of the Racism-Militarism Paradigm,¶ while widespread, is largely unconscious. Few of those who have¶ internalized its precepts recognize it as a mechanism for enforcing systemic¶ white supremacy. Importantly, individuals need not be white, Christian,¶ male, or avowed racists to believe that the United States has the right, the¶ responsibility, and the power to control what other nations do.¶ The paradigm is so pervasive throughout U.S. society that it masquerades¶ as objective truth, blinding most Americans and their leaders to its origins¶ and purpose. Because it draws on a number of deeply held and/or widely¶ promoted values—honor, discipline, order, loyalty, authority—it can seem¶ like common sense rather than the ideological construct that it is.

### Ukraine/US-Russia

#### The crisis in Ukraine is a symptom of the broader decay of neoliberal capitalism- underlying economic and social crises make collapse inevitable- calls to “solve Russia” are a facile attempt to paper over these structural contradictions

Alastair Crooke, New Cold War, 2022

THE WORLD DOESN’T WORK THAT WAY ANYMORE; Popular Resistance; https://popularresistance.org/the-world-doesnt-work-that-way-anymore/

The Fixation With Ukraine Essentially Is But A Gloss Pasted Over The Realities Of A Global Order In Decomposition.¶ The First World War signaled the end to a mercantilist order that had evolved under the aegis of European powers. One hundred years later, a very different economic order was in place (neoliberal cosmopolitanism). Believed by its architects to be universal and everlasting, globalization transfixed the world for an extended moment, but then started the subsidence from its zenith – precisely at the moment the West was giving vent to its triumphalism at the fall of the Berlin Wall. NATO – as the order’s regulatory system – addressed its attendant ‘identity crisis’ by pushing for eastward expansion toward Russia’s western borders, disregarding the guarantees it had given, and Moscow’s virulent objections.¶ This radical alienation of Russia triggered its pivot to China. Europe and the U.S. however, declined to consider issues of due ‘balance’ within global structures, and simply glossed over the realities of a world order in momentous metamorphosis: with the steady decline of the U.S. already apparent; with a European faux ‘unity’ that masked its own inherent imbalances; and in the context of a hyper-financialized economic structure which lethally sucked out the juice from the real economy.¶ The present war in Ukraine therefore simply is an adjunct – the accelerant to this existing process of ‘liberal order’ decomposition. It is not its center. Fundamentally geo-strategic in their origin, the explosive dynamics to today’s disintegration can be seen as blowback from the mismatch from diverse peoples’ looking now to solutions tailored to suit their non-western civilizations, and from the western insistence on its ‘one size fits all’ Order. Ukraine thus is a symptom, but is not per se, the deeper disorder itself.¶ Tom Luongo has remarked – in connection with the ‘messy’, confusing events of today – that that which he fears most, is so many people analyzing the intersection of geopolitics, markets and ideology, and doing so with such striking complacency. “There is a stunning amount of normalcy bias in the punditocracy, too much ‘cooler heads will prevail’ and not enough ‘everyone’s got a plan until they’re punched in the mouth’”.¶ What Luongo’s retort doesn’t fully explain is the shrillness, the outrage, with which any doubting of the accredited ‘punditocracy’ of the moment is met. Plainly, there is a deeper fear stalking the lower depths of western psyche that is not being made fully explicit.¶ Wolfgang Münchau, formerly at the Financial Times, now authoring EuroIntelligence, describes how such a canonized Zeitgeist implicitly has imprisoned Europe in a cage of adverse dynamics which threaten its economy, its autonomy, its globalism and its being.¶ Münchau relates how both the pandemic and Ukraine had taught him that it was one thing to proclaim an interconnected globalism ‘as cliché’, but¶ “It is quite another to observe what actually happens on the ground when those connections get torn apart … Western sanctions were based on a formally correct, but misleading premise – one that I believed myself – at least up to a point: That Russia is more dependent on us than we are on Russia … Russia however is a provider of primary and secondary commodities, on which the world has become dependent. But when the largest exporter of those commodities disappears, the rest of the world experiences physical shortages and rising prices”.¶ He continues:¶ “Did we think this through? Did the foreign ministries that drew up the sanctions discuss at any point what we would do if Russia were to blockade the Black Sea and not allow Ukrainian wheat to leave the ports?… Or, did we think we can adequately address a global starvation crisis by pointing the finger at Putin?”¶ “The lockdown taught us a lot about our vulnerability to supply chain shocks. It has reminded Europeans that there have only two routes to ship goods en masse to Asia and back: either by container, or by rail through Russia. We had no plan for a pandemic, no plan for a war, and no plan for when both are happening at the same time. The containers are stuck in Shanghai. The railways closed because of the war …¶ “I am not sure the west is ready to confront the consequences of its actions: persistent inflation, reduced industrial output, lower growth, and higher unemployment. To me, economic sanctions look like the last hurrah of a dysfunctional concept known as The West. The Ukraine war is a catalyst of massive de-globalization.”¶ Münchau’s response is that unless we cut a deal with Putin, with the removal of sanctions as a component, he sees “a danger of the world becoming subject to two trading blocs: the west and the rest. Supply chains will be reorganized to stay within them. Russia’s energy, wheat, metals, and rare earths will still be consumed, but not here – We [just] keep with the Big Macs”.¶ So again, ‘one’ searches for an answer: Why are the Euro-élites so shrill, so passionate in their support for Ukraine? And risk heart-attack from the sheer vehemence of their hatred for Putin? After all, most Europeans and Americans until this year knew next-to-naught about Ukraine.¶ We know the answer: the deeper fear is that all the landmarks to liberal life – for reasons they do not understand – are about to be forever swept away. And that Putin is doing it. How will ‘we’ navigate life, bereft of landmarks? What will become of us? We thought the liberal way-of-being was ineluctable. Another value-system? Impossible!¶ So, for Europeans, the endgame in Ukraine crucially must reaffirm European self-identity (even at the cost of its citizens’ economic well-being). Such wars historically, mostly have ended with a dirty diplomatic settlement. That ‘end’ probably would be enough for the EU leadership to spin a ‘win’.¶ And there was a big EU diplomatic drive to persuade Putin to do a deal, only last week.¶ But (paraphrasing and elaborating Münchau), it is one thing to proclaim the desirability of a negotiated ceasefire ‘as cliché’. “It is quite another to observe what actually happens on the ground when blood is being spilled to put facts on the ground …”.¶ Western diplomatic initiatives are premised on Russia needing a ‘way out’, more than does Europe need one. But is that true?¶ Paraphrasing Münchau again:¶ “Did we think this through? Did the foreign ministries that drew up the plans to train and arm a Ukrainian insurgency in Donbas in the hope of weakening Russia – discuss at any point what effect their war and their expressed contempt for Russia might have on Russian public opinion? Or what ‘we’ would do if Russia simply opted instead to put facts on the ground until it finished its project … Or did we even address the possibility of Kiev losing, and what that would mean for a Europe loaded to the gills with sanctions that then would never end?”.¶ The hope for a negotiated settlement has given way to a more somber mood in Europe. Putin was uncompromising in the talks with European leaders. The realization is dawning in Paris and Berlin that a fudged settlement is not something that benefits Putin, nor is one that he can afford. The Russian public mood will not easily accept that its soldiers’ blood was spent in some vain exercise, ending in a ‘dirty’ compromise – only to have the West resuscitate a new Ukraine insurgency against the Donbas again, in a year or two.¶ The EU leaders must be sensing their predicament: They may have ‘missed the boat’ for getting a political ‘fix’. But they have not ‘missed the boat’ in respect to inflation, economic contraction, and of social crisis at home. These ships are heading in their direction, at full steam. Did the EU foreign ministries reflect on this eventuality, or were they carried along by euphoria and the credentialed narrative issuing out from the Baltics and Poland of ‘Bad Man Putin’?¶ Here is the point: The fixation with Ukraine essentially is but a gloss pasted over the realities of a global order in decomposition. The latter is the source of the wider disorder. Ukraine is but one small piece on the chess board, and its outcome will not fundamentally change that ‘reality’. Even a ‘win’ in Ukraine would not grant ‘immortality’ to the neoliberal rules-based order.¶ The noxious fumes emanating from the global financial system are wholly unconnected to Ukraine – but are that much more significant for they go to the heart of the ‘disorder’ within the western ‘liberal order’. Perhaps it is this primordial unspoken fear that accounts for the shrillness and rancor directed at any deviation from sanctioned Ukraine messaging?¶ And Luongo’s normalcy bias in discourse is never more in evidence (Ukraine aside), than when addressing the strange self-selectivity of Anglo-American thinking about their neoliberal economic order.¶ The Anglo-American system of politics and economics, James Fallows a former White House speechwriter has noted, like any system, rests on certain principles and beliefs. “But rather than acting as if these are the best principles, or the ones their societies prefer, Britons and Americans often act as if these were the only possible principles: And that no one, except in error, could choose any others. Political economics becomes an essentially religious question, subject to the standard drawback of any religion—the failure to understand why people outside the faith might act as they do”.

#### **US militarism is not the solution to the war in Ukraine, it’s the root cause**

Petersen-Smith, ’22 (Khury Petersen-Smiths, the Michael Ratner Middle East Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. 02-09-2022, " US-NATO Militarism Is the Cause, Not the Solution," <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2022/02/09/us-nato-militarism-cause-not-solution)-Cayden> Mayer

The rising tensions between Ukraine, Russia, the United States and other NATO countries—and the resulting discourse in U.S. media—show that American leaders love an international crisis. In a crisis, the American public is often discouraged from asking questions—and when they do, militarism is usually the answer. Even as Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky discourages panic and downplays the idea that a Russian invasion is imminent, American officials are portraying armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine as inevitable—and U.S. military support of Ukraine as necessary. "What's the alternative?" asked retired Brigadier General and former Defense Attaché to Moscow Peter Zwack in an interview on NPR. ​"Do we just let them get invaded, or do we make the cost so high on the ground-level military—but also the diplomatic and the economic?" The choice being put forward is between military action or inaction; to opt for ​"inaction" is presented as an abandonment of Ukraine. Zwack's prescription is ​"lethal weapons"—specifically Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. And the U.S. is delivering. In just over a week, the U.S. made four shipments of weapons to Ukraine—a move that has U.S. arms manufacturers anticipating soaring profits for their shareholders. The particular kind of crisis story that American officials are deploying in the situation with Ukraine is a familiar one: An underdog faces a threat from an authoritarian regime, so the United States must come to the rescue with a military response. In an interview on NPR, Republican Representative and Chair of Congress's Ukraine Caucus Brian Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania offered a historical analogy often invoked by American officials to justify military action. "When we defended Kuwait in Operation Desert Shield," Fitzpatrick said, ​"we sent a message to the world that you cannot violate the territorial integrity of an independent nation. And Ukraine should be no different. We have to send a very strong and unequivocal message to Vladimir Putin, which would also be a message to Xi Jinping, to Kim Jong Un and other bad actors around the world that this is not OK to do." Fitzpatrick's interviewer didn't question his response. But his example of U.S. military action in Iraq in 1991 shows exactly why it's critical to question the narrative being pushed by U.S. media, especially during times of crisis. In Fitzpatrick's account of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. appears to be a bystander responding to Iraqi actions. But his story conveniently omits the fact that just prior to its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq counted the U.S. as an ally—one that supplied it with weapons during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. It also ignores that the story did not end with Desert Shield. The U.S. quickly shifted its supposed defense of Kuwait into its own invasion—Operation Desert Storm—of Iraq. In that assault, the U.S. killed some 100,000 Iraqis and shattered the country. It then imposed catastrophic economic sanctions on Iraq, which were responsible for the deaths of another million Iraqis. It accompanied this policy with air patrols of Iraq, and bombed the country intermittently over the next decade. And finally, the U.S. invaded once again in 2003, occupied Iraq after and maintains about 2,500 troops there to this day. Cherry-picking past examples of U.S. intervention excludes vital context and falls short of telling the whole story. Narratives like these obscure ongoing, longstanding military operations and other policies that make the world more dangerous and which have no end in sight. Still, there are moments when officials share details that unintentionally reveal that U.S. involvement in the crisis on the Ukrainian border is far more complicated than they have been acknowledging. With 8,500 U.S. troops readied for deployment, a journalist asked during a White House press conference if sending forces to the countries that NATO counts as its ​"Eastern Flank" might escalate the situation rather than calm it. ​"We've had troops in the Eastern Flank countries for decades," Press Secretary Jen Psaki replied. Indeed, the U.S. maintains an enormous, nuclear armed military presence in Europe—and in the years leading up to the current crisis, it has spent millions of dollars arming Ukraine in particular. Since the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, in which Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula, the U.S. has sent hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of weapons to Ukraine—in 2015, 2018, 2019 and 2020—including its celebrated Javelin missiles. Psaki's admission begs some follow-up questions: If U.S. troops and weapons have already been in Ukraine for years—and in Europe for decades—but their presence has not deterred Russia from mobilizing troops to the Ukrainian border, why does the Pentagon think that more weapons and troops will do so now? And could it be, perhaps, that this same U.S. militarism is a cause of rising tension in Eastern Europe, rather than its solution? It would be wrong to minimize the potential devastation of a Russian invasion of Ukraine should one occur. But U.S. actions are raising tensions rather than resolving them. While they speak of Ukrainian sovereignty, it is clear that U.S. officials are primarily preoccupied with Russian military aggression that they see as threatening a world order that the U.S. presides over. And as Representative Fitzpatrick makes clear, they also want to send a message to China and other states that they consider hostile. Ultimately, increased U.S. militarism in Eastern Europe—as history has repeatedly made clear—will only make the situation worse.

## Alt

### FW- Epistemology/Research First

#### Research practices should frame your ballot—the 1AC’s militarist assumptions trade off with the educational value of critical reflection in security politics

**Bellanova ’20** (Rocco Bellanova, Assistant Professor Critical Data Studies at University of Amsterdam, holds a double PhD in Political & Social Sciences and in Law, which has been awarded in 2014 by the Université Saint-Louis-Bruxelles and the Vrije Universiteit Brussel; 12/14/20, “Taking the trouble: science, technology and security studies”, Critical Studies on Security, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21624887.2020.1839852?needAccess=true> DOA 6/24/22)//nm

The riches of STS We propose that one way to take the trouble is focusing on the devices, technologies, objects, knowledge and materialities that shape security. Notably, we want to highlight that understanding ever-evolving technologies and their applications requires security scholars to go beyond disciplinary boundaries. History, ethics, law, computer sciences and media studies all bring valuable perspectives to the study of security politics. Deploying resources from other disciplines pushes the researcher away from that which feels comfortable and towards new modes of thinking, new analytical distinctions and new conceptual apparatuses. Illustrative of this is the rich literature from various security scholars who have already looked to STS when developing new analytical approaches to issues ranging from drones (Leander 2013) to stoves (Abdelnour and Saeed 2014). Our invitation, of course, does not mean abandoning CSS, but provokes an ongoing questioning of its dynamics and ontological and philosophical underpinnings. Therefore, it does imply a commitment to being curious about the value of approaching the study of security through a new lens, as a way to gain appreciation of additional dimensions. Ultimately, this brings the risk of becoming even further detached from more orthodox understandings of what IR and security studies are expected to be, what they should be concerned with, and which conceptual terms are useful. Yet, such an apprehension would be not dissimilar to the suspicions advanced by scholars like Stephen Walt (1991, 213) with respect to the programme of ‘broadening the notion of “security” to include topics such as poverty, AIDS, environmental hazards, drug abuse, and the like.’ Moreover, a object-driven transdisciplinary journey may trigger worries about CSS consistency. We believe the contributions to this Special Issue demonstrate how these conceptual, empirical and methodological troubles are troubles worth taking Acknowledging that science and technology are core aspects of security studies shows great promise. This is different from claiming that science and technology are de facto more important today than a few decades ago. Rather it means that recent technological developments like the internet (Carr 2015; Herrera 2002), cybersecurity (Dunn Cavelty 2013; Fichtner 2018) and new weapons (Boyle 2013; Huelss 2019) require that we pay attention to their (in)security politics. However, not all technology-focused research in security studies takes its inspiration from STS, and nor do all studies of security technologies and the intersection of science and (in)security take place within the field of security studies. In fact, STS scholars have had a long-standing concern with providing analyses of security practices and objects. For instance, in her contribution Lucy Suchman (2020) engages with Donald MacKenzie’s (1990, 4) work on the ‘invention of accuracy’ of ballistic nuclear missiles, to unpack the discursive and practical effects of the increased automation of warfare. She thus demonstrates the value of engaging with an STS literature that, despite focusing on security, to date remains little known and mobilised by security scholars. In their chapter focusing on STS research on security practices, Kathleen Vogel et al. (2017) emphasise the increasing attention to knowledge (and non-knowledge) practices as well as the challenges of carrying out STS-informed research in the field of security. Unfortunately, STS researchers studying security pay only marginal attention to research carried out by critical security studies scholars (Evans, Leese, and Rychnovská 2020). Similarly, CSS has thus far shown limited interest and engagement with STS research focusing on security practices. Besides STS works explicitly focusing on (in)security, we insist that STS has a lot to bring to the study of security politics. CSS researchers already acknowledge STS as a rich source of concepts and ontological approaches, but some of this work forgets the diverse ‘genealogies of STS’ (Jasanoff 2012). To put it bluntly, CSS has fallen prey to a narrow focus on Latourianism, which has collapsed STS as a whole into Actor-Network Theory (ANT), with the latter being understood primarily as the work of a single author, that is, Bruno Latour (1987, 2005). Latour’s work has indeed marked most of the ‘new materialist’ turn mentioned above (Salter and Walters 2016). Our suggestion to read STS beyond Latour is not to put into question the value of ANT for the study of (in)security practices. As Pieter Lagerwaard (2020) demonstrates in his contribution, there is still much to be gained in engaging with Latour’s works and ANT more generally (cf. also Bellanova 2017), and to connect them with work on ‘boundary objects’ (Star and Griesemer 1989). But the success of ANT within CSS risks failing to appreciate the differences and divergences within ANT (Latour 1999; Law and Hassard 1999) and across diverse STS approaches (Bijker and Law 1992). Importantly, it also risks missing the chance to take the trouble to engage with, and thus discover, the heuristic and political potential of many other approaches such as feminist and post-colonial technoscience (see Hayles 1999; Harding 2009), those exploring the co-production of science and society (Jasanoff 2004) as well as work on the social construction of technology (Bijker 1995) and the design and deployment of large technological systems (Hughes 1987). The conceptual exchange The growing interest of STS in IR is also due to the fact that it speaks to adjacent trends. These trends include an emphasis on the socio-political significance of the seemingly mundane (Guillaume and Huysmans 2018; Lisle and Johnson 2019), the conditions of possibility for politics and contestation (Mandelmaum, Friis Kristensen, and Athanassiou 2016; Monsees 2019), and the need for creative methods and deeper methodological reflection (Aradau et al. 2015; Naumes 2015). Recent conceptual exchange with IR also places an emphasis on those entanglements (Bellanova and Fuster 2013; Voelkner 2011) and processes (Jackson and Nexon 1999; Passoth and Rowland 2010) that create both the ‘state’ and the ‘international’, which make them look like frictionless wholes. Advancing existing work that draws on STS to emphasise ‘entanglements’, Rothe’s article (2020) shows how these insights are useful in developing an analytical framework through which to better appreciate local entanglements that partly consist of technology, in his case, explored through the case of jellyfish-killer robots. Rune Saugmann (2020) discusses in his contribution how entanglements joining cameras, the police, media and audiences play out in different contexts, demonstrating how the assumed factuality of pictures can be contested. This leads him to explore what it means to make claims about the agency of the digital camera. Saugmann thereby contributes to a long-standing debate in STS on the question of agency of objects. Although these questions have also been discussed in IR (Hoijtink and Leese 2019, Lindskov Jacobsen and Monsees 2019), Saugmann’s original contribution highlights the need to think about what it means politically to talk about digital cameras’ agency. Indeed, methodological insights stemming from STS have been used to analyse world politics beyond the realm of science and technology. As contributions to this Special Issue demonstrate, STS can be of value for a range of themes not primarily associated with STS such as disinformation (Monsees 2020) or financial regulations (Lagerwaard 2020). What emerges from reading across the diverse contributions to this Special Issue is that the relation between researchers and research objects is of special concern when we take the trouble to analyse the roles of science and technology in security practices (see also de Goede 2020). Besides seeking new ways of politicising, critiquing and raising novel questions, it is also important to emphasise that ‘taking the trouble’ to engage with STS also enables us to see different things that can then be politicised and explored critically – for example, the use of tweets as evidence in court cases (Anwar 2020), or the role of roadblocks and prisons in intervention practices (Schouten 2019; Lindskov Jacobsen 2020), to name but a few. The relation between researchers and research objects can be best understood as a dynamic process that starts with our research apparatus (methods). Such an understanding invites us to better conceptualise the politics that are at stake in our research and to clarify what practices we are examining, if not directly partaking in, through our research. The contributions to this Special Issue all highlight that the encounter between STS and CSS affects our methods, politics and practices – i.e., the perspective we choose, how we do research, and with which consequences. Studying security politics and practices requires methodological reflections, especially in contexts where secrecy and unknowns are constitutive of the dominant security and surveillance practices (Balmer 2012; de Goede, Bosma, and Pallister-Wilkins 2019; Walters 2015). As a result, this Special Issue is not only relevant because of its analysis of timely empirical issues – like disinformation, terror financing and terror fighting – but also because it fosters debate about methodological questions and what kind of trouble is caused by deploying authors and concepts from STS. In different ways, these articles demonstrate how taking the trouble with STS and thinking with STS enriches our methodologies and modes of critical scholarship. Two contributions in particular explicitly show how engaging with STS insights adds to ongoing debates about doing critique in critical security studies (Austin, Bellanova, and Kaufmann 2019; Berling and Bueger 2017; Koddenbrock 2014). de Goede (2020) invites us to think of the ‘practice’ of critique as a form of ‘communing,’ which for Stengers means ‘participating in an ongoing, adventurous, unguaranteed, but generative process of making sense in common’ (Stengers 2019, 18, cited in de Goede 2020). Suchman (2020) demonstrates how technoscientific claims about accuracy presented as evidence of an ethical approach to warfare are fallacious, and that their core function is legitimating further violence.

### Alt/FW- Education Key

#### The alt is key- we must work in educational spaces to interrogate and critically reject the militarized forms of logic that govern our drive to fuel military power and secure national interests-it’s try or die for the alternative

Acheson in 2022

Ray Acheson is the Director of WILPF’s Disarmament Programme, which provides analysis, research, and advocacy across a range of disarmament issues from an antimilitarist feminist perspective; Militarism Cannot Prevent War: An urgent call for de-escalation, demilitarisation, and disarmament in relation to Ukraine and beyond; NATO Watch; https://natowatch.org/default/2022/militarism-cannot-prevent-war-urgent-call-de-escalation-demilitarisation-and

Beyond this immediate context, action is needed to prevent future armed conflict and threats of nuclear war.¶ Instead of maintaining opposing military alliances, all parties should engage in building a common, demilitarised security strategy that places cooperation and the collective fulfilment of the needs of people and planet in the forefront of all policies and actions. NATO, for example, should be disbanded and non-militarised, non-divisive alliances for peace and cooperation should be built instead, with international solidarity as its guiding principle. All countries should reduce their military spending immediately, and agree to phased reductions through the implementation of Article 26 of the UN Charter, the mandate for which should be taken from the UN Security Council and given to the UN General Assembly.¶ All countries should join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and work urgently for the timebound elimination of all nuclear weapons. Through the treaty’s provisions for disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons could be pursued through verifiable process and achieved within a decade. The process of nuclear weapon abolition could provide a foundational path to broader changes in the world order. Eliminating nuclear weapons would help establish a new cooperative paradigm in international relations and free up resources help address the climate crisis. It would also help generate momentum for broader disarmament and demilitarisation and redirection of money and human ingenuity towards meeting human and planetary needs.¶ At the core of our efforts, we must put the lives of civilians and care for the planet above perceived military, political, and economic interests. To this end, a people-centred peace process is imperative. As Almut Rochowanaski writes,“We must apply the lessons of 21st-century peacebuilding to create a peace process that is people-centred, women-led and rights-based.” Without this, “patterns of exclusion and victimisation will not be remedied, and memories of pain and injustice will turn into grievance and alienation lasting generations. A broad range of stakeholders can be heard and validated through proven peacebuilding practices, and can go on to build a different future for their country.”¶ In the Ukraine context, we echo the call of the Ukrainian Pacificist Movement for “open, inclusive and comprehensive negotiations on peace and disarmament in the format of a public dialogue between all state and non-state parties to the conflict with the participation of pro-peace civil society actors.” This type of inclusive process, a process that is not driven or dominated by those who created the crisis in the first place, must be applied to other contexts. We know that more inclusive processes lead to more stable peace, yet time after time, only men with guns dictate the terms of “peace”. These solutions invariably lead to the imposition of neoliberal economic policies, gender and racial oppressions and inequalities, and endless militarisation.¶ The old ways of doing things have proven over and over again that they do not work. We need a new vision of global peace, grounded in the intersectional experiences of people and the needs of the entire planet. Creating and achieving that vision requires changing who is invited to the table: out with the ruling elites, who are bound to personal interests and gains, and in with everyone who stands to lose from conflict. Land and water protectors, feminists, antinuclear activists, those organising for demilitarisation, equality, and care must lead the work for peace, not the people who profit from conflict.¶ Abolition for transformation ¶ We need a paradigm shift in international relations, stemming from this kind of people-centred peace process. We need to alter the relations between United States and Russia, but more broadly we need to dismantle the militarised global order, militarised conceptions of security, and the dominance of the military-industrial complex over world affairs. The hegemony of colonial-corporate extractivism must also be transformed — for the climate, for relations with First Nations, for the protection of land, water, air, and animals.¶ An abolitionist framing is useful for cultivating such transformation. Instead of investing in weapons and preparing for war, we must be investing instead of care for people and planet. Abolition is a tool to build a world that works for all, instead of just a few. The abolition of war, globally, requires disarmament and arms control, systems for demilitarisation and reduction of military spending. But it also requires building structures for peace, solidarity, cooperation, and nonviolence to flourish. It means replacing weapons with renewable energy, war with diplomacy, capitalism with a redistributive feminist political economy that is centered on equality, social justice, degrowth and ecological sustainability.¶ Unlearning the necessity of violence is essential to exploring what could be built in its place. This means turning on its head so much of what we are taught about what’s necessary for safety and security in our world. It means learning to reject violence as a solution to all problems, interrogating and challenging systems of power that assert they exist to protect while instead they persecute and oppress.¶ Understanding and responding to the “bigger picture” doesn’t mean we each as individuals need to solve every piece of it. But it does mean we need to recognise and support each other’s efforts and reflect in our own work the analysis and organising of various movements and projects for peace. The sum of our whole is greater than our parts, and going up against the machine of capitalist violence can feel immense — unless we break it down and rebuild something else, together.

#### Critical resistance in educational spaces is the key first step to raise consciousness and build alternate worlds for an egalitarian future- we must start by resisting militarism and imperialism

Maria Nikolakaki in 2020

Associate Professor of Pedagogy at the Department of¶ Social and Educational Policy of the University of Peloponnese, Greece; The Hope of Critical Pedagogy in the New Dark Ages of Neoliberal¶ Globalization and Imperialism; Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies; http://www.jceps.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/18-1-10-marnik-.pdf

Although crucial, resistance alone is not enough to stop globalized¶ neoliberalism, in education or more widely across societies. Stopping neoliberal¶ reforms through resistance is a necessary, initial step. There is an urgent need to¶ go beyond such resistance and to build a global revolt, across societies, to¶ struggle against the class war being waged by the ruling class on their futures,¶ and to create the other, alternative, societies and worlds, based on social justice,¶ that are necessary and possible. 'Critical educators can indeed recognize that¶ education has the potential to fuel the flames of resistance to global capitalism¶ as well as the passion for socialist transformation' (Hill, 2006).¶ Peter McLaren (2003) says: 'Schools consciously and unconsciously justify¶ oppression and the tyranny of governments. Government officials claim that¶ schools in capitalist societies such as the United States are equal and that as¶ long as students remain comfortably ensconced within the cultural hegemony of¶ consumerism, and adhere to the dictates of the administration (which are meant¶ to be in tandem with the logic of the market), the country can enhance the value¶ of its international capital and can compete within the international market'.¶ This provides a useful description of imperialism, as justified and driven¶ through militarism in education. I agree with Saltman (2007) when he says: 'The¶ movement against militarism in education must go beyond the schools and¶ challenge the many ways that militarism as a cultural logic enforces the¶ expansion of corporate power and decimates public power. Such a movement¶ must include the practice of critical pedagogy and ideally, also link with other¶ movements against oppression, such as the anti-globalization, feminist, labor, ¶ environmental, and antiracism movements. Together, we can form the basis for¶ imagining and implementing a just future.'¶ As Dinerstein and Denuline (2012) suggest: 'Hope is a fundamental human¶ driving force. The principle of hope has a two-fold significance. On the one¶ hand, it informs present individual and collective forms of resistance that intend¶ to move beyond global capitalism. It presents an alternative vision to¶ development that will not come about through state power. Alternatives to¶ development initiatives have put at the center not only the significance of¶ nature, the collective use of natural resources, the construction of a solidarity¶ economy, the idea of substantive equality and radical democracy (Santos and¶ Rodriguez Garavito, 2006), but also the idea that it is necessary to imagine¶ another world in order to change this one (Acosta, 2010). By imagining we¶ mean the concrete experience of anticipating a better future in the present.'¶ Hannah Arendt (1954), proposes that ‘education is the point at which we decide¶ whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility for it’. As Freire¶ claims: 'Man's onotological vocation is to be a Subject who acts upon and¶ transforms his world, and in so doing moves toward ever new possibilities of¶ fuller and richer life individually and collectively' (Shaull, 2004). ' It is our duty,¶ in building this better world, to become fully human”.¶ Overall, as I have been arguing through this paper, capitalism in recent decades¶ has been becoming more aggressive and totalitarian. Education has been¶ suffering from imperialism and militarism along with other sections of society.¶ In order for change to happen, one must never abandon hope. Fear and despair¶ is the basis for an immobilized society that will passively accept the ruling¶ class’s dictums. This is something we cannot allow for the sake of humanity¶ itself. Critical Pedagogy, even in the darkest times, is connected to hope by ¶ definition, since it visions another world that is possible and struggles for it. For¶ as Brecht said:¶ In the dark times¶ Will there also be singing?¶ Yes, there will also be singing¶ About the dark times.¶ Critical pedagogy is one of the strongest powers for social change, for it builds¶ in the minds of the future generation, the whys and the how to resist and claim¶ back humanity. It is our duty for everyday struggle to make the future more¶ egalitarian and prosperous by erasing exploitation of humans by humans.¶ 'The future isn't something hidden in a corner. The future is something we build¶ in the present.' - Paulo Freire

### Alt Solves Imperialism

#### The alternative is key to countering the domination of imperialism- we must focus analysis on understanding the structures and points of crisis that legitimize the military and capital expansion- this knowledge results in effective struggles against exploitation

Berch Berberoglu in 2022

Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, NV,; Berch Berberoglu (2022) Capitalism and Imperialism in the Twentieth and¶ Early Twenty-First Century: A Critical Analysis of Conventional and Marxist Theories of Imperialism,¶ International Critical Thought, 12:1, 55-80, DOI: 10.1080/21598282.2022.2035794

Imperialism today, in the early twenty-first century, has a dual, contradictory character whose dialectical resolution is an outcome of its very nature—a product of its growth¶ and expansion across time and space within the confines of a structure that promotes its¶ own demise. However, while the process itself is a self-destructing one, it is important to¶ understand that the nature of the class struggle that these contradictions have generated¶ is such that the critical factor that tips the balance of class forces in favor of the working¶ class to win state power is strong political organization, the building of class alliances¶ among the oppressed and exploited classes, the development of a theoretically wellinformed revolutionary leadership that is organically linked to the working class, and¶ a clear understanding of the forces at work in the class struggle, including especially¶ the central role of the state and its military and police apparatus in defense of the¶ empire—the focal point of the struggle for state power (Szymanski 1978; Knapp and¶ Spector 2011). The success of the working class and its revolutionary leadership in confronting the power of the imperialist state thus becomes the critical element assuring that¶ once captured, the new proletarian state can become a political instrument that the¶ workers can use to establish their rule and in the process transform society and the¶ state itself to promote proletarian interests in line with its vision for a new socialist¶ society free of exploitation and oppression—one based on the rule of the working¶ class and the laboring masses in general.¶ The necessity for change and social transformation, which is a political one, demands¶ a clear, scientific understanding of modern imperialism in its late twentieth and early¶ twenty-first century form, so that this knowledge can be put to use to facilitate the¶ class struggle in a revolutionary direction. In this context, one will want to know not¶ only the extent and depth of global capitalist expansion, but its base of support, its linkage¶ to the major institutions of capitalist society (above all the state, but also other religious,¶ cultural, and social institutions), the extent of its ideological hegemony and control over¶ mass consciousness, and other aspects of social, economic, political, cultural, and ideological domination. Moreover—and this is the most important point—one must study¶ its weaknesses, its problem areas, its vulnerabilities, its weak links, and the various¶ dimensions of its crisis—especially those that affect its continued reproduction and survival. Armed with this knowledge one would be better equipped to confront capital and¶ the capitalist state in the struggle to transform capitalist globalization and imperialism in¶ the twenty-first century. Together, these struggles have been effective in frustrating the¶ efforts of imperialism to expand and dominate the world, while at the same time building¶ the basis of an international working class movement that finally overcomes national,¶ ethnic, cultural, and linguistic boundaries that artificially separate the workers in their¶ fight against imperialism. The solidarity achieved through this process has helped expand¶ the strength of the international working class and increased its determination to defeat¶ imperialism and all vestiges of global capitalism throughout the world and build a new¶ egalitarian world social order that advances the interests of the working people and ultimately all of humanity.

### Alt Solves NATO/GPW

#### Capitalist imperialism provides the best framework for understanding NATO and international conflict- it is a result of the generation of economic contradictions and the necessity of countries to protect market access

Alex Callinicos in 2022

political theorist and activist; The great power grab—imperialism and the war in Ukraine; Socialist Worker; https://socialistworker.co.uk/features/the-great-power-grab-imperialism-and-war-in-ukraine/

The mainstream media present the war in Ukraine as a struggle between “democracy”, represented by Ukraine and its Western backers, and “authoritarianism” in the shape of Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia. But this is much too simplistic.¶ For example, probably Ukraine’s most enthusiastic backer is the far right government in Poland, which is under investigation by the European Union for its authoritarian tendencies. Putin is supported by India, which, despite its own brutish fascist ­government, remains a multi-party democracy.¶ The mainstream way of framing the conflict is designed to equate the Western bloc of liberal capitalist states with the “international community”.It is also a way of denying ­legitimacy to the interests of this bloc’s rivals because they are “authoritarian.” This gets forgotten however when it comes to, for example, the murderous Saudi autocracy.¶ So are there better theoretical ­frameworks for understanding the conflict? One resource is provided by the idea of imperialism. After all, Putin seems intent on restoring the old Tsarist Empire that was destroyed by the Russian Revolution of October 1917.¶ But it’s important to clear about what we mean by imperialism. We can ­understand it as a phenomenon that spans historical eras, as the way in which powerful states dominate, ­conquer, and exploit neighbouring societies.¶ This has been a feature of class ­societies for thousands of years, going back to the ancient Persian, Chinese, and Roman empires. Now Russia is clearly behaving like an imperialist power in this sense, seeking to batter the Ukrainian state into ­submission and carve up its territory. But is it enough to understand the ­conflict in these terms?¶ The Lebanese Marxist Gilbert Achcar thinks so. He has put forward what he calls a “radical anti-imperialist position” that focuses exclusively on the struggle between Russia and Ukraine.¶ “A successful Russian ­takeover of Ukraine would encourage the United States to return to the path of ­conquering the world by force in a ­context of ­exacerbation of the new colonial division of the world and worsening of global antagonisms, while a Russian ­failure—adding to the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan—would reinforce what is called in Washington the ‘Vietnam syndrome’.¶ “Moreover, it seems quite obvious to me that a Russian victory would ­considerably strengthen warmongering and the push towards increased military spending in Nato countries, which has already gotten off to a flying start, while a Russian defeat would offer much better conditions for our battle for general disarmament and the dissolution of Nato.”¶ It would indeed be good if the Ukrainian people were able to drive out the Russian invaders. But there is a small problem with Achcar’s argument that this would weaken the US and Nato. They are enthusiastically backing the Ukrainians, flooding them with arms, and boosting their own military budgets. ¶ If, thanks to these efforts and the courage of the Ukrainian fighters, Russia were defeated, would the US and its allies react by disarming and dissolving Nato? Of course they wouldn’t.They would celebrate this outcome as their victory, and boost Nato further. The US would feel invigorated in its world-historic competition with the real challenger to its hegemony, China.¶ What is missing from Achcar’s approach, and that of other leftists that duck the issue of Nato such as Paul Mason, is the more historically specific understanding of imperialism offered by Marxism. We can see this theory emerging ­originally in Karl Marx’s Capital in the 1860s. But it is developed more ­systematically in the early 20th century, around the time of the First World War.¶ Marxists were confronted with a ­reality similar to our own. The radical liberal economist JA Hobson wrote, “The novelty of recent Imperialism … consists chiefly in its adoption by several nations. The notion of a number of competing empires is essentially modern.”¶ This geopolitical competition was expressed in conflicts over territory—the colonies and semi-colonies that the ­biggest states were striving to dominate— and in an accelerating arms race. The Marxist theory of imperialism was developed to explain these ­rivalries, which precipitated the two world wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, drowning the world in blood.¶ It was a theory of capitalist ­imperialism. The Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin called imperialism the highest stage of capitalism. His Polish-German comrade Rosa Luxemburg wrote, “The essence of imperialism consists ­precisely in the expansion of capital from the old capitalist countries into new regions and the competitive economic and political struggle among those for those new areas.”¶ To put it another way, capitalist imperialism represents the ­intersection of economic and geopolitical competition. Economic competition is the driving force of capitalism—rival firms ­struggle against each other, investing in improved and expanded production to seize a larger share of markets.¶ In the late 19th century, the ­geopolitical struggle among states was subsumed under the capitalist logic of competitive accumulation.¶ This reflected changes in both warfare and capitalism. War was industrialised, as military power came to depend on mass ­production to arm, support, and transport huge armies. States therefore needed to ­promote industrial capitalism. ¶ Meanwhile capitalist firms increased in size and started to operate globally. They depended on state support against their rivals. During the depression of the late 19th century, seizing overseas colonies ­compensated for falling profitability.¶ So capitalist imperialism isn’t just big states bullying and conquering smaller states—though there is plenty of that. It’s a global system of inter-capitalist ­competition. Just as before the First World War, today imperialism means geopolitical competition against the background of global economic integration.¶ The power of the antagonists depends on their position in the capitalist world economy. The US dominates finance and big tech, China has a vast manufacturing machine, and Russia relies on energy exports. Today one can identify perhaps six leading imperialist powers—the US, China, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany.¶ The most important antagonism is that between the US and China whose leaders aim to displace Washington’s hegemony, initially in the Indo-Pacific region. But Russian imperialism, ­manoeuvring to rebuild its power, creates a three‑way conflict. ¶ The big ­western European powers are pulled in different directions. They depend on Russian energy and are attracted by the vast Chinese market—but, as at present, they ­ultimately line up with the US. Now this understanding of ­capitalist imperialism as involving a system of interstate rivalry is completely missing from Achcar’s analysis.¶ He denies that the Ukraine war involves a conflict among imperialist powers. “If any war where each side is supported by an imperialist rival were called an inter-imperialist war, then all the wars of our time would be ­inter-imperialist, since as a rule, it is enough for one of the rival imperialisms to support one side for the other to support the opposite side.¶ “An inter-imperialist war is not that. It is a direct war, and not one by proxy, between two powers, each of which seeks to invade the territorial and (neo) colonial domain of the other.” This is much too narrow. The US waged a proxy war against the Soviet Union after the latter tried to seize Afghanistan at the end of 1979¶ Along with allies such as Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan it armed and trained the mujahedin fighters who resisted the Soviet occupation. The ­conflict helped to drain Soviet resources and morale in the last decade of the Cold War. Of course, the mujahedin had their own political agendas. This became clear after Soviet forces withdrew in 1989, culminating in the Taliban’s ­support for al-Qaeda and its resistance to the US occupation following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. ¶ But the US played a decisive shaping role in an important final episode of the Cold War. Of course, there are huge differences between Ukraine today and Afghanistan in the 1980s.¶ But there is an important similarity, in that the Western imperialist powers are instrumentalising the Ukrainian national struggle against Russian imperialism for their own interests.¶ Inter-imperialist struggles and wars of national defence often interweave. The First World War started when the Austro-Hungarian Empire attacked Serbia, which it blamed for the assassination of its crown prince Franz Ferdinand. Russia then backed Serbia, leading to an escalating process of military mobilisations that ended in a ­terrible general war.¶ The German Marxist Karl Kautsky argued that the role played by the Serbian struggle for national ­self‑­determination meant the conflict wasn’t just an ­imperialist war. Lenin responded, “To Serbia, i.e., to perhaps one percent or so of the ­participants in the present war, the war is a ‘continuation of the politics’ of the bourgeois-liberation movement. ¶ “To the other ninety-nine percent, the war is a continuation of the politics of imperialism.” Of course, the balance is ­different in the present case since the direct ­fighting involves just Ukraine and Russia.¶ Nevertheless the Nato powers’ efforts to stay out of the fighting—above all to avoid nuclear confrontation with Russia—don’t alter the fact they are doing ­everything they can short of this to defeat Russia. This too is “a continuation of the ­politics of imperialism”.¶ The Marxist theory of imperialism is important politically. Without it we are confronted simply with a struggle between rival nation-states. But once we see the role of ­imperialism, we can identify the class antagonism at work. We can see the thread of class interest that binds together not just the Russian conscripts dying in Putin’s war and their families back home being walloped economically by the effects of Western sanctions.¶ This thread also connects with ­working people all over the world, hit thanks to the war by food and energy inflation and threatened with nuclear destruction. It unites them all against the rival ruling classes busy feeding this terrible war.

### At: Policy Key

#### Policy changes will not stop the impacts of militarism- only a paradigm shift that recognizes the necessity of breaking away from militarist ideology solves

Booker and Ohlbaum in 2021

Salih Booker, president & CEO, Center for International Policy¶ And Diana Ohlbaum, senior strategist and legislative director, foreign policy, FCNL; Dismantling Racism and¶ Militarism in U.S. Foreign Policy; Center for International Policy; <https://www.fcnl.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/DismantlingRacism.16.pdf>

Capitalism, at least as it is organized and practiced in the United States, is¶ perhaps the deepest-rooted and widest-reaching system that perpetuates¶ the Racism-Militarism Paradigm. In its prioritization of the interests of¶ shareholders over workers, its socialization of costs and privatization of¶ profits, its focus on short-term profits over long-term gains, and its failure¶ to invest in human capital, the U.S. system of capitalism is inextricably¶ intertwined with racism and exploitation.¶ It has resulted in a carbon-based economy that is exceptionally reliant on¶ the arms and extractive and carceral industries; a government that has failed¶ to address climate change or promote climate justice in any meaningful¶ way; and a population that suffers from extreme gaps in health, wealth, and¶ income. The constant search for new sources of cheap labor, the competition¶ for access to natural resources, and the need for ever-expanding markets has¶ led to human and environmental degradation, military expansionism, and¶ the promotion of consumerism.¶ Closely associated with the capitalist system are the laws, policies, and¶ regulations that enable its most detrimental impacts. A regressive tax system¶ that tolerates massive tax evasion and avoidance by wealthy individuals¶ and corporations has left federal coffers without resources to spend on the common good. The excessive influence of the military-industrial-carceralcongressional complex has led to a massive network of prisons and detention¶ centers, a huge global military footprint, and an unrestrained arms race and¶ bloated Pentagon budgets.¶ War has become a permanent and largely unchallenged reality, with arms exports¶ now determining many foreign policy priorities. The accelerated development¶ of weapons whose use should be unthinkable is the new normal. The absence¶ of responsible oversight and accountability mechanisms has given license to¶ war profiteering, corruption, and waste—the burden of which falls upon U.S.¶ taxpayers, disproportionately among the poor and middle class.¶ But it is not just the formal state structures and government policies that¶ operate to maintain white supremacy and advance U.S. global military¶ supremacy. Christian, white, male dominance and military solutions are also¶ bolstered by nonprofit organizations, religious and cultural institutions, the¶ media, the education system, and multilateral institutions such as the United¶ Nations and the International Monetary Fund (where power and influence¶ are based upon national wealth, privileging the ruling elites of the G7¶ countries, which combined represent only 10% of the world’s population).¶ These institutions often unwittingly perpetuate the same exclusionary and¶ exploitative practices as the U.S. government and U.S.-based corporations,¶ and they encourage individual obedience to and compliance with those¶ practices. They generally tell the stories that those with power and privilege¶ want to be told. Many of them advocate, tolerate, or commit violence;¶ replicate racialized hierarchies; and socialize narratives and myths that¶ support the Racism-Militarism Paradigm.¶ Injustice of this magnitude will not be rectified by mere policy change. Even¶ though transitions of administration and party control of Congress can¶ result in meaningful policy shifts, the range of possible options is tightly¶ constrained by this pre-existing set of beliefs and assumptions about the¶ world and the U.S. role in it. What is needed is paradigm change. When we¶ speak of dismantling racism and militarism in U.S. foreign policy, we are¶ talking about the work of paradigm change.¶ A paradigm is a distinct set of concepts and rules that establish boundaries¶ and dictate behavior. It is a theoretical framework that informs the processes¶ of defining U.S. national interests, establishing foreign policy priorities,¶ determining the distribution of resources, and conceptualizing national¶ security. And this is what must be changed.

### Alt Solves- Ideology First

#### The alt is key- only a paradigm shift can dismantle US militarism. Exposing the ideological roots of militarism is a crucial first step.

Booker and Ohlbaum in 2021

Salih Booker, president & CEO, Center for International Policy¶ And Diana Ohlbaum, senior strategist and legislative director, foreign policy, FCNL; Dismantling Racism and¶ Militarism in U.S. Foreign Policy; Center for International Policy; <https://www.fcnl.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/DismantlingRacism.16.pdf>

Racism has always been closely intertwined with U.S. militarism. The¶ American nation was born from the genocide of Indigenous peoples and¶ conquest of their lands. Its brutal system of policing and mass incarceration,¶ as well as its indulgence of private militias and widespread gun ownership,¶ is rooted in the enslavement of Africans.¶ From imperial control of the Philippines and Cuba to the atomic bombing of¶ Japan, from the arming of dictators in Africa and Latin America to the endless¶ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a sizable proportion of Americans have been¶ willing to impose unthinkable pain and suffering on those perceived to be¶ non-white and therefore less-than. A new study confirms the close linkage¶ between anti-Black prejudice and support for bombing Iran.¶ Dismantling entrenched racism and militarism, and the political and¶ economic structures that reflect and reinforce them, will require new ways¶ of working together. Systemic change will come not from a small group of¶ elites or political insiders who revise policies, but from a broad grassroots¶ movement that fundamentally shifts the dynamics of power. It will mean¶ centering the views of those who have been marginalized and oppressed and¶ bringing people together across racial lines.¶ As Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. explained in 1965, “The segregation of the races¶ was really a political stratagem employed by the emerging Bourbon interests¶ in the South to keep the southern masses divided and southern labor the¶ cheapest in the land.”¶ By taking an anti-racist and anti-militarist lens to U.S. foreign policy and¶ bridging the divide between organizations working on domestic and foreign¶ policy issues, we can reject the corrosive and poisonous myth of American¶ innocence and support the growth of a broad democratic movement to¶ reshape America’s role in the world.¶ We believe that supporting the movement that is already in motion will¶ require the following:¶ 1. A concerted effort to unmask the lies, myths, and false narratives¶ about national security and the U.S. role in the world. For¶ people who have experienced marginalization, criminalization,¶ colonization, and dehumanization, these untruths are already¶ obvious. But those who draw social, political, economic, emotional,¶ professional, and reputational benefits from the current order are¶ either willfully ignorant of or unconcerned about the harms it¶ causes—or else they have been blinded to these harms by the system’s¶ internal mechanisms to normalize white supremacy and militarism.¶ We must expose, describe, and confront the moral, economic, and¶ physical harms caused by the Racism-Militarism Paradigm; identify¶ those who benefit from it; and reject the underlying notions of national¶ and racial superiority (i.e., the lie that there is a hierarchy of human value¶ in which some lives are worth more than others). However, we cannot¶ expect those who currently draw power from these myths to recognize¶ and repudiate them. Most of the power shift will come from supporting¶ those who are mobilizing communities that already reject these false¶ narratives to demand and achieve changes in representation and the¶ exercise of political power.

### Alt Solves-Imperialism

#### Centering a critical reading of imperialism is key to unite theory and praxis- it moves analysis beyond the nation-state and gives us the tools needed to carve out spaces of resistance

Anthony Pahnke in 2021

Associate Professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University; Regrounding Critical Theory: Lenin on Imperialism, Nationalism, and Strategy; International Studies Review, Volume 23, Issue 1, March 2021, Pages 181–203; https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/23/1/181/5850500

The argument put forward in this article is that we need to recapture key elements from the Critical Theoretic tradition—namely, a concern with strategy—to explore the nature of emancipation in our current historical moment. I agree with others who recognize the indispensable place of First Generation Frankfurt School thinkers in this tradition (Yalvaç 2015), yet also see the need to recognize that the Critical Theoretic project predates their work. Marx and Engels, for example, are integral, for not only providing concepts to analyze social relations, but also for intervening into affairs in ways similar to some ethnographers (Murphy 2007, 131–132). Marx's often referenced eleventh thesis on Feuerbach—philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it—includes a proviso that sits at the center of work on emancipation. Specifically, contemplation is insufficient for changing social relations. Emancipation, in following Fraser's understanding of the concept, is rooted in ambivalent claims of social movements to “erode” some form of domination in favor of transformation (2013). Ambivalence combines with transformation because there are no guarantees when seeking emancipation—collective efforts to fundamentally alter social relations may end in defeat or reversal. Kevin Anderson recognizes such qualities in Lenin's efforts to connect theoretic work with practical activity, leading him to state that the Russian Revolutionary deserves greater attention in the Critical Theory tradition (1995).¶ My central argument, in building from Anderson's comment, foregrounds Lenin's work as a way to reground Critical Theory. The reason I turn to Lenin is analogous to Fraser's concern that we cannot reckon with our many crises—political, economic, and environmental—with the received thinking from the regularly cited Critical Theorists (2017). Yet, where Fraser turns to Polanyi, I propose calling upon Lenin, with special attention to his theorization of and political practice concerning imperialism. His multi-dimensional work around the concept, from writing theoretical texts and pamphlets, to organizing conferences and events (e.g., The Third Communist International, or Comintern), provides a way to reconsider the Critical Theoretic tradition within International Relations. Intrinsic to Lenin's work, as I argue, is a way to conceive of strategy. This concept, which speaks to Marxist discussions of praxis, ties abstract theorizing to political and economic analysis, as well as to movement building projects. Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School variety and after has moved steadily away from discussions of strategy to the promotion of dialogue. This tendency represents depoliticization, which as Schmitt described, elevates neutrality and privacy as values ([2008] 1929, 89–90). This development also characterizes some seemingly radical endorsements of civil society.¶ This article contains five parts. In the first and the second, I detail the Theory of Communicative Action, featuring Habermas and Honneth, while also including the work of some International Relations theorists. I argue that this popular current of thought in the discipline depoliticizes Critical Theory by neglecting strategic considerations on internationalism, while also reifying the state/society divide. Section 3 focuses on the research of Cox and Ashley, as well as others, locating the presence of a more internationalist and engaged political sensibility within Critical Theory when compared to the proponents of Habermas’ discourse ethics. Still, these works feature flawed assumptions pertaining to civil society and political engagement. The fourth section introduces Lenin's thought as a way to address these concerns, particularly his work on imperialism. I offer a political reading of his work—both the famous pamphlet, as well as his extensive notebooks on the concept—detailing his preoccupation with organizers, intellectuals, and movements. I return to how nationalism connects to liberation in the fourth and fifth sections. Lenin's dual understanding of nationalism—as potentially a conservative force and an emancipatory one—moves us beyond taking the nation as the principal unit of politics. I do not argue for rejecting nationalism as a collective political project, but with Lenin's insights, show how such movements can bridge with more emancipatory struggles. Ultimately, Lenin pushes discussions of emancipation into moving beyond the state and the nation.

#### Anti imperialism must be the center of any understanding of IR- it creates the tools needed move beyond theorization and create unifying struggles against capital

Anthony Pahnke in 2021

Associate Professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University; Regrounding Critical Theory: Lenin on Imperialism, Nationalism, and Strategy; International Studies Review, Volume 23, Issue 1, March 2021, Pages 181–203; https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/23/1/181/5850500

This article places key elements of Lenin's thought in discussion with dominant currents in Critical Theory. I argue that the latter shows signs of what I call depoliticization. This trend—in privileging norms such as neutrality and private, reclusive forms of reflection—leads theorists to wall themselves off from movements. Politics has become an area for the passive contemplating of affairs. Habermas, a principal voice in this variety of Critical Theory, advocates for dialogue as the preferred mode of social interaction. Such positions are blind to our historical moment when conflict and taking sides is the norm, on the right and the left.¶ Central pillars of Critical Theory—a concern with emancipation and the understanding that concepts must work against domination—remain relevant. Frankfurt School theorists, such as Horkheimer, is particularly instructive in this regard. Fraser's work, as well, offers a way to conceptualize Critical Theory as a project for emancipation that is rooted in connecting with social movement struggles. To further improve our understanding of how this connection can take place, turning to Lenin, as I argue, is crucial. Lenin's thought on imperialism offers a way for us to rethink the place of theory when it comes to the importance of making strategic interventions in political life, especially concerning questions pertaining to territory. In this regard, Lenin highlights the central, yet problematic necessity of working with the state, while also confronting movement divisions to build unity. In Lenin's hands, Critical Theory is a tool to mobilize people, draw distinctions with antagonists, and build movement unity. The many ways he practiced and theorized political action, including writing editorials, producing abstract intellectual works, and delivering statements for conferences, provide multiple illustrations on how to bridge social movement activity with theory.¶ Extreme inequality characterizes international political economy and life within many advanced capitalist states, as we live in what may be considered “a new gilded age.” Powerful states and corporations are connected, linked in ways that generate uneven, global chains of production, exchange, and circulation. Wars rage on in many parts of the world. Global flows have brought some of us together, while at the same time, stoked divisions within and between states. Lenin, at his time, saw similar problems and developments. As an organizer, he worked to build movements oriented around social transformation. He also saw nationalist movements, on the right and the left. While supporting the latter, he rejected the former. Furthermore, while seeing national self-determination as a potential force, Lenin also considered its limitations. His work on imperialism helped him reach this conclusion, which he used to mobilize rank-and-file movement members as well as other organizers. Lenin's relevance is here, precisely, in helping us think on how to bring people together and create unity out of fragmentation, setting the work of emancipation on a path toward creating new political, economic, and cultural relations.

### At: War is Human Nature

#### Warfare and violence aren’t a human instinct- anthropological studies prove

R. Brian Ferguson 18 professor of Anthropology at Rutgers University, Scientific American “War is not part of Human Nature”, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-is-not-part-of-human-nature/>

Do people, or perhaps just males, have an evolved predisposition to kill members of other groups? Not just a capacity to kill but an innate propensity to take up arms, tilting us toward collective violence? The word “collective” is key. People fight and kill for personal reasons, but homicide is not war. War is social, with groups organized to kill people from other groups. Today controversy over the historical roots of warfare revolves around two polar positions. In one, war is an evolved propensity to eliminate any potential competitors. In this scenario, humans all the way back to our common ancestors with chimpanzees have always made war. The other position holds that armed conflict has only emerged over recent millennia, as changing social conditions provided the motivation and organization to collectively kill. The two sides separate into what the late anthropologist Keith Otterbein called hawks and doves. (This debate also ties into the question of whether instinctive, warlike tendencies can be detected in chimpanzees. If war expresses an inborn tendency, then we should expect to find evidence of war in small-scale societies throughout the prehistoric record. The hawks claim that we have indeed found such evidence. “When there is a good archaeological picture of any society on Earth, there is almost always also evidence of warfare.... Twenty-five percent of deaths due to warfare may be a conservative estimate,” wrote archaeologist Steven A. LeBlanc and his co-author Katherine E. Register. With casualties of that magnitude, evolutionary psychologists argue, war has served as a mechanism of natural selection in which the fittest prevail to acquire both mates and resources. This perspective has achieved broad influence. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote that the roots of recent wars and genocide go back for tens or hundreds of thousands of years among our hunter-gatherer ancestors, even to our shared ancestor with chimpanzees. Bradley Thayer, a leading scholar of international relations, argues that evolutionary theory explains why the instinctual tendency to protect one's tribe morphed over time into group inclinations toward xenophobia and ethnocentrism in international relations. If wars are natural eruptions of instinctive hate, why look for other answers? If human nature leans toward collective killing of outsiders, how long can we avoid it? The anthropologists and archaeologists in the dove camp challenge this view. Humans, they argue, have an obvious capacity to engage in warfare, but their brains are not hardwired to identify and kill outsiders involved in collective conflicts. Lethal group attacks, according to these arguments, emerged only when hunter-gatherer societies grew in size and complexity and later with the birth of agriculture. Archaeology, supplemented by observations of contemporary hunter-gatherer cultures, allows us to identify the times and, to some degree, the social circumstances that led to the origins and intensification of warfare. In the search for the origins of war, archaeologists look for four kinds of evidence. The artwork on cave walls is exhibit one. Paleolithic cave paintings from Grottes de Cougnac, Pech Merle and Cosquer in France dating back approximately 25,000 years show what some scholars perceive to be spears penetrating people, suggesting that people were waging war as early as the late Paleolithic period. But this interpretation is contested. Other scientists point out that some of the incomplete figures in those cave paintings have tails, and they argue that the bent or wavy lines that intersect with them more likely represent forces of shamanic power, not spears. (In contrast, wall paintings on the eastern Iberian Peninsula, probably made by settled agriculturalists thousands of years later, clearly show battles and executions.). Debate over war and human nature will not soon be resolved. The idea that intensive, high-casualty violence was ubiquitous throughout prehistory has many backers. It has cultural resonance for those who are sure that we as a species naturally tilt toward war. As my mother would say: “Just look at history!” But doves have the upper hand when all the evidence is considered. Broadly, early finds provide little if any evidence suggesting war was a fact of life. People are people. They fight and sometimes kill. Humans have always had a capacity to make war, if conditions and culture so dictate. But those conditions and the warlike cultures they generate became common only over the past 10,000 years—and, in most places, much more recently than that. The high level of killing often reported in history, ethnography or later archaeology is contradicted in the earliest archaeological findings around the globe. The most ancient bones and artifacts are consistent with the title of Margaret Mead's 1940 article: “Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity.” My work disputes the claim that chimpanzee males have an innate tendency to kill outsiders, arguing instead that their most extreme violence can be tied to specific circumstances that result from disruption of their lives by contact with humans. Making that case has required my going through every reported chimpanzee killing. From this, a simple point can be made. Critical examination of a recent compilation of killings from 18 chimpanzee research sites—together amounting to 426 years of field observations—reveals that of 27 observed or inferred intergroup killings of adults and adolescents, 15 come from just two highly conflicted situations, which occurred at two sites in 1974–1977 and 2002–2006, respectively. From comparative case studies, I conclude that “war” among chimpanzees is not an evolved evolutionary strategy but an induced response to human disturbance. Case-by-case analyses will show that chimps, as a species, are not “killer apes.” This research calls into question as well the idea that any human tendency toward bellicosity might be driven by an ancient genetic legacy from a distant ancestor of chimpanzees and humans.

#### War is not part of human nature- it’s only a recent social construct

Robin Lally 18, Senior editor/writer experienced in Media Relations with a demonstrated history of working in the higher education industry, Rutgers University, “We are not hardwired to go to War” https://www.rutgers.edu/news/we-are-not-hardwired-go-war#:~:text=There%20is%20no%20scientific%20proof,in%20our%20nature%20at%20all.

Is it in our nature to go to war? Should we just accept the fact that humans have this innate tendency and are hardwired to kill members of other groups? No, says R. Brian Ferguson, professor of anthropology at [Rutgers University-Newark](https://www.newark.rutgers.edu/). There is no scientific proof that we have an inherent propensity to take up arms and collectively kill.In a paper published in [Scientific American](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-is-not-part-of-human-nature/), Ferguson argues that war may not be in our nature at all. People might fight and sometimes kill for personal reasons, but homicide, he argues, is not war. Many scientists and scholars believe that humans as a species are aggressive, brutal and bloodthirsty and this behavior is part of our DNA. Ferguson argues, however, that there is no real indication or scientific proof that humans have been waging war for the entire history of the species.“Warlike cultures in some places became common only over the past 10,000 years and in most places more recently than that,” Ferguson says. In his research, Ferguson looked at cases reported as violent deaths throughout the prehistoric record. He found that 15 percent to 25 percent of deaths that many anthropologists and archeologists say were the result of war may reflect cherry-picking the most violent cases, which are contradicted by broad surveys of all archaeological sites.“Individual killing is not the same as war on social groups,” says Ferguson. “War leaves physical traces that archaeologists can find. When and where it began is very different in different places around the world, but there are stretches of even thousands of years when there are no clear signs of war.” Part of the reason for the debate, Ferguson says, is that the evidence used to identify prehistoric warfare – weapons, art and cave paintings, defensive structures and skeletal remains – are often ambiguous and difficult to interpret. Careful examination of all evidence typically finds no strong indication of war in early remains, which changes to clear signs of war in later periods. Is it in our nature to go to war? Should we just accept the fact that humans have this innate tendency and are hardwired to kill members of other groups? He disputes the belief of many scholars that humans may have inherited their genetic makeup from their chimpanzee cousins millions of years ago. After examining every reported chimpanzee killing, Ferguson, who is writing a book on the subject, believes that war among chimps was not an evolved evolutionary strategy but rather a response to human contact and disturbances. So why did war become so common in more recent archaeological finds? Ferguson says that preconditions that made war more likely became far more widespread, including social hierarchy, a more sedentary existence, a growing regional population, valuable resources and the establishment of boundaries. These conditions have sometimes worsened with severe environmental changes, he says. Ferguson, who also studies contemporary war, brutal civil wars around the world and U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, agrees with anthropologist Margaret Mead that “warfare is only an invention, not a biological necessity,” but does he not see war ending.“Anthropologists think about prospects for war in the long term,” Ferguson says. “If the idea that war is part of human nature is not scientifically supported, alternative futures open up. If more people work for prevention, the eventual eradication of war is a definite theoretical possibility.”

#### War is a tool used in certain contexts, not an inevitability for human societies

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The emergence of the industrial revolution in the late 18th century, following the occupation of agrarian societies, was also the coming of age of nations and nationalism (Pagano, 2013). This shift showed the immense possibilities of exploitation inherent in cultural uniformity and war. The switch from having primarily agrarian societies to industrialized communities created differentiated access to land and its commodities, facilitating the exercise of authority over others. According to Pagano (2013), social mobility is hampered by cultural diversity, whereas cultural standardization is hampered by social immobility. Social mobility and cultural uniformity enabled the exploitation of a wide variety of possibilities and facilitated the powerful process of creative destruction that is a hallmark of a capitalist society (Pagano, 2013). Societies that were socially stagnant and culturally distinct were ultimately left behind in terms of economic growth and, as a result, economic power. Furthermore, countries that had developed cultural homogeneity were incapable of being conquered; rather, they could readily colonize agrarian societies (Pagano, 2013). People seem to think that because war has existed for such a long period of time, it must be ingrained in our nature and constitute an undeniable, biological drive to participate; as stated by the 19th Century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche: “I am by nature warlike. To attack is among my instincts.” (Marlantes, 2011). But this view has been rebutted — war is not a drive that demands release, as food or sex do; a state will not suffer from deprivation if it abstains from war (Gat, 2019). Although battle is not a main motivation for people, this does not imply that they are not hardwired for it. It is hypothesized that warfare is imprinted in humans as a tool, just as collaboration may be used to reach an agreement rather than utilizing conflict or violence (Gat, 2019). Granting, cooperation would mean working together with a different nation, which is not in our nature, thereby possibly being an explanation for the heavy presence of war. Modern weaponry and extremes of money and power increase both the costs and rewards of combat, as well as the extent to which compulsion may promote violence against a fighter’s self-interest (Gat, 2019). Perhaps less evident are the ramifications of large-scale human socialization, in which people fight against one another but also, as we know, create coalitions against other groups (Cashdan & Downes, 2012).Human evolution has been influenced significantly by lethal tribal competition. Human social groups have almost undoubtedly competed with one another throughout humanity’s civilization for territory, food, shelter, and mates. At most, the defeated communities will have lost access to desirable territory and reserves; most unfavourably, they were murdered by the victorious group (Clark & Winegard, 2020).

### At: Realism- Cyber

#### Realist theory is wrong- cyber power will not transform traditional power dynamics. Full blown cyber war is not a threat.

Craig and Valeriano ’18 (Anthony S J Craig, PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, and a member of the Research School on Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research institute Oslo, Brandon Valeriano, Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University Reader in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, “Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age”, Realism in Practice: An Appraisal. An E-IR Edited Collection, February 3, 2018, [Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age (e-ir.info)](https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/03/realism-and-cyber-conflict-security-in-the-digital-age/)) PB

As a theory mostly concerned with issues of national security and power, realism would appear to be the instinctive international relations perspective for understanding cyber conflict. Our analysis suggests that realism does remain a relevant framework for identifying important security-related issues in the cyber domain and can sometimes provide useful insights about some enduring characteristics of international relations. However, realist theories about conflict often fall substantially short in explaining the unique dynamics of cyber conflict. In many ways, the cyber domain resembles a realist world with its anarchical nature and lack of institutional governance where states fear one another and develop their capabilities in response. Yet, it is unclear whether cyber arms races are likely to escalate into cyber conflict. Realism also raises interesting questions about cyber power, about who possesses it, and how it relates to international stability. In terms of whether cyber power will transform traditional power dynamics, the evidence suggests this is not the case. The trend we have seen thus far has been restrained from full-blown cyber war in favour of less destructive forms of cyber interactions. The offense-defence balance is the clearest example of a realist theory being used to explain the cyber domain, but it appears empirically inaccurate in its assumptions about the cyber domain and its predictions about cyber conflict. Real-world cases of cyber conflict suggest the offense is not as easy as is often assumed and the fact that we have not seen much cyber conflict suggest the theory is misplaced. Importing the notion of deterrence from the nuclear era is furthermore ill-judged and makes little sense in the context of the reality of cyber weapons.

#### Contrary to realist beliefs deterrence is not effective in cyber policy

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For realists, the acquisition of military capabilities is key to deterring aggression from other states and maintaining national security (Morgenthau 1947, 14). Deterrence aims at discouraging attacks through a demonstration of one’s military capacity and willingness to respond in kind. Deterrence theory rose to prominence during the Cold War because of the threat of mutually assured destruction from nuclear weapons, and realists figure prominently in the debate arguing that nuclear weapons have a stabilising effect on international relations (Waltz 1990; Mearsheimer 1990, 19-20). Deterrence logic now appears to be influencing cyber policy. For example, in its national cyber security strategy, the US government policy is aimed at ‘convincing a potential adversary that it will suffer unacceptable costs if it conducts an attack on the United States’ (Department of Defense 2015), and the UK government, too, has spoken explicitly about the need to respond to cyber incidents with offensive actions (Elgot 2016). Although it may seem an attractive option because of the perceived difficulty of defence as discussed earlier, there are several issues that undermine cyber deterrence. First, a state’s ability to retaliate is not physically demonstrable due to the virtual nature of cyber weapons and the secrecy states maintain over them. Second, unlike nuclear weapons, cyber weapons do not have the same destructive capacity and so, to have a sufficient deterrent effect, would have to be used repeatedly and to great effect. This is difficult, however, because each cyber weapon is designed for a specific vulnerability which could be subsequently patched. Third, attributing the source of cyber incidents can be difficult and perpetrators often deny involvement. In such cases, therefore, a state cannot be certain of whom to respond against (Libicki 2009, 39-73). These arguments suggest that deterring aggression through cyber means is an unworkable policy in practice.

#### Contrary to realist theory, empirics prove that cyber conflict does not turn into cyber warfare- states avoid escalation

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For some realists, arms races increase the likelihood of war (Jervis 1978, 188; Van Evera 1998, 13), yet for others, military build-ups are a necessary means of deterring a revisionist power (Glaser 2004). A critical question is therefore whether security competition will escalate to actual conflict. Previous scholarship has demonstrated a relationship between arms races and both militarised interstate disputes and war (Sample 1997; Gibler et al. 2005). The concern here is whether cyber arms races will lead to a similar outcome. As Lord and Sharp (2011, 29) argue: ‘conflict in cyberspace is uniquely predisposed to escalation given uncertainties about what constitutes an act of war and the growing number of state and non-state actors seeking offensive capabilities.’ The empirical record, however, suggests that although cyber conflict is becoming more frequent, this increase correlates with low level disruption and espionage tactics rather than more destructive forms of cyber warfare (Jensen, Maness, and Valeriano 2016, 17). Moreover, the data shows that cyber disputes are very unlikely to spill over into the physical domains of warfare suggesting that, rather than escalation, the prevailing trend is one of restraint (Valeriano and Maness 2016). Rather than live up to the predictions of the realist-informed spiral model, states appear to avoid escalation into warfare and restraint appears to be the prevailing norm instead. It may be too early to tell whether escalation may become a future trend, but thirty years of digital conflict demonstrate a remarkable degree of self-restraint in that states have avoided outright destruction and violence in cyberspace.

### At: Realism- General

#### Realism’s misreadings are rooted in the desire to strengthen power politics and are justified in the name of self-interest

HARTMUT BEHR and AMELIA HEATH in 2009

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Misreading in IR theory and ideology critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and neorealism, Review of International Studies / Volume 35 / Issue 02 / April 2009, pp 327 349

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The results from our analysis can be summarised and further developed as follows:¶ We recognise that Morgenthau’s theory cannot be understood as a general theory;¶ also, the assumption of international anarchy cannot be traced back to Morgenthau.¶ Furthermore, it remains a currently open question why both neo-realists¶ and their critics hold this association with Morgenthau. Finally, we argue that¶ classical ‘realism’ has to be understood as a historically contingent way of thinking¶ which intends to provide answers to distinct historical circumstances of world¶ politics. The time of Morgenthau was a time of ideologies and of hubristic and¶ apocalyptic national power politics. Reacting to these challenges creates,¶ and perpetuates, his support of power politics. Apart from that, however,¶ Morgenthau’s normative demands aim at the creation of international law and¶ organisations as well at the strengthening of supranational ethics. Thus, according¶ to Morgenthau any conduct of international politics is and has to be ‘realist’ (only)¶ insofar as it acknowledges contingent historical circumstances and develops¶ respective practical imperatives.¶ Morgenthau explicitly expressed this political ambition in the editions of¶ Politics Among Nations published after 1948. Considering the notion of ideology,¶ he writes:¶ The nation that dispensed with ideologies and frankly stated that it wanted power and¶ would, therefore, oppose similar aspirations of other nations, would at once find itself at a¶ great, perhaps decisive, disadvantage in the struggle for power. That frank admission¶ would, on the other hand, unite the other nations in fierce resistance to a foreign policy so¶ unequivocally stated and would thereby compel the nation pursuing it to employ more¶ power than would otherwise be necessary.70¶ Ideology or counter-ideology is therefore necessary and justified against the horrors¶ of totalitarianism and fascism and, in his view, the naïve policies of appeasement.¶ This book was indeed, and could be nothing else but, a frontal attack [. . .] [Morgenthau¶ addresses here the appeasement policy towards Hitler and the idealistic ‘democratic-peace’-¶ vision of Woodrow Wilson as well as the Fascist and Stalinist ideologies; the authors]. It¶ had to be as radical on the side of its philosophy as had been the errors on the other side.¶ With that battle largely won, the polemical purpose can give way to the consolidation of a¶ position that no longer needs to be attained, but only to be defended and adapted to new¶ experiences.71¶ But the battle continued, and the neo-realist production of ideologies relied upon¶ misunderstood ‘realist’ assumptions in order to conceptualise, promote and¶ strengthen national power politics, now with new targets and against a new enemy¶ (the Soviet Union and communism). The graveness and idiosyncrasy of the above¶ analysed misreadings, including the biased selectivity of their readings, seems only¶ comprehensible as an attempt to formulate and justify a new political ideology,¶ namely that of US foreign policy during the Cold War. This effort is accompanied¶ by an ideologisation of political thought, which seems to have become so¶ influential and manifest in a disciplinary canon that – with a few exceptions – even¶ the critics of neo-realism have not revealed these misreadings, but instead have¶ perpetuated them. This is probably the reason why some of those misreadings have¶ found their way in most of our up-to-date textbooks and introductions.72¶ Indeed, a plethora of neo-realists became cooks in the ‘kitchen of power’.73 The¶ initial ‘realist’ idea of a temporary political counter-ideology against the apocalypses¶ of nationalism and fascist and Stalinist ideology has developed into a¶ self-contained ideology of ‘national interest’ which has separated the theorems of¶ (Morgenthau’s) ‘realism’ from its original understanding of historical contingency.¶ In an emerging epoch of scientism when political science in general and¶ International Relations in particular have borrowed their epistemologies from¶ positivistic natural sciences and economy (Waltz is an outstanding example of this),¶ ‘realist’ (though falsely) and neo-realist theorems have become perceived as¶ scientific laws in order to deduce axioms for political conduct as well as strategic¶ predictions of future developments. Waltz’s perception of patriotism complements¶ this observation: The rationality of the state, which domestically acts in case of¶ doubt as an authoritarian power state and homogenises political differences,¶ dictates to oppress opinions, movements and individuals opposing the national¶ interest. Foreign policy elites have come to define political rationality in their¶ interest and to protect those interests as some objective raison d’état. The domestic¶ production of political homogeneity occurs through instruments of the power¶ state, like media control. A poignant example can be seen in the historical defence¶ of national interests in maintaining the Cold War rationale or the run up to a¶ specific war.74 This rationality of foreign policy has little, if no, relation with¶ democratic practice: neither in decision-making, its legitimisation, nor in its policy¶ implementation.

#### Realism fails to explain state behavior and factors realists argue for only increase conflict

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Realism has been challenged for its inability to explain state behaviour or offer productive policy guidance. For example, several studies point to the lack of evidence that states act in accordance with balance of power logic, a prominent hypothesis within the realist literature (Rosecrance and Stein 1993, 10, 17-21; Schroeder 1994). Its contradictory predictions and lack of empirical progress leads Vasquez (1997) to condemn realism as a ‘degenerative’ rather than ‘progressive’ paradigm. Furthermore, statistical studies suggest the factors that realists argue increase national security, such as military build-ups and alliances, are often counterproductive and increase the likelihood of conflict (Senese and Vasquez 2008). Nevertheless, with its focus on security and conflict issues, realism appears to be the natural go-to theory for elucidating pressing cyber security issues.

Realism good is a link- It naturalizes the idea that militarism is necessary bc it says that the way states achieve their interests is all dominated by a will for power which rationalizes suffering

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Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be. Imagined dominance of realism promotes violence and conflict- alternative images are not only possible but critical to examine in order to avoid cognitive biases dr. A. (Annette) Freyberg Inan Associate Professor, the Director of the Master's Program in Political Science, Univ of Amsterdam, PhD in Political Science at the University of Georgia, USA. Her MA degrees in Political Science and English were obtained at the University of Stuttgart in her native Germany. Editorial Board Member: International Studies Review, Globalizations Journal, Advisory Board Member: Millennium, What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature 2004 The problem of the self-fulfilling prophesy is of course not unique to the realist paradigm of international relations. We have seen that similar criticisms have been raised against other scientific approaches, and that, in principle, any interpretive frame- work, if it is influential enough, can become self-confirming. However, an exposure of these tendencies as they are exhibited by political realism may be considered particularly important. It is important because of the effects realist policies can have on the lives of human beings.

### At: Thayer/Evolution Proves Realism

#### Thayer is wrong – evolutionary biology’s relation to realism is premised on false notions of warfare and warrantless

Lebow, PhD, 13

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Thayer’s thesis is flawed at every stage of its construction. It rests on the assumption that offensive realism is an accurate depiction of international relations rather than an ideology without much empirical support. The same might be said for hegemonic stability theory, a justification for the American imperial project that is empirically problematic. Thayer insists that these approaches to international relations are successful because they build on correct assumptions about human nature. There is no discussion whatsoever of efforts to reduce war and ethnic conflict through conflict resolution, institution building, development and humanitarian intervention. They are presumably in conflict with our nature and doomed to failure. Thayer’s arbitrary choice of what is human and what is not is offered without any evidence, as is his claim that war as the most important of all human activities affecting evolution. We are given no mechanisms that would account for the increase in brain capacity warfare that is said to stimulate. Successful warriors are assumed to breed more successfully, another claim unsupported by evidence. We must assume that group advantages, conferred by individual characteristics such as aggression, bravery and loyalty, are somehow passed on through warrior genes and that natural selection does this rest. At the outset, Thayer claims that his approach is both scientific and readily falsifiable. I think we must accept the latter claim. A final word about warfare. Thayer barrages us with evidence about its near universality but offers no nuanced discussion of its diverse causes or roles it serves for societies. He assumes a single materialist motive: the protection of resources or the acquisition of additional ones. There is no recognition of the role of honor, standing, revenge, or war as a route of upward mobility, source of group cohesion or simply an adventure. Thayer weds a crude model of biology to a crude realist one of war and international relations.

# Aff

## Alt Ans

### State Militarism Inevitable- Evolution

#### Dominance behavior and hierarchies are evolutionarily constant across vastly different species

Johnson, PhD, and Thayer, PhD, 16

(Dominic D. P., PhD from Geneva University in political science, and Bradley, Department of Political Science and Geography at UT San Antonio (2016). The evolution of offensive realism: Survival under anarchy from the Pleistocene to the present. Politics and the Life Sciences, 35(1), 1-26.)//bc

Evolutionary theory can also explain dominance. Like egoism, the desire to dominate is a trait of human nature (which, as with egoism, we stress does not necessarily apply to every individual or situation but is a statistical tendency underlying behavior). As evolutionary economist Robert Frank has explained, ‘‘Evidence suggests that we come into the world equipped with a nervous system that worries about rank. Something inherent in our biological makeup motivates us to try to improve, or at least maintain, our standing against those with whom we compete for important positional resources.’’94 In the context of evolutionary theory, dominance usually means that particular individuals in a social group have priority of access to resources in competitive situations.95 A wide variety of animals exhibit a form of social organization called a dominance hierarchy, in which members of a social group each have a status rank descending from the alpha male down through all the other individuals to the lowliest subordinates. A dominance hierarchy is created competitively, often violently, and is maintained forcefully, but it can serve to prevent or reduce conflict within a group because it establishes a pecking order that is generally respected. As with all things in nature, dominance hierarchies vary considerably. Hierarchies may be weak or strong, and ‘‘alpha’’ males may sire nearly all offspring or just more than others. However, what is striking is the prevalence and potency of dominance in social organization, despite variations in the specifics. Dominance behavior occurs in thousands of taxonomic groups ranging from fish and reptiles to birds and mammals. Of particular note regarding the impact of dominance on human behavior are the roles of both phylogeny (a species’ ancestral lineage) and ecology (its adaptations to local conditions). With regard to phylogeny, most primates and all the great apes (the group to which humans belong) have strong social dominance hierarchies, and humans are no exception—dominance hierarchies have been extensively documented among humans in a wide variety of settings and eras.96,97,98 With regard to ecology, dominance hierarchies are a common form of social organization in the kind of ecological settings in which humans evolved (social groups with competing interests, variation in power, and finite resources). The strength of dominance hierarchies in humans is debated and varies empirically, but such hierarchies are always evident in some form or other. Even where dominance hierarchies are actively suppressed, such as in more egalitarian small-scale societies, suppression itself is evidence of the competition for status that simmers beneath the surface.99 In historical and contemporary societies, competition for power is all too obvious, and the quest for status, dominance, and leadership is ancient and ever present.100,101,102,103 Males of most mammal species are particularly competitive with each other over females. Indeed, the competition for mates is subject to a special type of evolutionary selection process—sexual selection, as opposed to standard natural selection. Reproductive access to females tends to be highly skewed, with a few males responsible for a large proportion of progeny. This is because a single male can reproduce with multiple females, whereas females can usually only reproduce and rear the offspring of one male at a time, with a long delay before becoming reproductively available again. In some species, reproductive access is settled by coercion, in which the strongest male defeats rivals to dominate a harem. In other species, males cannot coerce females, but the females are choosy about with whom they mate, leading to selection pressures for males to demonstrate or signal their quality as attractive partners. In either case, it is females rather than males that are the limiting factor in sexual competition, making male competition for available females intense. Sexual selection has led to costly biological adaptations, such as fighting, the growth of heavy ‘‘weapons’’ (e.g., antlers), risky courtship displays, or adornments that signal genetic quality (e.g., gigantic tails). These types of adaptations not only consume precious time and energy but can also decrease survival in other, nonreproductive domains of life (for example, the plumage of male peacocks limits their ability to fly). Thus, the power of sexual selection can lead to the evolution of traits that actually damage survival in order to achieve superiority over other males.104,105 Reproduction trumps survival in evolution. Sexual selection is typically responsible for the hierarchical nature of group-living animal species, including humans, as males fight for rank and the reproductive benefits in brings. As we would expect, this leads to sex differences in the desire for status. Both laboratory experiments and real-world observations have identified empirical differences between men and women in a range of social behaviors, not least that men tend to have relative-gains, or ‘‘zero-sum’’ motivations (wanting to get ahead at the expense of others), whereas women tend to favor payoff-maximization, or ‘‘variable-sum’’ motivations (content to do well even if others also do well in the process).106,107,108,109 It is well established that dominance and statusseeking behaviors in humans are based on many of the same biochemical and neurological processes as in other mammals, such as the secretion and uptake of testosterone and serotonin, which modify status-challenging behavior.110,111 However rational we may like to think we are, our judgments and decision-making are nevertheless influenced by cognitive mechanisms and biochemicals circulating in our bodies and brains that relate to dominance behavior.112,113,114,115 Dominance hierarchies need not only benefit those at the top. An organized social structure can help promote the harvesting of resources, coordinate group activity, and reduce within-group conflict. Although alphas in the hierarchy tend to have the highest reproductive success, other males may benefit from group membership by gaining protection from other groups, or by biding their time for a chance to challenge the alpha male when they become strong enough or old enough. Ethological studies have shown that hierarchical dominance systems within a primate group’s social network can reduce overt aggression, although aggression increases again when the alpha male is challenged.116,117,118 To summarize, a species that lives communally could have two broad forms of social organization. The group can accept organization with some centralization of power (dominance hierarchies), or it can engage in perpetual conflict (‘‘scramble competition’’), which incurs costs in terms of time, energy, and injuries, as well as depriving the group of many benefits of a communal existence, such as more efficient resource harvesting.119 Among social mammals, and primates in particular, dominance hierarchies have emerged as the primary form of social organization. Thus far, we have emphasized a state of ‘‘anarchy’’ in evolutionary history, in which there was no overarching power to provide protection from predators, rivals, or other threats. Egoism and dominance arose as strategies that provided solutions to achieving survival and reproduction in this environment. However, dominance hierarchies were in some sense a mechanism by which this anarchy could be suppressed—at least within the group—to the benefit of all group members since they share at least some common interests (such as avoiding conflict). This collective benefit points to the special and much more significant role of anarchy at a higher level—anarchy between groups. As we show in the next section, competition between groups is especially significant for human evolution, and for international politics, precisely because it is at the intergroup level where anarchy reigns supreme and is much harder to suppress.

#### States’ tendencies towards aggression and selfishness are derived from the evolutionary need to maintain dominance hierarchies

Thayer, PhD, 4

(Bradley A., Department of Political Science and Geography at UT San Antonio. Darwin and International Relations : On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, University Press of Kentucky, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=1914962.)//bc>

Evolutionary theory can also explain domination. Like egoism, the desire to dominate is a trait. In the context of evolutionary theory, domination usually means that particular individuals in social groups have regular priority of access to resources in competitive situations. For most social mammals, a form of social organization called a dominance hierarchy operates most of the time. The creation of the dominance hierarchy may be violent and is almost always competitive. A single leader, almost always male (the alpha male), leads the group. The ubiquity of this social ordering strongly suggests that such a pattern of organization contributes to fitness. Ethologists categorize two principal types of behavior among social mammals in a dominance hierarchy: dominant and submissive.56 Dominant mammals have enhanced access to mates, food, and territory, increasing their chances of reproductive success.57 Acquiring dominant status usually requires aggression.58 Dominance, however, is an unstable condition; to maintain it, dominant individuals must be willing to defend their privileged access to available resources as long as they are able. Evolutionary anthropologist Richard Wrangham and ethologist Dale Peterson explain why an individual animal is motivated to vie for dominant status: "The motivation of a male chimpanzee who challenges another's rank is not that he foresees more matings or better food or a longer life."59 Rather, "those rewards explain why ... selection has favored the desire for power, but the immediate reason he vies for status ... is simply to dominate his peers."60 Dominant animals often assume behavior reflecting their status. For example, dominant wolves and rhesus monkeys hold their tails higher than other members of their group in an effort to communicate dominance. A dominant animal that engages in such displays is better off if it can gain priority of access to resources without having to fight for it continuously.61 Such signaling behavior is found among submissive social mammals as well. They often try to be as inconspicuous as possible and recognize what is permitted and forbidden given their place in the hierarchy. This behavior shows that the subordinate accepts its place in the dominance hierarchy and-at least temporarily-will make no effort to challenge the dominant animal. Ethologists argue that dominance hierarchies evolve because they help defend against predators, promote the harvesting of resources, and reduce intragroup conflict.62 A species that lives communally has two choices. It can either accept organization with some centralization of power, or engage in perpetual conflict over scarce resources, which may result in serious injury and deprive the group of the benefits of a communal existence, such as more efficient resource harvesting.63 Ethological studies have confirmed that a hierarchical dominance system within a primate band minimizes overt aggression and that group aggression often increases when the alpha male is challenged.64 For primates and especially humans, the dominance hierarchy may have produced a fortuitous result: great intelligence.65 As cognitive psychologist Denise Dellarosa Cummins argues, it has had a profound effect on human evolution: "The fundamental components of our reasoning architecture evolved in response to pressures to reason about dominance hierarchies, the social organization that characterizes most social mammals."66 Her study and others have found that dominance hierarchies have contributed to the evolution of the mind, which in turn has contributed to fitness. According to Cummins, submissive individuals can detect, exploit, and circumvent the constraints of domination. If an animal can take what it wants by force, it is sure to dominate the available resources-unless its subordinates are smart enough to outwit it. To survive, a subordinate must use other strategies: deception, guile, appeasement, bartering, alliance formation, or friendship. Thus intelligence is particularly important to the survival of subordinates. "The evolution of mind emerges," Cummins writes, "as a strategic arms race in which the weaponry is ever-increasing mental capacity to represent and manipulate internal representations of the minds of others."67 From their studies of chimpanzee societies, ethologists have learned that the struggle for survival is best characterized as a struggle between those who are dominant and those seeking to outwit them, i.e., between recognizing an opponent's intentions and hiding one's own. The following example illustrates how a subordinate chimpanzee, Belle, who knows the location of hidden food, attempts to deceive Rock, who is dominant: Belle accordingly stopped uncovering the food if Rock was close. She sat on it until Rock left. Rock, however, soon learned this, and when she sat in one place for more than a few seconds, he came over, shoved her aside, searched her sitting place, and got the food. Belle next stopped going all the way [to the food]. Rock, however, countered by steadily expanding the area of his search through the grass near where Belle had sat. Eventually, Belle sat farther and farther away, waiting until Rock looked in the opposite direction before she moved toward the food at all, and Rock in turn seemed to look away until Belle started to move somewhere. On some occasions Rock started to wander off, only to wheel around suddenly precisely as Belle was about to uncover some food .... On a few trials, she actually started off a trail by leading the group in the opposite direction from the food, and then, while Rock was engaged in his search, she doubled back rapidly and got some food. 68 Despite the "arms race" described by Cummins to outwit dominance, the subordinate members of the group continue to participate in the dominance hierarchy because doing so increases the chances of survival. As ethologist David Barash explains, if subordinates "are more fit by accepting" subordinate "ranking than by refusing to participate, then some form of social dominance hierarchy will result."69 Humans and other primates evolved a mental architecture to address the difficulties they encountered in dominance hierarchies. These problems, which "directly impact survival rates and reproductive success," include two crucial needs: "the necessity to recognize and respond appropriately to permissions, obligations, and prohibition," and the necessity "to circumvent the constraints of hierarchy by dint of guile, particularly through successfully forecasting others' behavior. "70 Because human mental architecture was created through evolution, it remains part of human behavior today, as cognitive psychology studies show. 71

### State Militarism Inevitable- Realism

#### **Realism’s mechanism for change is War**

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Realism is most often depicted as a tradition or perspective on international relations explaining war and military conflict. This is not without reason as realists have focused on war as a major or even the primary mechanism of change in international relations. Thucydides, in The History of the Peloponnesian War, written in the fifth century BC, and a standard reference in textbook accounts of the realist tradition, found that ‘[t]he growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable’ (Thucydides 431 BC, 1.23). This position is echoed in realism up until today. For instance, in his modern classic, aptly entitled War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin asserts that ‘a precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power towards those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system’, and that change in international relations typically equals war (Gilpin 1981, 9). Likewise, John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, argues that the most war-prone regions are those characterised by unbalanced multipolarity with a potential hegemon seeking to change the established order in its favour by military means, and that the growth of China constitutes the greatest danger to world peace (Mearsheimer 2001). This does not mean that realists are unconcerned with peace. Acting as policy advisors or foreign policy commentators, realists have often been among the most vocal critics of war. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, arguably the two most prominent realists in the latter half of the twentieth century, were both highly critical of US military intervention in Vietnam (Rafshoon 2001; Humphreys 2013). More recently, ‘almost all realists in the United States – except for Henry Kissinger – opposed the war against Iraq’ in 2003 (Mearsheimer 2005), and realists have been highly critical of the US military interventions during the Obama administration from 2009 to 2017 (Walt 2016). However, despite this concern with peace, war remains the primary mechanism for change in realist theory, and realists have been surprisingly reluctant to explore the potential for peaceful change.

#### Realism makes militarization and use of military power inevitable- states have a vested interest in armed force

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Political Realism sees international relations mainly as a struggle of self-interested, sovereign states that are involved in a game of power-politics within a permanent state of anarchy. The international system, according to this school of thought, is a moral- and value-free environment in which the state is seen as a rational and unitary actor that finds itself in constant conflict with the other states of the system due to the lack of an overarching world government. Stemming from their pessimistic view on human nature, the only way to achieve security in the international system, according to political realism, is by creating a Balance of Power among the most powerful states of the system. As briefly mentioned earlier, both political thinkers pick up on the realist view of the international system as a value- and moral-free place of anarchy, where states live under a constant fear of attack or betrayal by others and thus are facing a Security Dilemma. Thucydides, taking up the issue of anarchy within the international system, very much agrees with the realist point of view, saying that in a system where there is no overarching authority, the only way to maintain order is through some form of Balance of Power, which – in the case of Thucydides – takes the form of the strong exercising their power over the weak. Hobbes, in comparison, takes quite a different look at this. Stemming from his theory about the ‘State of Nature’, he admits that without a world government, the system is subject to a state of anarchy and of “a war as is of every man against every man”[1]. However, Hobbes opposes the view that under such conditions it is the strong who determine the order of the international system. According to his theory of the ‘State of Nature’, every man is equal and thus “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.”[2]. The order, according to Hobbes, is rather maintained by a “general rule of reason”[3] which is that “every man ought to endeavour peace”[4] and since every man is equal in strength and desires, there is certainty that this principle will be followed as long as one’s own security is not endangered. This leads on to the realist claim of a moral- and value-free international system. He also claims that peace and security in an international system without an overarching authority can only be achieved through cooperation between states and between individuals. This leads on to the next point which has to be made about the view of Hobbes and Thucydides on individuals and states: cooperation. Political realism sees no actual possibility for states to form successful alliances, as no state can be trusted since it only relies on its self-interest and does not pay much attention to what would happen to other states in the system. Thucydides takes a similar stand as he – although not ignoring the possibility – is very sceptical of the chances of success of such a form of cooperation given the anarchic structure of the international system and solely self-interested states. Hobbes, on the other hand, does recognise the limitations mentioned above, however he also says that due to the fact that all states are equal within the international system, they can “create more stable forms of coexistence among themselves”[8] and thus establish peace and security.

### War = Human Nature

#### **War is inevitable and a part of human nature**

Perry 19 (Craig Perry, emerging fellow and professional futurist, February 24 2019, “IS ANOTHER GREAT-POWER WAR INEVITABLE?” APF, <https://www.apf.org/blogpost/1763106/318624/Is-Another-Great-Power-War-Inevitable)-Cayden> Mayer

A century ago, with the world embroiled in what was then naively dubbed the “war to end all wars,” few people imagined a second global conflagration igniting just a generation later. Since the end of World War II, however, humanity has experienced over seven decades of relative peace, with the frequency of war deaths trending sharply downward throughout this period. This is largely attributable to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, a standoff that spawned numerous proxy conflicts but never turned truly hot. It remains to be seen whether the ongoing reemergence of a multipolar world, with potentially several states capable of exerting influence on a global scale, will lead to yet more wars among these so-called great powers. There are good reasons to fear a return to great-power conflict. Warfare has been endemic to the human condition since the dawn of civilization, and remains the ultimate way of resolving conflicts among states even in the modern era. World affairs are inherently anarchic, with states pursuing their own advantages in a Hobbesian struggle of each against all. While the weak may occasionally band together to balance would-be hegemons, the prevailing self-help system of international relations features no permanent friends or enemies, just interests. “Countries have always competed for wealth and security, and the competition has often led to conflict,” the late neo-realist scholar Kenneth Waltz noted. “Why should the future be different from the past?” Indeed, war has accompanied the rise and fall of great powers throughout recorded history. In his classic account of the Peloponnesian War, Greek historian Thucydides concluded that the growth of Athenian power and the fear this inspired in then-dominant Sparta made war between these city-states inevitable. This dynamic, which political scientist Graham Allison calls the “Thucydides Trap,” has ensnared rising and established powers in more than a dozen wars over the last 500 years—and it threatens to do so again as other states challenge the United States for global influence. Such systemic, structural factors are not the only aspects of international relations that can drive states towards armed conflict. Marxists argue that capitalism compels the core, industrialized powers to compete for dominance as they exploit peripheral countries for labor and raw materials. Political scientist Samuel Huntington suggested it is culture—rather than ideology, politics, or economics—that is shaping patterns of conflict, with the Western belief in the universality of its values leading to clashes with rival civilizations. Constructivists similarly believe ideas shape international relations, as each state perceives world events in its own peculiar way. So why should the future be different from the past? With nearly 200 sovereign states around the globe, it seems inevitable that at least some of them will come into conflict in the coming decades—and great powers will occasionally intervene if only to enforce international law or for some other ostensibly noble purpose. Yet it is far from certain that these great powers will again come to blows with each other, for several reasons. While anarchy will continue to characterize international relations for the foreseeable future, a number of developments—including nuclear deterrence, globalization of trade and investment, relevant international institutions, shifting social norms, and widespread competition below the threshold of war—are incrementally reducing the likelihood of another great-power conflict. Will these trends be enough to prevent the eventual outbreak of World War III?

#### Aggression is biological — psychological adaptations determine reactions to conflict

Klasios, 19 – Researcher for York University (John, "Aggression among men: An integrated evolutionary explanation", Science Direct, July-August 2019, Vol. 47, p. 29-45))SK

\*\*we do not endorse gendered language

A number of biosocial [criminologists](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/criminologist) have attempted to illuminate aggression (as well as crime and [delinquency](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/social-sciences/delinquency) more generally) in terms of its [heritability](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/heritability). Here, my aim will be twofold: First, to bridge behavior genetics with the [explanatory model](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/psychology/explanatory-model) developed in this paper, and then to briefly discuss the evolutionary processes that can act to generate heritable variation in traits connected to male aggression. Heritable variation in violent crime has been established by behavior geneticists (e.g., [Barnes et al., 2014](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0050); [DiLalla & Gheyara, 2011](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0205); [Ferguson, 2010](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0250); [Rhee & Waldman, 2002](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0570)).[7](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "fn0035) On the one hand, these studies show us how much of the variance in a given population, at a given time, can be explained by heritable factors. Yet on the other hand, heritability studies are largely silent on the mechanistic and developmental details that subserve the heritability of traits. In order to see how these two sides of the coin are interrelated, we can start by considering the concept of reactive heritability, which sketches how heritable traits express or magnify themselves developmentally (e.g., [Tooby & Cosmides, 1990](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0680); [von Rueden, Lukaszewski, & Gurven, 2015](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0585)). To illustrate how such processes can work, we can consider an example germane to aggression, whereby an individual inherits above average physical strength. From the figurative point-of-view of the underlying psychological adaptations that govern aggression (broadly speaking), and all else equal, it is unknown what the level of physical strength is in the organism that the adaptations are developing and operating in. However, it is possible that natural-selection can design such adaptations so that they can assess what the agent's physical strength level is—perhaps, for instance, by attending to feedback regarding how often, and to what degree, the agent is either successful or unsuccessful in physical [conflicts of interest](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/social-sciences/conflict-of-interest) with other agents. Given these assessments, the underlying psychological adaptation can then compute an overall index of the agent's physical strength, and then utilize that index when judging if and when to instrumentally mete out aggression. Whether such an adaptation has actually evolved, and, if so, what its design features are, are of course empirical questions. However, evolutionary psychologists have indeed found experimental evidence that suggests that a psychological adaptation has evolved in men that can assess one's physical strength, and then use that assessment as an “internal regulatory variable” which governs, for instance, one's proneness to use anger as a bargaining tactic during conflicts of interest with other agents ([Sell, Cosmides, et al., 2009](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0620); [Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0625)).

#### War throughout history has always been caused by human nature and greed

Finucane ’13 (Matt Finucane, Russian and European foreign policy, speak intermediate Russian, hold an MA in International Relations and European Studies from the University of East Anglia, October 31st “Is War Primarily the Product of ‘Human Nature’?” E-International Relations <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/31/is-war-primarily-the-product-of-human-nature/>)

\*Modified for gendered language- Cayden Mayer

It is too great a task to identify a common cause of all wars, past and present, then attribute it responsibility for their commencing. However, what can be done is to identify certain foundations common in all “war”, and pay heed to how “states [or other structures] actually behave, behind the façade of their values-based rhetoric” (Kaplan, 2012, p.1). It will be this essay’s goal to determine first, what needs be included in the definition of “human nature”, and what constitutes “war”, and second, stake the claim that all political action, including that of states, is derived primarily from this definition of human nature. The first task is to define what is meant by “war”, and while definitions abound, it is possible to order them into one of two categories supplied by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. The first is the modern conventional view, that war is “the state of armed conflict between nations or states” (Oxford, 2007, p.3573), and the second, considerably broader, of “any active hostility or struggle between living beings” (Oxford, 2007, p.3573). The former accounts well for conflicts that were overwhelmingly state-centric, such as the First World War, and marks a clear distinction between war and individual political violence: war is the business of states. However, is the Vietnam War to be understood—like the Korean—as a simple north versus south conflict, despite the northern state only assuming active involvement nine years after indigenous fighting broke out in 1955? (Young, 1991, p. 123) The second category, while accounting correctly for the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, is in need of qualification, or else runs the unhelpful risk of equating all acts with warfare. While a simple merging of the two definitions would not suffice, there are some similarities to be observed. Both imply in the Clausewitzian sense that war is a tool used to achieve ends: “a continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 606). A state acts in its national interest, just as Islamist group Ansar al-Dine acts in its—and its people’s—religio-political interests in Mali (Welsh, 2013). The latter definition will be qualified by the observation that all actors engaged in war, be they NLF in Vietnam, or Ansar al-Dine in Mali, do so in hierarchical groups. “War” in this essay will be characterised by its employment by united, hierarchical structures, as a tool to achieve politics ends. While it is accepted that wars have an almost infinite number of unique causes, the pursuit of a primary explanation has a long tradition. From Christian teachings arose what Neorealist, Kenneth Waltz, refers to as the “pessimistic” view of human nature, its advocates attesting to a fixed and flawed humanity, man’s[1] inherent evil (Waltz, 2001, p. 26). Among them is Sir Norman Angell who in 1925 wrote of man, the “fighting animal, emotional, passionate, illogical…” (Angell, p. 7). It is their view that while rationality is pursued, it is—and will forever be—blighted by the underlying imperfections of humanity, among them, the propensity to war. The pessimist view endures, as do the principles established in 17th century philosopher, Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. That (hu)man will essentially pursue his own interests and this, in the absence of a higher power, will lead to conflict (Hobbes, 2008, pp. xxviii-xxx). In this state of anarchy (of no higher authority), of “war with every other man”, societies are apparently “few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and destroyed of all that pleasure, and beauty of life, which peace and society are wont to bring with them” (Hobbes, 2008, p. xxxi). Examples of such existences abound from the failed states of Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and it is for this reason that man yields his freedoms to authority, the only guarantor of peace. The philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, too observed that: “one man cannot begin to behave decently unless he has some assurance that others will not be able to ruin him” (Waltz, 2001, pp. 6-7); the state provides these assurances; this is why man assembles into states or other structures. The state assumes the role of provider, acting too as arbitrator within its territory while its constituents obey. But what of a world in which multiple states emerge? Waltz writes that “Among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is [again] associated with the occurrence of violence” (emphasis mine) (Waltz, 1986, p. 98). However, that is not to say these societies are “few, and fierce”, least of all “short-lived” as Hobbes predicted. Many states have long histories, and those that fail are clearly exceptions to the rule. What is really at fault here is the pessimist view that human nature is irrationally inclined to violence. As Waltz notes in his critique, “a static human nature cannot explain the differences in political outcomes. For example, one cannot explain both war and peace by arguing that man is wicked” (Griffiths, 1995, p. 66). Clearly there is another variable, without which human nature cannot suffice as the primary cause of war. This additional variable becomes apparent in further reading of Leviathan, specifically concerning the environment mankind inhabits. Hobbes writes of the state of nature, “If any two (hu)mans desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end […] endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another” (Hobbes, 2008, p. 83). While it might seem this competition for resources is an alternative to the human nature claim to war, as will be seen, it is only by the combination of this factor and another of human nature, that war can be given any primary cause. It must be argued that the base requirements for mankind’s survival are of such significance to human nature that the competition for these be included in its very definition. Survival, dependent first and foremost on the securing of these resources, and secondly on their protection, is integral to the causation of wars. However, there remains another question: why when two actors desire the same thing, does co-operation not play a greater role? The answer is again found deeply embedded in one of the facets of (hu)man. As Hobbes observed, there is a great distrust among men. That a (hu)man need fear those “prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive them, not only of the fruit of their labour, but also of their life or liberty”, is cause for him to “master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him” (Hobbes, 2008, p. 57). In Realist terms, this is known as the “security dilemma” (Waltz, 2001, p. 37), and is sourced from the knowledge that one can never know the true intentions of another, and so can rely only on oneself. The same is true for states, which are again proven to be “(hu)man writ large” in the words of Morgenthau (Griffiths, 1995, p. 66). John Mearsheimer refers to this as the “uncertainty of intentions”, and as a facet of human nature it has had disastrous consequences, most prominently in the beginning of the First World War. There had been an arms race in 1912 and 1913 all throughout Europe (Mulligan, 2010, p. 209) and when combined with high diplomatic tensions, and the scramble by Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and France to mobilise (Martel, 2003, pp. 2-3), a situation arose in which, states were unsure that “other states [did] not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities” (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 31). The likelihood of war here as a direct result of limitations imposed by human nature was irreversibly heightened, and the significance of this insurmountable fear—only dampened by defence spending—this limitation generates was exposed. Mearsheimer’s analysis, going further than the traditional Realist’s, concludes similarly to Hobbes’, that the only way to maintain security is to muster a power so great that no other can contest your strength. Writing on German eagerness for war in 1914, he claims it was “not a case of wacky strategic ideas pushing a state to start a war it was sure to lose” but “a calculated risk, motivated in large part by Germany’s desire to […] become Europe’s hegemon” (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 214). Here it can be seen that no matter how complex a state’s policy, its own ability to procure and defend resources—defined in terms of power—is always the primary aim. As Morgenthau writes on power “whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim” (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 29). Now that a culpable human nature has been established, it is now time to see where it stands among other theories of the causes of war.

#### **War is biologically engrained in human nature**

Wilson ’12 (E.O. Wilson, an American biologist, naturalist, and writer. June 12th 2021 “Is War Inevitable?” Liveright Publishing Corporation <https://www.pps.net/cms/lib/OR01913224/Centricity/Domain/3337/evolutionofwar.doc)-> Cayden Mayer

“History is a bath of blood,” wrote William James, whose 1906 antiwar essay is arguably the best ever written on the subject. “Modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors. Showing war’s irrationality and horror is of no effect on him. The horrors make the fascination. War is the strong life; it is life in extremis; war taxes are the only ones men never hesitate to pay, as the budgets of all nations show us.” Our bloody nature, it can now be argued in the context of modern biology, is ingrained because group-versus-group competition was a principal driving force that made us what we are. In prehistory, group selection (that is, the competition between tribes instead of between individuals) lifted the hominids that became territorial carnivores to heights of solidarity, to genius, to enterprise—and to fear. Each tribe knew with justification that if it was not armed and ready, its very existence was imperiled. Throughout history, the escalation of a large part of technology has had combat as its central purpose. Today the calendars of nations are punctuated by holidays to celebrate wars won and to perform memorial services for those who died waging them. Public support is best fired up by appeal to the emotions of deadly combat, over which the amygdala—a center for primary emotion in the brain—is grandmaster. We find ourselves in the “battle” to stem an oil spill, the “fight” to tame inflation, the “war” against cancer. Wherever there is an enemy, animate or inanimate, there must be a victory. You must prevail at the front, no matter how high the cost at home. Any excuse for a real war will do, so long as it is seen as necessary to protect the tribe. The remembrance of past horrors has no effect. From April to June in 1994, killers from the Hutu majority in Rwanda set out to exterminate the Tutsi minority, which at that time ruled the country. In a hundred days of unrestrained slaughter by knife and gun, 800,000 people died, mostly Tutsi. The total Rwandan population was reduced by 10 percent. When a halt was finally called, 2 million Hutu fled the country, fearing retribution. The immediate causes for the bloodbath were political and social grievances, but they all stemmed from one root cause: Rwanda was the most overcrowded country in Africa. For a relentlessly growing population, the per capita arable land was shrinking toward its limit. The deadly argument was over which tribe would own and control the whole of it. Universal conflict  Once a group has been split off from other groups and sufficiently dehumanized, any brutality can be justified, at any level, and at any size of the victimized group up to and including race and nation. And so it has ever been. A familiar fable is told to symbolize this pitiless dark angel of human nature. A scorpion asks a frog to ferry it across a stream. The frog at first refuses, saying that it fears the scorpion will sting it. The scorpion assures the frog it will do no such thing. After all, it says, we will both perish if I sting you. The frog consents, and halfway across the stream the scorpion stings it. Why did you do that, the frog asks as they both sink beneath the surface. It is my nature, the scorpion explains. War, often accompanied by genocide, is not a cultural artifact of just a few societies. Nor has it been an aberration of history, a result of the growing pains of our species’ maturation. Wars and genocide have been universal and eternal, respecting no particular time or culture. Archaeological sites are strewn with the evidence of mass conflicts and burials of massacred people. Tools from the earliest Neolithic period, about 10,000 years ago, include instruments clearly designed for fighting. One might think that the influence of pacific Eastern religions, especially Buddhism, has been consistent in opposing violence. Such is not the case. Whenever Buddhism dominated and became the official ideology, war was tolerated and even pressed as part of faith-based state policy. The rationale is simple, and has its mirror image in Christianity: Peace, nonviolence, and brotherly love are core values, but a threat to Buddhist law and civilization is an evil that must be defeated. Since the end of World War II, violent conflict between states has declined drastically, owing in part to the nuclear standoff of the major powers (two scorpions in a bottle writ large). But civil wars, insurgencies, and state-sponsored terrorism continue unabated. Overall, big wars have been replaced around the world by small wars of the kind and magnitude more typical of hunter-gatherer and primitively agricultural societies. Civilized societies have tried to eliminate torture, execution, and the murder of civilians, but those fighting little wars do not comply. Archaeologists have determined that after populations of Homo sapiens began to spread out of Africa approximately 60,000 years ago, the first wave reached as far as New Guinea and Australia. The descendants of the pioneers remained as hunter-gatherers or at most primitive agriculturalists, until reached by Europeans. Living populations of similar early provenance and archaic cultures are the aboriginals of Little Andaman Island off the east coast of India, the Mbuti Pygmies of Central Africa, and the !Kung Bushmen of southern Africa. All today, or at least within historical memory, have exhibited aggressive territorial behavior.

### Alt Fails – AT: Movements

#### Activist movements fail – they can’t produce concrete alternatives.

**Jones 11** [Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, [www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html)]

My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits – from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled.¶ Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa.¶ Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning."¶ The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. ¶ Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow.¶ There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of existence. It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union movement.¶ But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.

### Policy Focus Good

#### The plan’s policy-relevant and consequentialist framing is more effective

Matthew Bolton 16, assistant professor of political science at Pace University; and Elizabeth Minor, researcher at UK‐based NGO Article 36, September 2016, “The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay: The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons’ Operationalization of Critical IR Theories,” Global Policy, Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 385-395

Within the IR literature there is a perennial admonition to make theory more ‘relevant’ to policy makers, but this is usually cast in problem‐solving terms: producing knowledge that solves the problems faced by the existing political framework. (Lepgold, 1998; Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005; Walt, 2005). Many of those engaged in critical theorizing resist such demands to be ‘useful,’ suspicious of the operationalization of academic work in oppressive systems, and tend towards a position of ‘resistance’ to the system as a whole. Critical security studies scholar Anna Stavrianakis (2012, p. 233) for example, calls on disarmament activists to demand ‘transgressive change that fundamentally alters the social landscape as well as generates concrete improvements’ rather than calling for ‘incremental changes that leave the parameters of an issue untouched’. Given the centrality of discourse to critical theorizing, resistance is often framed not in terms of taking territory, mobilizing bodies, changing legislation, gaining votes or raising money. Rather it tends to focus on the critical deconstruction of oppressive discourse and disruption of existing norms (e.g. Hargreaves, 2012). As a result, many critical IR scholars see their academic work – undermining dominant discourses through their scholarship and teaching – as their primary form of resistance. (Said, 1996).¶ An emerging generation of political actors were educated by post‐positivist and critical IR scholars and conceive of their work self‐consciously in discursive terms. That is, they frame their intervention in the political arena as a deliberate attempt to reshape the way society speaks about and gives meaning to a particular phenomenon, people, group or activity. Occupy Wall Street activists drew upon critical and discursive theories to strategize their symbolic disruption of the neo‐liberal order (Welty, 2013). LGBTQA activists and ‘third wave’ feminists are trying to change dominant discourses of gender and sexuality (e.g. St. Pierre, 2000). However, critical theory has had less impact on the realm of international military and security policy, which remains heavily influenced by realist thought (Cooper, 2006).¶ As critical theorizing has begun to be used for solving definable political problems (e.g. Davies, 2012; Merlingen, 2013), what Brown (2013) calls ‘critical problem‐solving theory’, it has eroded Cox's (1981) boundary between ‘problem‐solving’ and critical theories. What happens when a theoretical paradigm that explicitly defines itself in critical opposition is instrumentalized and used in problem‐solving ways? This question, which we begin to explore in this article, is underexamined in the literature (see Weizman, 2012, pp. 185–220 for an important exception).¶ According to the epistemic community literature (e.g. Haas 2004), the education of policy makers can shape their later actions (Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005). Most usefully for this article, it shows how at critical junctures policy makers will turn to experts. Policy makers tend to be less interested in meta‐theory or broad academic debates about an issue. Rather, they look for knowledge that can be used instrumentally to solve a particular policy problem (e.g. Hall, 1993). But moving theoretical ideas from academia, through the activist community, to the policy arena, dilutes the original ideas and reinterprets them in instrumental ways. To help understand this, we draw on postcolonial concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘creolization’ of different ‘knowledge systems’ pushed into contact (Shih and Lionet, 2011, p. 30). We find that some ICAN campaigners responsible for its current strategy have ‘translated’ IR discursive theory into the world of disarmament policy making. In doing so, they selected the aspects of critical security studies ‘to transpose and emphasize’ (cf. Tymoczko, 2000 p. 24) as befit their specific political goals. This creative application of critical theory in a new setting, in its translation of theory into political engagement, may necessarily involve rendering it less threatening to elite audiences, in the process of seeking policy changes (cf. Jeffrey, 2013, pp. 107–131).

#### Policymakers must take national interest above all other interests---it’s the only ethical option

William F. Felice 2008, Professor of international political economy, international law, international organization, and human rights at New York University, “Moral Responsibility in a Time of War”, Social Justice/Global Options, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768499

Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, attempts to distinguish between right and wrong behavior. Ethical theories have been applied to war and violence with "just war" theories influencing policymakers. However, the intellectual framework used by the overwhelming majority of the world's foreign policy decision-makers is an "amoral" calculation of what action best serves the "national interest." The first-rate foreign policy expert will give absolute priority to the interests of his or her nation, which often means neglecting and opposing the material interests of those outside this partial community. Through this lens, policy options pose few moral dilemmas, as these decisions are merely practical solutions to real-world problems. Some who call themselves "political realists" share such a view of the separation of ethics from politics. ¶ To a classical political realist, history demonstrates that states must focus on power and wealth to survive in the international system. Morality has a limited role to play in this anarchical, dangerous world. Since the time of Thucydides in ancient Greece, states have consistently chosen power over negotiated diplomatic agreements, with the "logic of fear and escalation" always pushing out the "logic of moderation and peaceful diplomacy." This overriding priority of "national security" means that ethics plays an extremely circumscribed role in the deliberations of states. Many realists argue that in international politics "only the weak resort to¶ moral argument" (Smith, 1986: 6-7). ¶ Many powerful officials in the U.S. government have stated strongly that, in their view, moral considerations have no place in politics. For example, Dean Acheson, former secretary of state under President Harry Truman, was asked by President Kennedy in 1962 to serve on the Executive Committee to advise the president on an appropriate response to the Cuban missile crisis. Acheson later wrote that during these discussions, when the lives of millions of people were in danger, "those involved...will remember the irrelevance of the supposed moral considerations brought out in the discussions...moral talk did not bear on the problem" (Acheson, 1971; Coady, 1993: 373). Realist counsel has traditionally excluded morality from foreign policy and instead focused solely on the "national interest." Yet, this does not mean that no ethics apply to statecraft. Rather, a difference is accepted in the morals that apply to individuals versus those that apply to the state. An individual can base his or her conduct on principles such as honesty and nonviolence. In contrast, the state must protect its position of "power" in the international system. This means that the state should not engage in ideological crusades for democracy and freedom that could dilute its power. Yet key "realist" virtues enhance the state's power position and thus must be embraced. These ethical norms are said to include prudence, humility, study, responsibility, and patriotism. Such an approach allows leaders to conduct a responsible and tough defense of the national interest, but still show respect for others. The claim made for the cosmopolitan significance of this realist approach has been named "ethical realism." "Ethical realism," according to Lieven and Hulsman (2006: 62-83), "is therefore of universal and eternal value for the conduct of international affairs, and especially useful as a guiding philosophy for the United States and its war on terror."¶ As a representative of the community overall, the government official has a primary obligation to the national interest, and, in particular, the security and integrity of the state. The ethics of "humility" and "prudence" can help to protect the security of the state. However, the necessities of national existence cannot be sorted out through an ethical lens of right and wrong conduct. Effective statecraft demands that officials act to protect the whole, even if individual and collective moral principles are sacrificed. The government official must protect the interests of the community above all else. As a result, according to international relations theorist Hans Morgenthau (1979: 13), there is a "difference in the moral principles that apply to the private citizen in his relations with other private citizens and to the public figure in dealing with other public figures." Many of these "political realists" and/or "ethical realists" seem to embrace Machiavelli’s division of morality between the public and private worlds.

## Turns

### Militarism Good Turn

#### Militarism is good- military deterrence and the willingness to use force will save more lives

Victor Davis Hanson 04**,** Professor of Classical Studies at CSU Fresno, “The Fruits of Appeasement”, City Journal, Spring 2004, http://www.cityjournal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html

The twentieth century should have taught the citizens of liberal democracies the catastrophic consequences of placating tyrants. British and French restraint over the occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, the absorption of the Czech Sudetenland, and the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia did not win gratitude but rather Hitler’s contempt for their weakness. Fifty million dead, the Holocaust, and the near destruction of European civilization were the wages of “appeasement”—a term that early-1930s liberals proudly embraced as far more enlightened than the old idea of “deterrence” and “military readiness.”

So too did Western excuses for the Russians’ violation of guarantees of free elections in postwar Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia only embolden the Soviet Union. What eventually contained Stalinism was the Truman Doctrine, NATO, and nuclear deterrence—not the United Nations—and what destroyed its legacy was Ronald Reagan’s assertiveness, not Jimmy Carter’s accommodation or Richard Nixon’s détente.

As long ago as the fourth century b.c., Demosthenes warned how complacency and self-delusion among an affluent and free Athenian people allowed a Macedonian thug like Philip II to end some four centuries of Greek liberty—and in a mere 20 years of creeping aggrandizement down the Greek peninsula. Thereafter, these historical lessons should have been clear to citizens of any liberal society: we must neither presume that comfort and security are our birthrights and are guaranteed without constant sacrifice and vigilance, nor expect that peoples outside the purview of bourgeois liberalism share our commitment to reason, tolerance, and enlightened self-interest.

Most important, military deterrence and the willingness to use force against evil in its infancy usually end up, in the terrible arithmetic of war, saving more lives than they cost. All this can be a hard lesson to relearn each generation, especially now that we contend with the sirens of the mall, Oprah, and latte. Our affluence and leisure are as antithetical to the use of force as rural life and relative poverty once were catalysts for muscular action. The age-old lure of appeasement—perhaps they will cease with this latest concession, perhaps we provoked our enemies, perhaps demonstrations of our future good intentions will win their approval—was never more evident than in the recent Spanish elections, when an affluent European electorate, reeling from the horrific terrorist attack of 3/11, swept from power the pro-U.S. center-right government on the grounds that the mass murders were more the fault of the United States for dragging Spain into the effort to remove fascists and implant democracy in Iraq than of the primordial al-Qaidist culprits, who long ago promised the Western and Christian Iberians ruin for the Crusades and the Reconquista.

#### Militarism is key to leadership and preserving order to check those who threaten the world order

David Brooks 01, a Canadian-born American political and cultural commentator who writes for The New York Times, “Age of conflict,” November 5, 2001, https://www.weeklystandard.com/david-brooks/the-age-of-conflict

Obviously nobody knows what the future years will feel like, but we do know that the next decade will have a central feature that was lacking in the last one: The next few years will be defined by conflict. And it's possible to speculate about what that means. The institutions that fight for us and defend us against disorder -- the military, the FBI, the CIA -- will seem more important and more admirable. The fundamental arguments won't be over economic or social issues, they will be over how to wield power -- whether to use American power aggressively or circumspectly. We will care a lot more about ends -- winning the war -- than we will about means. We will debate whether it is necessary to torture prisoners who have information about future biological attacks. We will destroy innocent villages by accident, shrug our shoulders, and continue fighting. In an age of conflict, bourgeois virtues like compassion, tolerance, and industriousness are valued less than the classical virtues of courage, steadfastness, and a ruthless desire for victory. […continues…] But now violence has come calling. Now it is no longer possible to live so comfortably in one's own private paradise. Shocked out of the illusion of self-reliance, most of us realize that we, as individuals, simply cannot protect ourselves. **Private life requires public protection.** Now it is not possible to ignore foreign affairs, because foreign affairs have not ignored us. It has become clear that we are living in a world in which **hundreds of millions** of people hate us, and some small percentage of them **want to destroy us**. That realization is bound to have cultural effects. In the first place, we will probably become more conscious of our American-ness. During the blitz in 1940, George Orwell sat in his bomb shelter and wrote an essay called "England Your England." It opened with this sentence: "As I write, highly civilised human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me." What struck him at that moment of danger was that it really does matter whether you are English or German. The nation is a nursemaid that breeds certain values and a certain ethos. Orwell went on to describe what it meant to be English. Now Americans are being killed simply because they are Americans. Like Orwell, Americans are once again becoming aware of themselves as a nationality, not just as members of some ethnic community or globalized Internet chat group. Americans have been reminded that, despite what the multiculturalists have been preaching, not all cultures are wonderfully equal hues in the great rainbow of humanity. Some national cultures, the ones that have inherited certain ideas -- about freedom and democracy, the limits of the political claims of religion, the importance of tolerance and dissent -- are more humane than other civilizations, which reject those ideas. As criticism of our war effort grows in Europe, in hostile Arab countries, and in two-faced countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which dislike our principles but love our dollars, Americans will have to articulate a defense of our national principles and practices. That debate in itself will shape American culture. We will begin to see ourselves against the backdrop of the Taliban. During the Cold War, we saw ourselves in contrast to the Soviet Union. Back then, we faced a godless foe; now we are facing a god-crazed foe. As we recoil from the Islamic extremists, we may be less willing to integrate religion into political life. That would mean trouble for faith-based initiatives and religion in the public square. On the other hand, democracies tend to become patriotic during wartime, if history is any guide, and this will drive an even deeper wedge between regular Americans and the intellectual class. Literary critic Paul Fussell, a great student of American culture in times of war, wrote a book, Wartime, on the cultural effects of World War II. Surveying the culture of that period, he endorsed the view of historian Eileen Sullivan, who wrote, "There was **no room** in this war culturefor **individual opinions** or personalities, **no freedom of dissent or approval**; the culture was homogeneous, shallow and boring." […continues…] Don't make the mistake of interpreting the events of Sept. 11 purely in terms of terrorism and murder. . . . The terrorists are a virulent subset of a much larger group of anticapitalists, one that includes many politicians, bureaucrats, writers, media types, academics, entertainers, trade unionists and, at times, church leaders. The barbarians at the gates are more numerous than you thought. But the most important cultural effect of conflict is that it breeds a certain bloody-mindedness or, to put it more grandly, a tragic view of life. Life in times of war and recession reminds us of certain hard truths that were easy to ignore during the decade of peace and prosperity. Evil exists. Difficulties, even tragedies, are inevitable. Human beings are flawed creatures capable of monstrosity. Not all cultures are compatible. To preserve order, good people must exercise power over destructive people. That means that it's no longer sufficient to deconstruct ideas and texts and signifiers. You have to be able to **construct hard principles so you can move from one idea to the next**, because when you are faced with the problem of repelling evil, you absolutely must be able to reach a conclusion on serious moral issues. This means you need to think in moral terms about force -- and to be tough-minded. During the Cold War, Reinhold Niebuhr was a major intellectual figure. In 1952, he wrote The Irony of American History. The tragedy of the conflict with communism, he argued, was that, "though confident of its virtue, [America] must yet hold atomic bombs ready for use so as to prevent a possible **world conflagration**." The irony of our history, he continued, is that we are an idealistic nation that dreams of creating a world of pure virtue, yet in defeating our enemies we sometimes have to act in ways that are not pure. "We take, and must continue to take, morally hazardous action to preserve our civilization," Niebuhr wrote. "We must exercise our power." We have to do so while realizing that we will not be capable of perfect disinterestedness when deciding which actions are just. We will be influenced by dark passions. But we still have to act forcefully because our enemies are trying to **destroy** the basis of civilization: "We are drawn into an historic situation in which the paradise of our domestic security is suspended in a hell of global insecurity." Niebuhr's prescription was humble hawkishness. He believed the United States should forcefully defend freedom and destroy its enemies. But while doing so, it should seek forgiveness for the horrible things it might have to do in a worthy cause. To reach this graduate-school level of sophistication, you have to have passed through elementary courses in moral reasoning. It will be interesting to see whether we Americans, who sometimes seem unsure of even the fundamental moral categories, can educate ourselves sufficiently to engage in the kind of moral reasoning that Niebuhr did. The greatest political effect of this period of conflict will probably be to relegitimize central institutions. Since we can't defend ourselves as individuals against terrorism, we have to rely on the institutions of government: the armed forces, the FBI, the CIA, the CDC, and so on. We are now only beginning to surrender some freedoms, but we will trade in more, and willingly. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, "Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. . . . To be more safe, [people] at length become willing to run the risk of being less free." Moreover, we will see power migrate from the states and Capitol Hill to the White House. "It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority," Hamilton continued. This creates rifts on both left and right, because both movements contain anti-establishment elements hostile to any effort to relegitimize central authorities. The splits have been most spectacular on the left. Liberals who work in politics -- Democrats on Capitol Hill, liberal activists, academics who are interested in day-to-day politics -- almost all support President Bush and the war effort. But many academic and literary leftists, ranging from Eric Foner to Susan Sontag to Noam Chomsky, have been sour, critical, and contemptuous of America's response to September 11. The central difference is that the political liberals are comfortable with power. They want power themselves and do not object to the central institutions of government, even the military, exercising power on our behalf. Many literary and academic liberals, on the other hand, have built a whole moral system around powerlessness. They champion the outgroups. They stand with the victims of hegemony, patriarchy, colonialism, and all the other manifestations of central authority. Sitting on their campuses, they are powerless themselves, and have embraced a delicious, self-glorifying identity as the out-manned sages who alone can see through the veils of propaganda in which the powerful hide their oppressive schemes. For these thinkers, virtue inheres in the powerless. The weak are sanctified, not least because they are voiceless and allegedly need academics to give them voices. These outgroup leftists dislike the Taliban, but to ally themselves with American power would be to annihilate everything they have stood for and the role they have assigned themselves in society. […continues…] For Bush, the leader of the free world, the issue is terrorism, not street crime. But now he too is engaged in the effort to restore order so that people can go about their lives. He is the one rounding up the posse, forsaking social issues and other moral debates for a straightforward act of international prosecution. He is reasserting authority to show that under Pax Americana, the world is governable. […continues…] But history never repeats itself neatly. No one can predict the political and cultural consequences of a war, any more than the course of the war itself. But it does seem clear that we have moved out of one political and cultural moment and into another. We have traded the anxieties of affluence for the real fears of war. We have moved from an age of peace to an age of conflict, and in times of conflict people are different. They go to extremes. Some people, and some nations, turn cowardly or barbaric. Other people, and other nations, become heroic, brave, and steadfast. It all depends on what they have in them. War isn't only, as Bourne said, the health of the state. It's the gut-check of the nation.

### Securitization Turn

#### New security frameworks and a move away from securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

Tara **McCormack, ’10**, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states **a more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful sta**tes**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

### Interventionism Good Turn

#### US interventionism is good – it’s the only alternative to mass death.

Rieff 99 (David, World Policy Institute, New York Institute for the Humanities and Council on Foreign Relations, Summer, “A New Age of Liberal Imperialism?” World Policy Journal, Vol XVI No 2, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/rieff2.html)

Finessing the Disaster And yet in Kosovo (this had almost happened in Bosnia), the West was finally hoist on the petard of its own lip service to the categorical imperative of human rights. It was ashamed not to intervene, but it lacked the will to do so with either vision or coherence. Kosovo is probably a lost cause; it is certainly ruined for a generation, whatever eventual deal is worked out, as Bosnia, whose future is to be a ward of NATO, America, and the European Union, probably for decades, has also been ruined for a generation, Dayton or no Dayton. What remains are the modalities through which this disaster can be finessed, and its consequences mitigated. It is to be hoped that in the wake of Kosovo, the realization that this kind of geo-strategic frivolity and ad hoc-ism, this resolve to act out of moral paradigms that now command the sympathy but do not yet command the deep allegiance of Western public opinion-at least not to the extent that people are willing to sacrifice in order to see that they are upheld-will no longer do. To say this is not to suggest that there are any obvious alternatives. Even if one accepts more of its premises than I do, the human rights perspective clearly is insufficient. As for the United Nations, it has been shown to be incapable of playing the dual role of both succoring populations at risk while simultaneously acting like a colonial power and imposing some kind of order and rebuilding civic institutions. The important Third World countries seem to have neither the resources nor the ideological inclination to intervene even in their own regions, as Africa's failure to act in Rwanda in 1994 demonstrated so painfully. The conclusion is inescapable. At the present time, only the West has both the power and, however intermittently, the readiness to act. And by the West, one really means the United States. Obviously, to say that America could act effectively if it chose to do so as, yes, the world's policeman of last resort, is not the same thing as saying that it should. Those who argue, as George Kennan has done, that we overestimate ourselves when we believe we can right the wrongs of the world, must be listened to seriously. So should the views of principled isolationists. And those on what remains of the left who insist that the result of such a broad licensing of American power will be a further entrenchment of America's hegemony over the rest of the world are also unquestionably correct. What Is to Be Done But the implications of not doing anything are equally clear. Those who fear American power are-this is absolutely certain-condemning other people to death. Had the U.S. armed forces not set up the air bridge to eastern Zaire in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, hundreds of thousands of people would have perished, rather than the tens of thousands who did die. This does not excuse the Clinton administration for failing to act to stop the genocide militarily; but it is a fact. And analogous situations were found in Bosnia and even, for all its failings, in the operation in Somalia.

### Perm Solvency – Movements

#### Only the perm solves – movements fail without showing credible political alternatives, and their anti-reformist ideological purity prevents true democracy.

Teivainen 5 [Teivo Teivainen, professor of World Politics at the University of Helsinki, “The World Social Forum: Arena or Actor?”, Chapter 11 in Charting transnational democracy : beyond global arrogance / edited by Janie Leatherman and Julie Webber, 2005, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781403981080]

Being anti-something can be politically useful, but only up to a point. The protesters of Seattle and similar events have been very effective in pointing out authoritarian aspects of the capitalist world-system. Even if various groups that have participated in these events do have programmatic statements for alternative futures, the way these events have been staged has not been very conducive in showing these futures to the world. The criticism of not being able to show a credible alternative, or any alternative at all, has become a problem for the legitimacy of the protest movements.

In most of the post-Seattle events, the protesters have often been labeled as “antiglobalization,” and some of them have used the expression themselves. 24 It would, however, be analytically faulty and politically unwise to simply define the movements as being against globalization, if the term is understood as the increasing transgression of nation-state borders on a worldwide level. Many of them are, I would claim, looking for a different kind of globalization, though some may prefer to use the older term internationalism. From a democratic perspective, the problem in some antiglobalization rhetoric is that one easily ends up with rather strange bedfellows. Professing antiglobalization pure and simple is not very helpful in terms of making a distinction between regulating the cross-border movements of speculative capital and those of black immigrants.

Outra globalização (another globalization) is an expression that has been emphasized by some of the key organizers of the Porto Alegre meetings (Grzybowski 1998; de Souza Santos 2001). Despite their insistence, the mass media in many parts of Latin America often talks of antiglobalization activists when referring to both Porto Alegre and some of the events inspired by it. The February 2001 protests related to a WEF regional meeting in Mexico and the March 2001 marches around the Inter- American Development Bank meeting in Santiago de Chile were the first big globalization-related protest events in Latin America after the first WSF, and the media coverage of them often referred to the Porto Alegre event as an important moment in the antiglobalization struggles.25

For those who want to argue for the possibility of a different kind of globalization, the risk of ending up with strange bedfellows is by no means absent. It is not always easy to see the differences, if any, of the “alternative” globalization proposals with the idea of many business leaders that some democratization is necessary in order to make the global expansion of capitalism acceptable (Falk and Strauss 2001). Those who cling to antiglobalization discourse are often right when they claim that the alternative globalization strategies would only lead to very moderate changes. Often, but not always.

It is frequently assumed that in the anti/alternative divide of globalization debates, being “anti” represents more radical and revolutionary options, whereas the “alternatives” are on the side of more superficial reforms. In terms of thinking about how to democratize the world, this assumption is not very helpful. Within the alternative globalization specter, it is possible to find and even easier to imagine such political projects that strive for a globalization that radically transforms the world. While antiglobalization people can be pro-capitalist, pro-globalization people may be anticapitalist.

Some of the debate and divide between the “anti” and the “alternative” is due to confused semantics or distorted categorizations. In order to fundamentally democratize the world, people who have chosen to regard globalization as a term that has been too polluted by its dominant usage and those who think it can still be given more progressive meanings can often work together. In principle, the WSF offers many opportunities for this to happen.